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PREFACE
Except for the Civil War, probably no other period of American 
History has been covered so extensively by writers as has the New Deal era 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, It Is mot the Intention or presumption 
of this thesis to re-cover that period in detail# What is intended is to 
cover the editorial writings of James E. Lawrence In the Lincoln (Nebraska) 
Star as he explained and defended the New Deal Programs.
% am very much indebted to my advisor, Dr# Boy M. Bobbins, who has 
been patient, tolerant, and understanding as t worked to complete my grad­
uate studies# X owe a debt of thanks to Dr. A# Stanley ftickett and the 
Graduate Council of the University of Omaha for their cooperation, the 
Librarians and staffs of the following Libraries have been most helpful 
in the use of facilities and source material for this thesis: The Franklin 
D« Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New Fork; The Nebraska State Historical 
Society Library, Lincoln, Nebraska; The Gene Epply Library, University of 
Omaha; and The Love Memorial Library, University of Nebraska.
Most of all, I give special thanks to my wife, Frances, for her 
support and understanding during my long years of off-duty efforts toward 
higher education# Without her cooperation and encouragement t could never 
have arrived at this point#
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
Nineteen-thirty began a difficult tan years far the people of the 
United States. After helping win "the war ta end all wars" and exper­
iencing the sWhilsrating financial boom of the twenties, the dismal 
depression of 1929 plunged the nation to the bottom of its economic and 
emotional barrel. It was an experience which seemed to sap the people9s 
will to survive. To the public President Hoover and the Republican- 
controlled Congress were unable to take any action which would start the 
country back on the long uphill road to recovery.
At the same time reports were coming out of Albany, New York, 
about a man who was taking action during those trying times. Although 
a cripple who could not physically climb himself, he was furnishing the 
program and the leadership to help that state return to the top of the 
hill. This ability to give positive leadership plus an apparent com­
passion for and rapport with the people gained Franklin D. Roosevelt 
the presidency. For many citizens he supplied the answers to every 
problem —  personal as well as public.
In Nebraska, not all people were impressed with Roosevelt. Many 
of the state newspapers were frankly anti-New Deal.3* Of those papers 
friendly to the administration, the strongest was The Lincoln Star.  ^As 
its editor, James E. Lawrence championed Roosevelt and the New Deal in 
its entirety. He kept his readers informed of each aspect of the program
'hftiese Included the Nebraska State Journal and the Omaha Bee,
2James C. Olson, History of Nebraska (Lincoln: diversity of 
Nebraska Frees, 1955), 319,
and explained how it would benefit Nebraska and the country.3 Lawrence, 
a native of Beatrice, Nebraska, graduated from the University of Nebr­
aska in 1911 with a Bachelor of Laws degree# He never practiced law —  
Journalism was his life’s vocation and love* One of his co-workers com­
mented: "The newspaper was his very life . . .  He was on the Job seven
days a week."* He was a reporter for the Star from 1906 to 1911 and then
city editor, managing editor, and editor from 1911 until his death in 1957* 
He wrote all of the editorials, even while away on trips. Thus, the edi­
torials often read like speeches because he usually dictated them.
Lawrence was a registered Democrat3 and a political liberal —  
both rate philosophies in Republican Nebraska.6 Always active in the 
state party activities he was mentioned as a candidate for office several 
times but chose to remain a newspaperman* For him, "the opportunities of 
informing the people * . * and of public service through editorials made
the newspaper a calling, not a job*" He was an adviser to both
3Xh August, 1938, Roosevelt wrote George Norris that an editorial 
by Lawrence was nso clear and so convincing that the average boy and girl 
could understand it.” Elliott Roosevelt <ed), F» D. R* i His Personal 
Letters (4 vols.; H.Y.s Duel, Sloan and Pearce, 1947-1950), IF, 629.
^Editorial, The Lincoln Evening Journal. September 17, 1957.
^Lancaster County Election Commissioner. Telephone interview, 
February 3, 1964, revealed that Lawrence was a registered Democrat as 
far back as 1924*
%atil 1930 the Democrats had been able to elect only four Governors 
and controlled almost as few state legislatures. The Nebraska Blue Book. 
1930 (Lincoln: Nebraska Legislative Reference Bureau, 1930), 22-23, Here­
after cited as Blue Book 19XX.
TThe Lincoln Evening Journal. September 17, 1957.
Roosevelt and Truman during their administrations and he managed two 
Senatorial campaigns for George W. Norris# He did much for Nebraska 
as a member of the state advisory boards for the Foblie Works Admini­
stration and the Farm Security Administration. With such a background 
of education* associations, and experiences* James Lawrence was con­
sidered by many as a leader of Nebraskans#®
the objective of this thesis is to present the editorial comments 
of James Lawrence in the Lincoln Star regarding the first four years of 
the Roosevelt administration* Because he mainly concerned himself with 
those programs affecting Nebraska directly, only domestic issues will 
be considered,
8Sara M. Baldwin (ed*), Who1a Who in Lincoln (Lincoln: Robert M. 
Baldwin, 1928), 136* Article in the Lincoln Journal, September 17,
1957* Editorial* the Lincoln Evening Journal, September 17, 1957*
(The Lincoln Journal was a morning paper, the Evening Journal an evening 
paper at that time* Both were published by the Journal Publishing Co;
J. C* Seacrest, President.)
CHAPTER XX 
POLITICS
Franklin Roosevelt did not have to become a politician,9 Hie 
background and education were suited to the production of a country 
gentlemen* not the spawning of a political crusader. An only child 
of wealthy parents, he attended Groton as a matter of course. The 
curriculum had little to offer a politician. Xt was heavy with Ian* 
guageB, and the only History taught was European. While a student at 
Harvard he was known as a playboy and took little interest in his 
studies* After graduating in 1904 Roosevelt decided to study law and 
live in Hew York City as a student and clerk. This did not prevent 
him from spending much time at his mother * s Hyde Park estate. Xt was 
from there that he entered politics In 1910 as a candidate for the 
State Senate.
The campaign was a success and he retained the seat until his 
appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in 1913. During his 
senatorial service he gained the basic political experiences which 
helped him in later campaigns. His tour with the Department of the Navy 
afforded him a grasp of the^political context of public administra­
tion."1^  Both tours gave him prominence in the Democratic party*which 
won for him the second place on the ill-fated Democratic national slate 
in 1920. But in that election the country rejected Cox and voted over*
^Frances Perkins wrote that his entering the campaign in 1910 had 
been a "stunt" and an "accident." The Roosevelt 1 Knew { N.Y.: The 
Viking Press, 1946), 28.
lOjames H. Burns* Rooseveltf The Lion and the Pox ( N.Y. s Harcourt 
Brace and Co., 1956)* 68. Hereafter cited as, The Lion mid The Pox.
whelm!ngly for a return to normalcy.
After such a disaeterous defeat and the attack of polio in 1921, 
he retired to quiet country life. But while attempting to restore his 
physical self, he never retired. In 1924 he attended the Democratic 
national convention and proposed A1 Smith as the Presidential nominee 
with his “Happy Warrior'1 speech. ^
In 1920 Smith was successful in gaining the nomination and he 
asked Roosevelt to run for Governor of Hew York so as to holster the 
national ticket. The rift between the “modern David and Jonathan" 
may have begun when Roosevelt won while Smith did not carry Hew York 
or the nation.Roosevelt was a hard working Governor and attempted 
to- counteract within, the state 'the adverse effects of -the national 
disaster of depression. His actions, coupled with his political 
history and name made him a prime contender to be the Democratic 
s tandardbearer in 1932.
I
IN SEARCH OF A CHANGE, 1932 
The race for the Democratic Presidential nomination was wide open in 
1932. There was every indication that the party would win so everyone 
sought the post. A1 Smith, once defeated but undismayed had the back* 
lag of the Tammany machine. Influential California and Texas were pledged 
to Speaker of the House, John Garner of Texas. Newton Baker, Wilson's
lllbid.. 14*16, 29-76, passim. *2Star. January 28* 1932
13a»j<t.
Secretary of War, and Maryland * s Governor Albert Ritchie were strong
dark horses. Even "Alfalfa Bill" Murray, maverick Governor of Oklahoma,
was making a try for the nomination. Roosevelt formally became a
candidate in January, 1932, by a letter to the secretary of the North
Dakota Democratic Committee, accepting the filing made on his behalf
in the state preferential primary. He stated that he was a progressive.
On the same day, January 23, the Alaskan Democratic convention instructed
16its six delegates to vote for Roosevelt.
In a Star editorial on January 25, 1932, Franklin Roosevelt's 
name was mentioned for the first time as a presidential contender. In 
glowing terms he was favorably compared to his cousin "Teddy". Regard­
ing his polio attack, the comment was made that no man-given test could 
equal the trials which nature had placed upon him* Because he was able 
to overcome such a condition, it was contended that Roosevelt deserved 
the attention he was receiving and was a man to watch
In March an editorial reported that Roosevelt had won three tests 
of strength which was apparently a validation of the forecast made of his 
potential as presidential material. He had won contests in the East, the 
Mid-West, and the Old South. "No man In the last thrity-two years, not 
even including Woodrow Wilson . . . has captured so completely the 
imagination of the democratic party," was the editor's opinion. This 
success was not completely due to Roosevelt's personality and record,
James A. Farley, Jim Farley's Story. The Roosevelt Years (N. Y.f 
Whittlesey Bouse, 1949), 13* Hereafter cited as Jim Farley's Story.
15Star, January 25, 1932.
7Lawrence admitted* the American people were demanding a change la a 
administration and they resolved that nothing should deadlock the con­
vention and give Hoover the election by default.***
Nebraska joined the Democratic tide in April, 1932* In a three­
sided contest between Roosevelt, Gamer, and Hurray, Roosevelt received 
nearly twice as many votes as the other two combined. Lawrence did not 
find it difficult to explain Nebraska's preference for Roosevelt* The 
people were ‘’weary and nauseated11 with the manner in which the government 
was being conducted* They did not want to lose that which they had gained 
by their own efforts* As for Roosevelt, they admired his courage and 
fighting heart and they liked his views on national problems. The vote 
was not merely a protest but also a mandate to the Democratic convention. 
The formerly "dispirited minority" party in the state was prophesied to 
become a "rampant, irresistable majority” in November.*^
That rampant majority was the "forgotten man" to which Roosevelt 
referred in his speech at Albany, New York, April 7, 1932.*® In review­
ing the speech the editor wrote that it was the first time a prominent 
person had talked about the consumer who after all was the foundation of 
the nation's prosperity. Washington had concerned Itself far too long 
with Big Business* When Roosevelt said that the Hoover recovery efforts
16Ibid.. March 24, 1932. 17Ibld.. April 13, 1932.
^The text of this speech nay he found in The Public Papers and
Addresses of Franklin P. Roosevelt. Samuel I. Rosenman (comp.) (13 vols.; 
N.Y.: Random House, 1938-1950), I, 624-627. Hereafter cited as Rosenman, 
Papers.
were of a temporary nature and started the recovery program from the 
top down instead of from the bottom up, Lawrence agreed* He added that 
it was time to think more of small business than of big business* The 
nation would be ostrich-like if it did not acknowledge and act on the 
problems of that forgotten man* "What a tragic departure from American 
Ideals and American traditions has taken place in these last twelve 
years," he concluded*3£
During the spring Lawrence noted that several prominent Republi­
can fighters for the forgotten man had crossed over the the Roosevelt 
side* To him, the announcement of such support by Nebraska Senator 
George Norris "removed some of the sting" of Roosevelt's setbacks in 
Massachusetts and California* It was predicted that many Nebraskans 
would be glad to ride with the "outstanding leader of liberal thought 
in America « • * behind the banners of Franklin Roosevelt." Senator 
William Borah of Idaho, "the least likely" to defect, announced In June 
that he could not support Hoover* This was after he had attended the 
Republican convention at Chicago.20
Editor Lawrence also attended that convention. Under the title, 
"A Disappointing Convention," he wrote back that his first reaction to 
the pre-convention activities was disgust. The loud attempts to instill 
life into an otherwise dull assembly alienated many of the delegates.
Be did consider that the program was emblematic of Hoover, his personal­
ity, and his administration. "Subdued but efficient," and "thoroughly
*9Star. April 8, 1932. 20ibid#, May 7, June 21, 1932.
mechanical” were the words he used to describe the convention. "What
It lacked in human tone, it made up in organization,” he reported.^*
He wrote a graphic description of the reading of the platform
and Its reception by the delegates: "We sat listening to that long
document* one of the longest in the party's history* and not a single
burst of applause or handclapping interrupted the tedious reading of
the document." He summed up the entire proceedings as
. . . the most amazing puzzle of a convention which throughout 
Its entire deliberation was a continuous atmosphere of bafflement 
and futility. Here was a great party assembled in a critical 
period of national history. It was as cold* as lifeless and 
as dead as the grave. ^
In contrast to the funeral air of the Republican convention* 
Lawrence reported on the thrills of the Democratic meeting in the same 
city. After a stirring keynote speech by Senator Alben Barkley* he left 
the hall with the message still ringing in his ears. In a park he heard 
a soap box orator her ranging a crowd, telling them that the Republicans 
and Democrats were exactly alike. "But evidently he (the soap box 
orator) did not hear Keynoter Dickinson and Keynoter Barkley. Ihey aren’t 
alike," he declared*^
Ihe preparation for the convention had been a full-time job for 
Roosevelt’s political aide, James Farley. His efforts included direct
21Ibld.. June 15, 18, 1932. 22Ibld.- June 21, 1932.
22lbld., June 22, 1932. James Farley wrote that "the Republicans 
had met in apprehension that defeat was just around the comer. In con­
trast* the Democrats met with joyous enthusiasm of crusaders." Farley*
Jim Farlev’s Storv. 14.
310
personal contacts with the local party workers, bypassing the archaic 
and cumbersome committee pyramid system* there was behind-the-scenes 
maneuvering for key positions on convention committees and for the posi­
tion of keynote speaker* Farley admitted that the biggest problem of 
the campaign was A1 Smith* the party faithful waited mid asked, "What 
will A1 dot”24
In February* 1932, Lawrence had speculated on ”A1 Smith's Poten­
tial Candidacy*’ and its effect on Roosevelt's chances* He felt that
Roosevelt would be stronger without Smith than with him because this 
would show Roosevelt free of fammany control* Lawrence doubted that 
the convention delegates would "conduct a sham battle among themselves" 
when selecting their candidate* On March 9, 1932, he reported the clean 
sweep of Roosevelt over Smith in Hew Hampshire, a state which had fought 
valiantly for Smith in the past* An analysis of the voting showed that 
Roosevelt not only won the farm and small town votes as expected but 
surprised many by breaking even in the urban areas* this victory should 
give the Roosevelt forces new confidence, Lawrence felt, although it 
Would also center the fire of the full field on FDR*^
The editor was the first to admit that the field of possible
candidates was not lacking in able men* He agreed, however, with Mark 
Sullivan who observed that if the Democrats wanted to fight on the basis 
of liberalism vs* conservatism, "Roosevelt was the natural and logical
^Farley, Jim Farley's Story* • ; 15-1$, 29 ; Bums, The Lion
and The Pon, ; 140*
2^Star, February S, March 9, 1932*
candidate of the organisation.,T He was the only one who espoused 
liberalism as a cause* He said that the democratic principle of start­
ing at the bottom and working to the top was not old fashioned and use­
less as the Hoover administration claimed* Lawrence went on to compare 
Roosevelt to Jackson, Lincoln, Cleveland, and Wilson* It was his faith 
in the great American experiment which would make Roosevelt hard to stop 
at the convention.2^
Lawrence believed that Roosevelt used good judgment in remaining 
away from Chicago; his cause was in the hands of his friends*22 By con­
vention time almost every prominent progressive Democrat had announced 
his support of Roosevelt.2** James Farley was not as positive of winning 
as Lawrence* He busily gathered votes during the sessions# He asked 
Sam Rayburn for California's and faxes' votes on the second ballot in 
return for the Vice Presidential nod for Gamer. Rayburn would not pro- 
miee *2^
After the standard program of the convention had run Its course
Farley called for the balloting on the candidates* It was 4:28 A. M.
The first state polled was Alabama* Even though he knew that their 
twenty-four votes were for Roosevelt, Farley "thrilled to the response
2^Ibid.. May 25, 1932* Sullivan was Washington correspondent for 
the Hew York Herald-trlbune and confident of Hoover and later Roosevelt*
27Ibld.. June 22, 1932.
2®Wllllani E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin P. Roosevelt and the Sew 
Deal 1932-1940 (Torchbook edition; N.Y*: Harper and Row, Publishers, 
Inc., 1963), 4. Hereafter cited as FDR and the Hew Deal.
29Farley, Jim Farley's Story. 20
. . . weariness and exhaustion were forgotten."30 when the balloting 
was completed, Roosevelt had 666 1/4 votes to Smith's 201 3/4, Garner 
'had 90 1/4' and the remainder were divided among favorite sons. TWo more 
ballots gained Roosevelt less than twenty votes, and the situation looked 
desperate, "the convention wise men were pronouncing Roosevelt out of 
the picture," Farley recalled.’** That morning the hotel corridors were 
alive with people bargaining for' votes, there were several .accounts of 
how and why the Gamer votes were released to Roosevelt but the impor- 
tant thing for him was that they were released.22
When the convention was called to order that afternoon, the 
fourth ballot was ordered. William McAdoo of California stood up and 
announced that California came to elect, a president, not participate in 
a deadlocked convention. When he cast the forty*four California votes 
for Roosevelt the dam was broken. Except for die-hard Smith men, the 
states rushed to Roosevelt and Farley wrote, "Everyone knew we had just 
■nominated the next fresfdeat of the United States."22
it was two days before Lawrence could write his impressions of 
the final voting, for, he said, "Ear splitting yells from 25,000 throats 
are not conducive to reflection." He called the vote a union of the 
South and West to "rout the Tammany Tiger." "Tammany Loses Again" was
30Jkii-. 2i 311iM.
32Leuchtenburg, FPR and the Hew Deal. 7,8; Farley, Jim
FmMM'js § m z *  *3.
3%arley, Jim Farley's Story. 25. Another account of the con­
vention may be found in Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt The-Triumph 
{Boston* Little, Brown and Company, 1956), 291-311.
the title of his editorial 0 0 July t when, he first reported Roosevelt * s 
nomination. Re continued the editorial with a description of the "in­
spiring scene" when Roosevelt appeared to make his speech of acceptance1
He cane in and he revealed the thing which we hoped would show 
itself immediately. He was moved **** profoundly stirred by 
the sea of faces, then his face was lighted hy a glorious smile 
—  a smile which both heartens hy Its strength and attracts by 
its warmth. 3^
Lawrence was sure that Roosevelt1 s appearance answered the rumors 
and whispers which had been voiced about his health. The acceptance 
speech set the tempo for the campaign —  action! Re said that the cam­
paign would start that very night. Lawrence felt that this gave the 
convention "confidence in its own decision to nominate him." The speech 
was a hopeful document which expressed the thoughts of the American 
people. Linking Roosevelt to the great Democratic leaders of the past, 
Lawrence wrote that the speech
. . .  had something Wilsonian in its flaming devotion to idealism 
and yet it had the practical flavor of Grover Cleveland in its 
conception of the responsibilities of public office. It had the 
scholarly, philosophical Jeffersonian blend and, at times, it 
revealed a fighting note reminiscent of the public documents of 
Andrew Jackson.
The Presidential nominee sent the delegates home as a "united, enthus­
iastic legion to battle for a new era in the life of the American people."3 
The Democrats came home and began the job of electing Roosevelt.
It was not too difficult a problem. The Kansas City Star, always ardently 
Republican and a spokesman for the President, was quoted by Lawrence as 
being disenchanted with Hoover’s relief program. The paper said that the
33gtar, July 4, 1932. 35Xbld.
14
program probably saved the banka and the railroads bat the Kansas farmer 
could not tell that the benefits were seeping down to him.. He -was not 
afraid of the return to liberalism which Roosevelt demanded. He was in 
favor of it. Lawrence admitted that this was unite a confession for so 
Strong a Republican paper to make. He did feel that it reflected the true 
picture of Americans, except for those living in large cities and for
big business.36
Gf course the Republicans were not counting themselves out of the 
contest. Secretary of the treasury Ogden Kills made a speech stating that 
the Democratic nominee had no economic program to offer. In an editorial 
titled ’’Where Ho We go from Here,” Lawrence called Kills an "artful 
dodger.” After the past two years of misery and distress, Kills ashed 
that the Republicans be retained in power just because the opposition 
had no program, the Democrats would welcome the announcement that the 
campaign would be fought "in the trenches of economics." She editor 
continued with a review of the financial programs of the three Republican 
presidents, summed up by the phrase, "let big business prosper even if it 
was necessary to exterminate small business." Well, the "big boys" 
were no smarter than the "little ones" and now they were all in the same 
boat. Roosevelt had challenged the nation to find the answer.37
Roosevelt challenged the nation again in a speech from Hollywood 
in September. Lawrence tried to distill the issues of the campaign in 
m  editorial on that speech.
36Jbid., July 11, 1932. 37Ibid.. July 12, 1932.
15
Roosevelt said that the "best minds" did not always produce the greatest 
good tor humanity. Because of inherent selfishness man attempted to re* 
duce others to virtual economic slavery. Hoover, meanwhile, was saying 
that the “best minds*' would produce the best good for all if left un­
fettered by controls. Lawrence equated these two views on government to 
Jefferson on the one hand and Hamilton on the other. The refection of 
the Hamiltonian theory permitted the progress of the country in the past
and he believed it should be repudiated again so that people could have
"A Better World to Live In."^
An editorial on September 29, 1932, reported the names of several 
Liberal Republicans who had decided that Roosevelt could create this 
better world. When such liberal leaders as Clyde Reed of Kansas, Hiram 
Johnson of California, and Senator Bronson Cutting of New Mexico cut across 
party lines, it Indicated the contest was not between Republicans and Dem­
ocrats but liberals and conservatives. "it is a war against favoritism and 
privilege in Government," Lawrence said. This transformation of former 
enemies into supporters was Roosevelt's greatest triumph.^ As one of 
those former "enemies" George Norris was later to tell newsmen that he 
had no regrets for bolting his party in 1932. The country was drifting
3**Ibid., September 26, 1932. Lawrence wrote editorials on other
campaign speeches. These are covered by subject matter.
39jMd., September 29, 1932. Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin was 
another defector. Arthur M. Schleslnger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old 
Order (Vol. 1 of The Age of Roosevelt. 3 vols.; Boston; The Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1957-1960), 417.
on the verge of dissolution. Something needed to be done or the nation
40would face utter ruin. Roosevelt seemed to present the program.
On November 8, 2932, almost twenty-three million Americans in- 
d lea ted that they too believed FDR had the program for their problems. 
The Democrats also secured control of both branches of Congress. Hoover 
received sixteen million votes.^ In Nebraska, Roosevelt carried the 
st«te 359,082 Co Hoover*. 201,177.42 This landslide, Lawrence wroCe Che 
next day, obliterated sectionalism as it roiled from the Atlantic to 
the Pacific. He recounted the items which had helped produce the vie- 
tory and listed as the chief one, the people's loss of confidence in 
the Government. America had passed through a great bloodless revolution 
—  "That is a triumph for democracy.” Now America could face a new 
day, united toward a common purpose.^
As an indication of that spirit of unity, Lawrence was happy to 
report that Roosevelt would choose his cabinet members without reference 
to geographical or political lines. It was a most refreshing attitude 
and revealed his inherent sense of honesty and integrity. Roosevelt had
faith in the traditions of our country.** And yet he had a desire to get
i
AA
Quoted by Lawrence in a Star editorial, June 27, 1934.
41Richard B, Morris (ed.), Encyclopedia of American History 
(N.Y.: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 29617, 340-41.
42Blue Book 1932 . 499. Roosevelt carried all but two Nebraska 
counties and for the first time in sixteen years, the Democrats elected
their entire state ticket. Olson, History of Nebraska. 305.
*^Star. November 9, 1932. **Ibid», December 20, 1932.
17
things done, in February he took the politically unprecedented action
of asking for the power to revise the Government structure with a view to
cutting expenses so that the budget would balance. Even if the action 
aroused opposition and deposed office-holders, Lawrence knew that these 
measures more than filled the bill of providing for a new deal.*^
in asking for this revisionary power, Roosevelt was asking for the 
cooperation and support of Congress. Lawrence was concerned that this 
would be the real challenge for Roosevelt —  a congress which was jealous 
of its own power. Having been out of control for twelve years and having
won by such a margin, they might feel inclined to remind the President
that they were co-ordinate branches, meant to check each other. Lawrence 
had faith that Roosevelt, through his courage, boldness, and leadership 
ability, would be able to rally Congress behind him after he came into 
office.*6
On inauguration day Lawrence wrote that Roosevelt came into office 
at a difficult time —  "Yet [he came] . . . to his post calmly, courage­
ously, and confidently.” It was not to be the end of the democracy be­
cause a new glowing chapter would be written. Roosevelt placed his hand 
on the Bible and gave his oath to lead the people "back to the highway of 
well being • • How well he conducted the march would determine whether 
his program would be allowed to continue by electing of sympathetic 
legislators to Congress in 1934.
43Ibld.. February 10, 1933.
47Ibid.. March 4, 1933,
46Ibld.. February 11, 1933.
THE WORK tS JUST BEGUN, 1934
The lusty Infant of 1934 promises to he a most precocious 
youngster. Upon his shoulders rests the task of converting 
the doubting Thomases to the new order of things in America.
That is a job from which even a full-grown man might shy.
This is the opening paragraph of the Star1s New Years editorial for 1934.
In the editorial, Lawrence reiterated the events of the ten months since 
Roosevelt's inauguration. There had been measurable results from the pro­
gram which the Chief Executive had presented and the Congress had approved* 
The people once again believed in themselves and their Government, wrote 
the editor.
The question west were the changes made in the first year of the 
administration to be permanent? Lawrence felt that 1934 would see some 
more changes as Roosevelt asked for corrective action on some of his pro­
grams which had developed flaws* But the fundamental principles of the 
changes made in 1933 would remain unaltered, Americans had faith in the 
sincere idealist in the White House* He was the first President, wrote 
Lawrence, who admitted that he could make mistakes and the first to per­
iodically report his stewardship to the people. The editor saw no reason 
why the new year could not be viewed with optimism.*6 The fact that it was 
an election year did not seem to concern the editor.
At all levels, the election of 1934 had national overetones. Each 
candidate for office attempted to identify himself with the Roosevelt 
administration, or dammed it in his campaigning, Whether the candidate
48gtar. January 1, 2934
was Republican or Democrat did not seom to matter; how he stood on the 
New Deal determined his chances of election. In fact, there was even 
talk that year of a political re-alignment in the United States. The 
editor described two views that were prevalent.
John G. Maher, who Was, the editor said, an experienced political 
leader, foresaw a split in both parties. Liberal Republicans and Demo­
crats would join together against the united conservatives of both parties, 
This particular split was not a new thing. The editor recalled that in 
the Eighties and Nintles, and again in 2912, the progressives in both par­
ties tried to cooperate, Lawrence ascribed the Democratic victory in 
2932 to the uniting liberals and moderate conservatives of both parties 
behind Roosevelt, Another type of split was that predicted by Senator J. 
Ham Lewis of Illinois. Be said that the two-party system would be re­
placed by bloc groups, similar to French and pre-Hitler German politics.
The editor hoped that this would not take place; the governmental prob­
lems of both France and Germany resulted from this type of political divi- 
alon.49
Lawrence commented that even as he was writing, Republican liber­
als were trying to oust the conservative Harding-Goolidge-Hoover group 
from control of the party. In the Democratic party, he could report, the 
President was in complete control. There were a mere handful who opposed 
the Chief Executive, In addition to this solidarity within the Democratic 
party, Lawrence felt that there was another reason the predicted re-align- 
ment would not take places The business man "who forms the bulwark of
*9lbld,, January 27, February 12, 1934.
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conservative thinking" had changed; he had become more liberal and 
social-minded during the last year*
The editor wee pleased to report that Roosevelt did not go by 
party lines* In a speech at Tale University, the President was frank 
to admit that he could not tell the party affiliations of most of his 
responsible people, "and it is a good thing X can't," he added* No other 
president had made such a statement, Lawrence felt that one had to admire 
a leader who criticised this sacred political institution even though it 
meant stepping on some very sore Democratic toes* The editor expressed 
his opinion that no other single thing had brought out the shining ideal­
ism of Roosevelt as did this admission.
dames Burns, a Roosevelt biographer, wrote that the President did 
not picture himself as a leader to build a new alignment of political 
power in 1933-34* The primary effort needed to be the promotion of eco­
nomic recovery* To do this Roosevelt needed to coax and conciliate lead­
ers of major interest groups into a "great national partnership*" Burns 
termed this "broker leadership*1' Roosevelt took a passive method of re­
sponding to pressures rather than the active one of building a new voting 
alignment that would recast the pattern of politics in America*52
SOlbid* * January 27, 1934
5*Ibid., June 21, 1934* Xn a Star editorial on January 28, 1937, 
Lawrence admonished the State to follow Roosevelt's lead in using a non­
partisan basis for selecting the administrators for a state unemployment 
insurance agency*
^Burns, The Lion and the Fox* 197-198*
Lawrence would have probably agreed with Burn's interpretation of 
the President's alms, the editor noted In an editorial on February 6,
1934, that some observers felt the country was beaded towards a eon**' 
pletely Government-controlled economy. If not to tbls extreme, at least 
individualism was to be a thing of the past* Lawrence did not feel that 
the President was committed to any such extreme plan of national reorgani­
sation. ftoosevelt was only interested in national recovery and the abolish 
meat of unfair advantages that seme had over others; not a radical redistri 
bution of the nation's wealth* Overall, Lawrence wrote, there had been a 
political transformation in that there was almost unanimity of popular 
support from both parties behind the President.
there were people, however, who did try to realign the political 
parties after the first bloom of the Hew Beal had flowered* Conservative 
opposition within the Democratic party led to forming the Liberty League* 
With DuPont money and politicians like A1 Smith, Jouett Souse, and John W. 
Davis, the League unsuccessfully attempted to draw Democrats away from 
Roosevelt*^ these men, as well as Republican leaders, attempted to paint 
Roosevelt as a budding dictator*
The charge of dictatorship was the theme of the Republican Lincoln 
Day gatherings, reported Lawrence on February 13, 1934* He called it a 
peculiar coincidence that no direct criticism was made of Roosevelt or of
53star. February 6, 1934
$4Buras, the Lion and the Fox* 206* Lawrence wrote several editor­
ials during the sucxner of 1934, in which he castigated the Leaguers for 
their defection* The editor did not feel that the action was worthy of 
them*
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his program* "What actually took place," he wrote, "was a series of ad­
dresses in which veiled innuendo and insinuation were substituted for tan­
gible, concrete, definite attack,” In Iowa, Colonel Frank Knox, "the most 
outstanding Republican spokesman,” had challenged the Washington bureaus*- 
racy* Be alleged that this bureaucracy said that popular Government was 
a failure and a Fascistic form of Government was needed in America, Law­
rence felt that Knox was letting his imagination run away when he saw such 
spooks* And even if the President was inclined to be a dictator, which 
Lawrence was sure he was not, he could not destroy representative Govern­
ment and put on the robes of a dictator without the consent of the govern- 
55
To prove that the electorate and Congress had not abdicated their 
powers, the editor could report on March 29 that the Congress had overridden 
the President's veto of the General Offices Appropriation bill* This Re­
publican victory would be hollow, he wrote, because it punctured the 
dictatorship bogeyman which they had been using to scare the people* Roose­
velt's program was safe again for a while, although Lawrence did expect to
fig
see other ghosts being called up to scare the people*
A ghost which was raised up as a spoof and got out of hand was the 
threat of Communists in Government* It could be called "the Wirt Affair." 
Dr. William A* Wirt, an Indiana educator, attended a Washington party 
where there were also several young administration men* Wirt, sounding 
like Birch Society members in the 1960s, voiced concern over the Roosevelt
^Star, February 13, 1934. ^^Ibld* * March 29, 1934*
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revolution which he was hearing so much about* The boys,, being in rather 
high spirits and wanting to kid the gullible old duffer, expanded on the 
theme that the Hew Deal was part of a Communistic plot* They confided 
that Roosevelt was really only the Kerensky of the movement and that, In 
two years, a Stalin would appear to assume control* When Wirt pressed 
to know who the Stalin would be, the boys solemnly said, "Rexford <3. 
Tugwell.’’^ ? pr* Wirt, much Impressed and concerned, went to Congress 
with his report that there were persons in the administration who were 
using the President, and planning on an economic failure so that there 
could be a Communistic takeover in the country* The Rouge asked for an 
investigation*58
In an editorial, Lawrence wrote that the "meek, farm-bred Iowan," 
Wallace had been named by Wirt as the chief conspirator*^ The editor 
commented that it would appear from Wirt’s story that Moscow was located 
in Res Moines* If the educator’s story were true, Wallace should be shot 
as a traitor* To the editor, the story was another indication that the
57p*ge 1 article. Star. April 9, 1934.
58"Nob they'er [the young administration nan] quaking in their
boots for fear that what was intended for some good clean fun will em­
barrass them with the administration*" Editorial, Star* March 29, 1934*
S^In his account of the affair, Tugwell did not mention himself 
at all* Rexford 6* Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt (Garden City: 
Doubleday and Co*, 1957), 322-323* Tugwell was prominently named by 
Wirt before a special House investigating committee* Without being 
specific, Wirt asserted that Wallace shared Tugwell9s views* P.6 article, 
The Wall Street Journal, April 11, 1934* ’’Secretary Wallace seems to 
have been singled out for a number of attacks because Dr* Wirt believes 
that***(Wallace! has done more plain speaking***about the nature of the 
’revolution’ than most government officials.” P.2 article by Bernard 
Kilgore, The Wall Street Journal. April 3, 1934* Thus, either Tugwell 
or Wallace could be considered the ’’Stalin" of the "revolution*"
173631.
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country was returning to normal —  it was passing through another "silly 
season."60
The chargee leveled by Dr. Wirt were 0 0 ridiculous that they would 
be laughed out of court, Lawrence wrote* The House of Representatives» 
however, appeared to Lawrence to be bent on making itself as ridiculous 
as the story by ordering a full investigation* This interest gave the 
Wirt story a credence it had not had, nor deserved* The editor considered 
the pushing of an investigation as poor strategy for Democratic Congress­
men and a "real relief for frightened* starving Republicans*" The pros­
pect of Communism in government would replace the deflated bog;eyman, 
"Dictator" Roosevelt* Lawrence was sure that the nation was little con­
cerned with this playing and fun* It was more interested in the reports 
of decreasing unemployment and rising trade volume then with hearing about 
Dr* Wirt’s "hallucinations of a red menace.” People were too busy "chas­
ing three squares a day to become wrought up over Mad March Commedies," 
he added.6** Lawrence was correct in his ©valuation of the importance of 
the Wirt affair —  it faded, to be replaced by other problems*
In August, a Nebraska woman wrote to the editor commenting on the 
plight of the farmer* While he was facing starvation, politicians were 
greedily fighting for power. To the question, ’’Whom shall you believe?” 
Lawrence answered: the Roosevelt of the warm heart and depth of compas­
sion* When she asked for whom she should vote, the editor wrote that It 
was not the purpose of a newspaper to tell people how to vote* It should
60Star. March 30, 1934, 61lbi<l., March 30, April 11, 1934.
present the facts and news with honesty. It should advocate programs which 
would make a better Nebraska end America, Hie best mao a state could send 
to Washington would be one who knew and understood the state's unique pro­
blems ; one who would place this information before the President accurate­
ly and forcefully. Of course, the editor pointed out, support of the 
President did not mean the same as acquiescence. When determining whom 
to send, "Let us send men who believe both in Mr. Roosevelt and In 
Nebraska," Lawrence concluded.62
this right to vote was considered a civic responsibility by the 
editor* The list of candidates for the election of 1934 gave the voter a 
wide choice. It was for their own and the country's good that each man 
and woman examine the merits of the candidate. "Democracy can function 
properly only in the degree that members of society are able to pass 
intelligent judgment upon • • . those seeking their suf forage ..." ex­
pounded Lawrence. In the primary election, one should choose from his 
own party on the basis of "fitness, integrity, and experience;" not let 
the professional politician dictate the vote* In the general election, 
policies of the party as well as the candidate needed to be examined.
Good government should prompt the political desire of each cltisen, 
wrote Lawrence. Hie people of Nebraska had so much in common as to live­
lihood, problems, and objectives. The only issue which divided them was 
the method of attaining those objectives, the platforms of the two parties 
defined the cleft in methods, to the editor the choice was clear: "Shall
62Ibld.. August 10, 1934. 63tbU.. May 11, 1934
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we shall go ahead or shall we turn back?” To go ahead was to continue 
the alleviation of human misery, the revival of business, and the bring* 
ing of order out of chaos* To turn back was to scrap the policies of 
Roosevelt and return to the slow and painful attrition of Hoover * s admini­
stration. It frightened Lawrence to think of turning baek.^*
There was every indication to Lawrence that people were taking 
more of an Interest in their Federal Government. Prior to the depression, 
Washington had seemed far away and 'the measures passed there had little 
direct effect on the lives of Individuals. Roosevelt had changed this 
by carrying the Federal Government ’’right home to the people who owned 
It*'1 wrote Lawrence* People took an interest in the Government because 
the Government was faking an interest in them.^ This interest by the 
public was in spite of the fact that many of the newspapers of the nation 
were opposed to Roosevelt and the Hew Deal.
That summer editor Lawrence regretted to report that not a single 
major newspaper in Chicago was supporting the President* A form of guer­
illa warfare was being waged by Colonel Robert McCormick * s Tribune* Colonel 
Frank Knox's Sailv News* and the two papers of William Randolph Hearst.
This was a strange contradiction to Lawrence because he felt that the 
great majority of Chicago*a three million people* "more than double the 
total population of Nebraska,1’ looked upon the President with gratitude 
and hero worship. The fears voiced by the newspapers, that a super- 
Government would dictate and control individuals and that America was be-
^Ibld.. November 2, 1934 65Xbid.. March 6, 1934.
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coming enslaved, meant to Lawrence that they had missed the greater peril. 
“They do not seem to understand that political freedom, unless fortified 
with economic security* is threatened and menaced . . .  by hungry people* 
who . . . would welcome anything . . ."he wrote.^
Another newspaper that missed the point was the Kansas City Star. 
This Missouri paper, ardently Republican, was quoted by Lawrence as 
questioning the expenditures of the New Peal: "If the New Deal fails it
will be the moat costly failure in American history." Hie critical dis- 
cussions of the New Deal Ignored the intangibles, which had a strong 
bearing on the case* Hie cost of failure would not be solely in terms of 
money but in terms of morale and American thought. "Faith cannot be 
measured by gold bullion . . . and yet it is the foundation of American 
business and industry," wrote Lawrence. Hie pertinent question to 
Lawrence was not the expenditures of the New Deal but the alternatives 
to the New Deal. X&iat was to come if the New Deal fails, he asked. While 
the critics whacked away at the New Deal, they should think that "the 
fruits of their criticism may be an even heavier price than the cost of 
the New Deal," Lawrence reminded them.**7 Of course, not all Republicans 
were critics nor were all the critics Republicans.
A prominent Republican who supported Roosevelt was Senator Arthur 
Capper of Kansas. His kind words for the President has led the conser­
vative Old Guard Republican leadership to bar him from party affairs.
To the editor, the importance of Capper's ouster was that it indicated
66Ibid.. March 7, 1934. 67Ibid.. September 10, 1934.
the Republicans had not learned their lesson from 1932# To ostracise a 
man because he endorsed an opponent’s program* not on the basis of the 
program but because it was from the opposition —  this was the type of 
thinking which had cost the party the faith of the people in 1932* The 
ouster also Indicated to Lawrence that the leadership had changed their 
attitude* They felt strong enough to fight back against Roosevelt and 
the New Deal, and planned an all-out campaign for 1936.^®
Arthur M. Hyde, Secretary of Agriculture under Hoover, was one of 
the Old Guard leaders of the Republican party* Lawrence quoted him'as 
saying that the fundamental duty of Government was to "create and pre­
serve conditions of peace, order, and security under which every citizen 
has an equal opportunity*11 He continued the speech, saying that this did 
not mean that a Government should regulate the race. To Lawrence this 
sounded like rugged individualism but it was not the Republican philosophy 
of Lincoln or "Teddy.” Lincoln preached human!tarianism, and the older 
Roosevelt insisted that the Government should prevent the abuse of wealth, 
The American voters had turned against the Republicans in 1932 because of 
the brute force which Hyde was again advocating* If the party expected to 
recover at all, Lawrence wrote, it must get rid of the leadership epito- 
raized by Hyde and change its attitude about recovery methods. 7
Later in the campaign, the editor compared those who would destroy 
the entire recovery program because of a few "rats in the recovery bam** 
to the Barnburners of the 1840s. Those early Barnburners did not destroy
68Ibld.. February 27, 1934. 69Ibld.. June 1, 1934.
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the Democratic party then* nor did Lawrence believe that the modem ones 
would* The editor admitted that there might he some faults In the pro­
gram hut the President was attempting to correct them as soon as they 
were found. In spite of the fact that the program had drawn the attacks, 
Lawrence voiced the strong suspicion that It was Roosevelt that the critics 
were really after, the only way that they could get votes away from the 
President was to attack his program, the editor did not expect the people 
to allow such a short-sighted policy to continue,^
Continuing his attacks on the Republicans and their policies, the 
editor wrote that they were using the strategy made famous by "Colonel 
Catch*em Coming and Going.,r In the industrial Bast the Republicans told 
the electorate that they were bearing the "cruel and crushing burden" of 
the farm products processing tax. In the wide open spaces of Nebraska, 
the party commander, McKelvie,^1 was informing the farmer that he, the 
producer, was footing the bill, Lawrence felt that it was a good time to 
remind the Nebraskans of the problems they had faced and what the Presi­
dent had done to alleviate those problems. Because the state*s economy 
was wholly dependent on agriculture, parity between farm and manufactured 
products was a vital necessity, although not always a fact. The process­
ing tan had been devised to restore and maintain this parity. In Nebraska 
alone, fifty million dollars had been received in benefits and, with the 
drouth destroying other sources, furnished the principal income for farmers
70Ibld.. October 5, 1934.
7*Saouel R. McKelvle was the publisher of the Nebraska Farmer and 
Governor of Nebraska, 191S-1922. Olson, History of Nebraska. 276,
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defending the Farm Board and Its policies* He closed by saying that he 
did not expect the letter would be published*
Lawrence wrote to "Dear Sam" In the editorial that he was sorry to 
be disappointing* but that he would publish the letter* The editor claimed 
he had not suggested that Griswold repudiate McKelvie* Griswold would be 
guilty of the "most gross ingratitude" if the repudiation did take places 
after all McKelvie had meant to him as a friend* supporter, and confidant* 
Regarding the Farm Board, Lawrence wrote that It did not matter what Me- 
Kelvie or the editor thought of it* The farmers had voted overwhelmingly 
against it, as they did on the other Hoover policies* As for the campaign 
of 1934, Lawrence asked Griswold to continue denouncing the Hew Beal* Xt 
made the issue clear-cut; if elected Governor, he would be committed to 
veto any legislation necessary for the state to do its part in the Boose** 
velt recovery p r o g r a m *75
As it turned out, Lawrence need not have been concerned with the 
fate of the state* On November 7, 1934, he was able to head an editorial: 
"The New Beal Wins.” Robert L* Cochran, the Democratic candidate for 
Governor, won over Griswold, 284,093 to 266,707, while the Democrat Edward 
Burke easily bested Republican candidate Robert G, Simmons, 305,938 to 
237, 126 for the United States Senate.76 After telling of the election of 
New Deal supporters all over the country, Lawrence wrote that the voting 
results indicated that Roosevelt then possessed "more fully the faith and 
confidence of his fellow countrymen than when he took office * « •”
75Ibld. October 4, 1934 76,1,16 Book 1934. 516-319,
It was a gratifying outlook to the editor.77
Editor Lawrence agreed with the President of the United States
Chamber of Commerce when he said that the election was a "Mandate of the
voters.” It was the editor's opinion that this mandate came at just the
right time. Some of the nation*s business leaders had begun to break
away from the President's recovery program, the voting results, however
satisfied even the most obtuse and reactionary that the people 
were still with the government at Washington, and that any 
attempt at obstruction could have no other effect than to arouse 
tjt;e burning anger of a vast majority of the populace.7$
If , as Lawrence predicted, the country was entering the "final phase of
recovery," Roosevelt could be assured of winning re-election in 1936.
If there was any faltering, his re-election would be less of a certainty
77gtar« November 7, 1934 78Ibid., November 24, 1934
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THE POLITICS OF RECOVERY 
In mid-March, 1933, Lawrence editorially speculated on what the 
history books of 2000 A.D. would say about those first fourteen days of 
Roosevelt1s administration. There had been a lightening-like transfer* 
mation from the black pre-inauguration days. It was incredible to Law* 
rence that the nation's morale could change so completely in so short a 
time* He admitted that two weeks was only the beginning of the adminis­
tration but Roosevelt had established a firm leadership and the people 
were satisfied that the new government had resolution and determination 
to continue its progress.
After the election of 1934, President Roosevelt made a tour of the 
Southern states. In Mississippi he made a speech in vfcich he said that 
there were intangible elements In the country which gave him encourage­
ment and satisfaction. Lawrence agreed with him, writing that these 
intangibles were reflected in a change in the faces of the people during 
the preceding two years. The hopelessness was gone. Lawrence did not 
consider that the President's comments had been forced by political 
psychology| there had been a change in the attitude of the masses#
America was on its way back. The people had a faith in their popular 
leader which the critics could not shake.
I
nt STAND ON MY RECORD,'’ 1936 
As the election of 1936 approached, Lawrence reminded the people
79lbld.. March 17, 1933. 80lbld.. November 19, 1934.
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that Roosevelt had given them "a chance for life • . . by insisting upon 
economic parity.1' The President had succeeded in spite of the powerful 
groups which opposed him —  "the wlsecrackers and smartcrackers of the 
East who belittle us yaps • • • fin the Mid-Wes t.J” Thinking people would 
realize that the Roosevelt program was a sound program.To continue 
this program by re-electing Roosevelt was the editorial effort for Lawrence 
during 1936.
Because Roosevelt was running on his record, Lawrence directed most 
of his writing to describing the Republican candidate and campaign* He 
agreed with the Omaha World-Herald editorial which said that the Republicans 
were running Alfred M. London so as to split the West* The party needed a 
Westerner from a farm state as their candidate* Lawrence called it curious 
logic —  no farmer would vote against the Roosevelt farm program, even for his 
own governor* Conceding that Landon was a good salesman, Lawrence did not 
think that the Governor would sell any unknown plan when Roosevelt’s "agricul­
tural tariff" had equalized the national income. The West still remembered the 
Hoover Farm Board with trepidation. Landon, in addition to winning the
West had to offer something to the Easterners who wanted cheap food* What
82a job for the Republicans to tackle.
81Ibid.. July 25, 1936.
®2"The Democratic platform was more notable for its claims than for
its promises•" Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Roosevelt (Chicago: Univer­
sity of Chicago Press, 1957), 52. Possibly because Lawrence felt more 
sure of Roosevelt’s victory in 1936, he did not write as many general 
political editorials as in 1932. He did not even editorially comment on 
the speech which Roosevelt made when he visited Lincoln in October, 1936.
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the editor suggested that the first and foremost job for the Repub­
licans was to divorce the party from the old leaders and policies; those 
leaders and policies which had placed the party in the impossible position 
it had occupied during the last fifteen years* "It must push aside those 
who would emphasise urban and industrial development at the expense of 
rural life," he insisted, the farmer had as much right to a subsidy for 
his products as the industrialist did. If the subsidy did not continue, the 
farmer would "sink to the level of peasantry" Lawrence predicted*
Governor Landon spoke to the farmers of Nebraska in April 1936. Law* 
rence wrote that "Brother 'Alf1 Crossed the Rubicon" when he denounced the 
Roosevelt New Beal* The Governor was wise enough not to dwell on the farmrj 
subsidy program* Re had, however, no kind words regarding the relief pro­
gram. It had been incompetently, partlsanly, and wastefully administered.
The editor felt that this was a "pretty how-de-do," because of the manner 
in which the program was being handled in Kansas. The State Government would 
have nothing to do with its administration and furnished only $374,000 com­
pared to $51% million furnished by the Federal Government. This did not seem 
very partisan to Lawrence. Governor Landon sounded distinctly like a politi­
cian to the editor.
As Landon was announcing his candidacy on Kansas Bay, January 29, 
Lawrence was writing about a visit to Kansas. He wanted to find out more 
about the "Budget Balancer." He found no basis for the Governor's claim 
to the title. Landon had actually increased taxes and Increased spending 
during his four years in office. Nebraska got much more for its tax dollar*
3% tar. Hay 2, 1936.
In. addition, Kansas needed, twice the Federal aid .that Nebraska, did. Can* 
didate Landon had pledged to reduce Federal spending by fifty percent in 
eighteen months If he were elected. "Any silly plan which assumes both the 
constitution and 50 percent of federal expenditures can he saved in the nest 
eighteen months Invites grave dangers," contended Lawrence. When asked, 
"What about this man Landon?" the editor wrote that he joined such noted 
Republicans as Colonel Frank Knox, newspaper publisher, and Senators Vanden- 
burg and Borah, who were asking the same questions. "Alf" had been placed 
in the lead by a "nifty organization".^
The organization did a good job of selling Landon. Writing after 
the convention in Cleveland, Lawrence felt that Landon1# nomination was 
due to the buildup he had received in the press. The Governor was a 
stranger to many of the delegates. In the final analysis, they were not 
really concerned as to who the candidate was, as long as he could succeed 
in terminating the New Beal. It was difficult for Lawrence to imagine 
Landon in the role of a crusader, "He likes people too well. He is too 
friendly . . . .  If he wins he will win because people are tired of a real 
crusader," contended Lawrence.®^
^Ibid., January 30, Hay 29, dune 15, 1936. Oddly enough, in an edi­
torial on. August 9, 1934, Lawrence had praised: Landon for his actions as 
Governor.
^Ibid., June 15, 29, 1936. "(The choice of Landon) . . . was not a 
happy one. Bis flat, colorless voice bored his listeners. Bis friendly 
smile and good intentions were a weak match for the dynamic, audience- 
wise Roosevelt." David E. Weingase, F.D.R., Han of Destiny (N.I. s Julian 
Hessner Inc., 1952), 112.
Although Roosevelt felt he could win easily, he wanted to make the 
campaign a crusade, based on the new benefits and hopes which the Hew 
heal had brought to America. Primarily this meant Social Security which 
was to be the basis of future security for the people. Democratic stra­
tegy called for a defensive campaign —  let the Republicans bring the . 
charges of inefficiency; the Democrats would describe the state of the 
nation in 1936 compared with 1933, The President wanted to send out
speakers but Parley told him it must be a one-man show* It was FDR the
0£
people wanted to hear. One reason they wanted to hear him was to be 
reassured about the Hew Deal,
To an uniformed observer the Hew Deal was in a bad way. The NRA 
and the AAA had been declared unconstitutional* Other phases of the pro­
gram were the subject of angry debates, Rooseveltvs 1932 attacks on
Hoover as a spendthrift were coming back at him. The President was charged
87with "irresponsible experimentation," using the people as guinea pigs.'
The nation's press was opposed to him. Cries of "Soak the Successful," 
and "the Raw Deal" sold many copies of Hearst newspapers,8®
While the Republican Chicago Sun solemnly gave a count-down on days
remaining to Save the Union, <**What are you doing to save it?")*8  ^the
conventions met and agreed on their platforms. Lawrence wrote that the
®®Bums, The Lion and the Fox. 266-268; Farley, Jim Farley's 
Story, 59,
87John T, Flynn, The Roosevelt Myth (N.Y,; The Devin-Adair Co,, 
1956), 84, 85# Compare Noel F# Busch, What Hanner of Han (N*Y, t Har­
per and Bro*, 1944), 117, who wrote that "the only really obvious defeat
* . . was the fact that he broke his campaign promise to cut down govern­
ment expenses . »
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Eapobllaan platform was a 4d e w tf looking tba mootfe*
stylo of aarllar a«public*n platforms* If  road mi i f  i t  has baaa 
•traotad a paragraph at a tlia» amah by a diffarant parson* It  mas 
almost boyish In its approach* possibly by dsatps, amriUMd lawranca*^ ® 
Tba Republican* m m  aocosad at oaing tha Sf3t  Daexscraftie plat fata m  
thair own in 1936* to which sans wag raplladt **‘Kty nott Tha Danocrafca 
havs an nova asa fair it*  Hbtaaaat it  is In parfsotly goad condition — 
i t  mm nmmt ussd**’®* Harold fafesa motad is hia diary that landon was 
not plaaaad with parts of tba platform aa that tha party was going into 
tbs campaign with two platforms*^2
lawraaca did not think that tha Bapnblican platform could compare 
with tha Democratic platform* fha lasts* aballangsd interest* it was 
**tfca outline of a political philosophy as if afloat {ad] national wall* 
haisig*,t^  Dents* Batkins wrote that Mit contained remarkably taw cost- 
mitments for tha future*1^  ■ leka# wrota that it was forthright and. pro* 
grsaaiwe* la did not aaa “how any intaiilgaat* forward-looking citissn, 
on tha basis of tba platforwa alonat could fail to accept tba Democratic 
platform as balng far superior to tba Republican.”*5 Infarior and unde-
9QSSS&> •»**• « . MS*- n nyna, Thft SSSSSaolS. SEtil. «*»
®2H**old I>. Iek«a, B w  Flr«t Thoua«nd B»im 1933-1936 (Vol. 1 of 
f«w«»*. PSdCT og B«reI4 1. Xctato. 3 *ol>. i M.f.s Slnon and Schtm.r, 
1933*1954,) 614, 617* Hereafter cited as Xckas, Diary*
June if, 1936.
**Bexfcer Perkins, tba lisp Asa., of looaaylt. ft*
Diary * 614*
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sirable as it might be, the Republican platform was the platform on which
Landon was committed to stand.
In accepting the nomination, Landon called himself an "everyday 
American." Lawrence agreed, adding that the speech was an "everyday 
speech delivered in an everyday style." It sounded better when read 
than when heard. Landon talked about prosperity but words did hot make 
prosperity, contended the editor. Lawrence also found portions of the 
speech which showed an ignorance or willful indifference to the situ­
ation as It existed. Landon commented that the economy which he preached
would not come from the relief program but from the "hide of political
exploiters." Lawrence called this a "gratuitous insult" to those 
Republicans who had been serving in relief work, the editor summed up 
the speech by saying that Landon turned to the past; that he was the 
standard bearer of the conservative thought of the country. Borrowing 
a phrase from Roosevelt's acceptance speech, Lawrence wrote that between 
a deficit in the treasury (which Landon abhorred) and a deficit in human 
fortitude (collapse of national morale), Lawrence preferred the former.^
Ihis was one of several comparisons which he made between the speeches 
of Landon and Roosevelt.
Landon himself said that he was no speaker but the Republican 
National Committee issued a press release saying the "great interest in 
his (Landon*s) ability as a radio speaker is expressed by critics and 
public alike." Lawrence asked the two to get together on their stories.
Star. August 19, 1936.
97Ibid.. July 24, 1936.
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the acceptance speech by Roosevelt climaxed what James Farley called 
a family reunion. "We could have completed our work in one day and gone 
home," he wrote.She first draft of Roosevelt1s acceptance speech had 
been composed by Raymond Moley and was mild, hater, Samuel Rosenman and 
Stanley High produced a militant one. "In the end he (Roosevelt) produced 
his own, with sweetness and light but with something else," wrote Burns 
Ihe something else was the gauntlet that the President threw tsmthe "eco­
nomic royalists," -- that they were to lose their power. "Hie choice of 
the words was "lucky," he later told Frances Perkins. "Anyhow, I don’t 
think people ought to be too rich," he added enigmatically and without 
explanation.*®® Roosevelt concluded the speech, saying that the people 
had a rendezvous with destiny and that he accepted the commission which 
they had given him.*®* Xt was a speech which invited comments.
On a train returning from Philadelphia, four newspapermen rode and 
discussed what they had heard FDR say. Harvey Newbranch, of the Omaha 
World-HeraId (formerly a Democratic paper), called Roosevelt’s speech a 
threat against private enterprise. William Allen White, Landon*s closest 
friend, said that it would rank beside Lincoln*s Gettysburg Address. 
Commentator David Lawrence compared the speech to "the swaying fields thr­
ough which Mussolini and Hitler had trampled over the rights of free 
people ..." Xhe editor of the Star called this stupid writing. Hie
^Farley, Jim Farley’s Story. 62.
^Bums, Xhe Lion and the Fox. 273.
*®®F. Perkins, The Roosevelt J, Know. 124.
*®*Rosenman, Papers. V, 230-236.
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Lincoln editor himself wrote that the speech was "the most important 
contribution to American thought that has come to a grown up country#*'
Too, in commenting on both Roosevelt * a and London's speeches he .recalled 
that Landon had been cheered for thirty-six minutes while Roosevelt was 
cheered for one hour and six minutes.
In late July, Lawrence wrote several more editorials on the Repub­
lican candidate's acceptance speech* On July 25 he said that the Ameri­
can farmer faced a crisis. Landon might call for a balanced budget, less 
spending, and tax cuts; but this would not help the farmer. The farmer 
had a right to know what changes Landon proposed to make in soil conser­
vation, conservation of natural resources, and the other agricultural aid 
programs so vital to the tiller of the soil and the nation. What farmers 
needed was a permanent farm program. As Lawrence understood him, Landon 
had inferred that he would have essentially the same program for agri­
culture that Roosevelt had, so the editor saw no reason for debate or 
change. Landon*a criticism of the expenditures for agriculture and re­
lief was unjustified because of the unnatural condition of the nation's 
experiences in the preceding years.
Regarding any program of relief , Landon had said that man must live
105by the sweat of his brow# Lawrence called this a rather cheap and nasty 
remark because millions had not lived but only existed while they futilely
102Star. June 29, 30, 1936.
^^''Hov tinea do change. A few short years ago the Republicans 
were advising us to 'keep cool with Coolidge#' Now Mr. Landon . . • 
insists that we 'must live by the sweat of our brow."' Ibid..
July 30, 1936.
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searched for work. The candidate's speech Implied to Lawrence that Lan­
don considered those on relief as being "lazy, indolent, and shiftless*" 
Possibly soma of them were, admitted the editor, bat generally speaking 
it was nonsense to make each a statement. Lawrence classified the speech 
as "very shallow," "very academic," and "very trite." America had a 
problem which was not merely a political adventure. The "lost generation," 
i.e., those who were fifty and sixty in 1929 and who were too old to be 
absorbed into the work force of the thirties, needed help if it was not 
to be led astray by Dr. Townsend and others. As with the agricultural 
problem, Lawrence was sure that Landon would care for those on relief 
"precisely as the man he condemns took care of them." Apparently there
would be no difference in the way the Republicans would seek economic re- 
104covery.
This was the major complaint which Lawrence had against the Repub­
lican campaign. Although they damped every policy of the Roosevelt admin­
istration and promised to accomplish the same results of relief and re­
covery; they had not presented their own program of recovery. In a con­
tradiction of the pledge of continued relief spending, the Republicans 
also pledged to reduce governmental expenditures. To the editor it was 
a "fair question" to ask how Landon proposed to meet his responsibilities 
if he were elected, Landon spoke on the "American Way" of solving the 
nations problems, Lawrence considered that the speech was neither com­
3-0^ Ibid.. July 25, 28, 1936, * , Governor London's only complaint
is that he and his party did not perform the job {of recovery]." Ibid*> 
October 14, 1936,
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prehensive nor analytical. It was, fee continued, confusing and contradict 
tory —  anotfeer case of being long on criticism and efeort on propositions. 
Landon did not reveal "a comprehension of the infinitely complicated char* 
acter of . . . domestic life,” wrote the editor.
Landon was not intentionally insincere nor intellectually dishonest, 
wrote Lawrence. But some of the campaign statements on his behalf were 
full of sham, pretense, and insincerity. No one would be fooled by cheap 
and idle talk, Hie catastrophe of drouth meant spending and the people 
would "turn to a man who Chad! the sympathies, the courage and the vision 
to combine realism and idealism in a practical oommonsenae fashion, and 
who did the job before.** Landon and his strategy board needed to revise 
their plans completely if they expected to win the votes of the people.
In early September the Republican National Committee made the "sur­
prise" announcement that Candidate Landon would visit Maine, where he 
would make his "first fighting repudiation" of the Roosevelt administration. 
To Lawrence the announcement was not Just a surprise, it was stupendous! 
Here was a state which voted for Hoover in 1932 and which favored Landon 
by sixty percent in the polls; and now Landon was going there to be sure 
the state was safe for the Republican party.
Of the speech which Landon made at Portland, Maine, Lawrence wrote
that
in his crusade for free enterprise, the governor waltzed two steps 
ahead, three to the left, occasionally cut loose with a long glide 
to the right, and then reversed the length of the hall.
105Ibid.. August 26, 27, 28, 1936. 
x°6ibtd., July 20, 31, 1936.
In the speech Landon approved federal control of almost nil aspects of bus* 
iness, and then said that there was no half way house between free enter* 
prise and complete regulation of the citizen. To Lawrence, all Landon neg* 
leered to say was that President ftooaevelt had been correct in his 
handling of the problems of the economy, the editor asked if the free 
enterprise for which Landon was asking meant that which existed under 
Hoover "when farmers were working for nothing.14 Lawrence contended that 
the AAA and soil conservation programs were voluntary and 11 free enter* 
prise."1^ 7
Comparatively late in the campaign, Governor Landon issued his 
agricultural program announcements• On the second of September* Lawrence 
reported on the conservation plank. It was a “Hybrid plan . . . that 
[had] neither intelligence nor practical foundation back of it,“ he 
wrote.1®$ At Has Moines, Iowa, on September 22, “Governor Landon*s gift 
to American agriculture was dumped into (the farmer's] laps.” the 
Governor said it was "a well rounded program'* designed for the present 
and also for the “long time pull.” Lawrence asked the reader to remember
107Ibid.. September 9, 14, 2b, 1936. Lawrence reported on Sep­
tember 15th that the GOP had won by a narrow margin in Maine, but even 
the Republic an Congressmen ran on a platform of increased spending.
lQ**Ibid.» September 2, 1936. the editor also pointed out that the 
Conservation program which Landon had forced on the State of Kansas had 
been declared unconstitutional because it was non-voluntary. Ibid.. 
September 23, 1936*
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the words, "long time poll.”
the Republican plan of uncontrolled production and stored sur­
pluses raised the ire of editor Lawrence* He pointed out that agri­
culture was always controlled by the practices of crop rotation, seed 
improvement and other procedures used to make farming more economical 
and prosperous. Regarding the stored surplus plan, Lawrence reminded 
the farmer that he had crops in storage in 1933 on which he could not 
get a decent loan from hankers# The government was the only agency able 
and willing to loan money. The editor closed by writing that
the farm speech of governor Landon was a curious conglo­
meration of borrowed Roosevelt policies and espousal of 
Hooverism. It was the speech of a man sashing to play upon 
deeply implanted instincts and at the same time satisfy his 
industrial legions.
Apparently the Republicans needed to talk on some program other than
agriculture,
Landon received no better treatment from Lawrence when the candi­
date spoke on the subject of social security* Hie editor wrote that it 
was the most effective criticism of a Roosevelt program which the candi­
date had made* This compliment was leavened, however, by the comment that 
on such a large and diverse program, there was a great opportunity for 
faultfinding. If the Republicans favored social security legislation, 
they should announce their proposed program# Instead, they had given a
3^9Ibid,t September 13, 1936# In a speech at Omaha, October 10, 
Roosevelt said of the Republican plan: "No plan could lead the Nation
back faster to such a crisis fas 19331#*1 Rosenman, Papers, V, 432*
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package, "wrapped In the cellophane of fear, a package which meaningless 
words and figures can be seen calculated only to appeal to fear," com­
mented Lawrence* tinder the cellophane, and inside the boa, there was 
emptiness*
for all of London*s talking about social security, Lawrence reported 
that the Governor had done nothing to Institute a state program in Kansas* 
He listed five specific areas of deficiency* Then the editor contrasted 
this do-nothing program with the fine record in Nebraska under Democratic 
Governor Cochran, and in the nation under Roosevelt* An intrepid pioneer 
was needed to lead in the exploitation of this new social field* The re­
cord of Landon showed him to be inactive and timid —  not the man for the 
n ojob. The Republicans needed to attack the administration from yet 
another quarter*
The Republicans "lifted the door to the cellar of politics" when 
they initiated a fear campaign attack* Roadside signs appeared in 
Nebraska which read; "VOTE POE LANDON AND LAND A JOB* VOTE FOR SIMMONS 
AND GRISWOLD." Lawrence considered this contemptuous to decent sensi­
bilities, and arrogant* The statement appealed to crass fear and it was 
a"despicable attempt to subject humble people to the will of business 
employers * * *" he wrote* It was not the American way "to clutch a
llOgtar* September 28, 1936; October 30, 1936* "Perhaps one of 
the gravest campaign errors of the Republicans was their propaganda 
against the new Social Security Act." Harold F. Cornell, Champion 
Campaigner* Franklin P. Roosevelt <2 vols*; N.Y., The Macmlllian Co., 
1952) I, 164.
poor devil by the throat, line him up against the wail" and tell him 
how to vote. It would be a sorry day for the country if this was 
allowed to happen.**** thus, Lawrence repulsed another Republican earn* 
paign attack in Nebraska, there was no question in the editor's mind as 
to which party had the program that would succeed.
A Nebraska grandmother wrote Lawrence, saying that the nation owed 
Roosevelt a debt of gratitude. She asked: "Dare we risk a change?" the 
editor's answer was an emphatic "No!" The President had not followed the 
"American Way" as defined by his opposition, but he had fed and preserved 
families and kept the nation from following the example of Russia, with 
Its communal institutions which saved money but shattered family relation* 
ships. Because Rosevelt attempted to soften the blows that fell on the 
old, business hated him; business had no use for those too old to work.
The editor concluded by saying that if care of the destitute was consider* 
ed un-American, then make the most of it; If it was wasteful, it was 
necessary.112
The Landon charges of waste In the government were considered a 
bit tardy by Lawrence, tardy after Kansas had already benefited from 
the economic relief programs of the New Deal. The Governor had not ob­
jected to receiving the money then, commented the editor, "Be was a 
glad and grateful recipient before he became a candidate for the presi*
111Star. August 31, October 23, 1936.
112lbid., September 7, 1936.
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dency." Lawrence thought that Landon would have bean defeated in 1934 
If the federal government had not rescued the s t a t e T o  the Easterner* 
this spending of tan money in the Mid-West was Roosevelt*s greatest 
offense*
Lawrence pointed out that before FDR* three fourths of the tan 
money of the nation was spent in seaboard areas for harbor improvement * 
ship building, public buildings, and the'like projects* While these 
projects were considered as functions of government, conservation in 
middle America was not! it was a raid on the treasury to the Easterner*
In his editorial, Lawrence asked when the Easterner had become so saintly 
and sprouted wings * They had always been "self-centered, stupid * blind, 
and contemptuously Indifferent to anyone or to anything except them­
selves and thair own self interests," he wrote* During the campaign they 
worried about tomorrow and itfs debt, but the editor wondered if they had 
worried about "tomorrow" when they were in control of Washington during 
'the 1920s To Lawrence, the President was the one person who was con­
cerned with both the "todays’* and the "tomorrows" as he Imple aented his 
various programs* His record spoke for itself.
After the convention in June, the President had taken a vacation 
while the Republicans opened their campaign. The President was content 
to wait because he had already prepared his machine* Although he gave 
the appearance of being non-involved, he was very much in command of the
1I3Xbid.. August 17, 1936. 114Ibld.. August 19, 1936.
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proceedings. During the summer he toured the drouth areas. When re* 
porters asked if the trip had any political over*tones, the President 
piously said that it was a disservice to the administration to link 
human misery with polities.**5
"In swift, deft strokes," wrote Lawrence, the President opened his 
Campaign on September 29* Roosevelt spoke "with greatest moderation and 
the greatest restraint." Lawrence applauded the statement that the Re* 
publicans did not object to the way the Democrats were doing the job -- 
they did not want the job done at all. The nation had made great strides 
in safeguarding democracy during his first term, but Roosevelt said that 
additional reforms needed to be made. To the President, the struggle was 
between concentrated wealth, with its abuse of power, against public wel­
fare. To Lawrence, the choice was one of moderation. The Roosevelt admin* 
istration was a government of compromise, not of extremes. In comparison, 
the GOP had accepted many extreme groups into their camp: the Liberty
League, ^1® and the reactionary elements that wanted to overthrow sound
and sane p r o g r e s s  * ^ 7  Big business wanted to return to control.
When Roosevelt was asked what he had done to fight Hie monopolies 
created by big business, he answered in a speech at Boston: "We have in*
^ 5Bums, ,SEh<f Lion and The Fox. 275*277.
llfr'Sumpin1 new in the form of a fireside chat took place in Hew
York Wednesday night (October 28) when Al Smith met, greeted, and placed 
11s approval upon Governor Aif Landon." Star. October 29, 1936.
Ibid., October 15, 1936.
creased their taxes." Lawrence wrote that the hig Republican drive to 
save the Constitution and to insure freedom of speech merely resolved into 
a question of taxation. The tax bill which Roosevelt had signed placed 
Hie burden on those incomes over $100,000. This was the tax measure which 
Landon called "cock-eyed." Lawrence was sure that he now regretted the 
utterance, because evidence supported the contention that the tax was econ­
omically sound. The people of Nebraska had an interest in retaining the 
measure because they had supported the government under the Republican 
plan of taxation, and now they were receiving a well-deserved rest. The 
editor pointed out that there were no million-dollar annual incomes in 
Nebraska and few even over §2 5,0 0 0 . ^ 8  Nebraskans could recoup financially.
Whether it was Roosevelt *"• programs or for some other reason, the 
economy did look better in 1936 than in preceding y e a r s .  **9 %u Nebraska, 
the commodity index of prices received by farmers was 121 in 1935 and 1936, 
compared with 84 in 1934 and a low of 62 in 1932 and 1 9 3 3.*28 There were 
only 68 business failures in the state in 1936; down from a high of 363 
in 1932.3-21 Nebraska had 208,367 residents on relief in January, 1935*
**3lbid..-October 22, 26, 1936.
119,ijjOJ3Le of • • . rRooaeveitfS] measures would have availed, it may 
be presumed, if . . . 1936 had not been a year of very substantial economic 
recovery." Dexter Ferkins, The New Ana of Roosevelt. 51.
* ^Nebraska Agricultural Statistics Historical Record 1866-1954 (no 
publisher or date indicated), 128. Hereafter cited as Nebraska Agricultural 
Record. Lawrence credited the Administrations agricultural policies with 
bringing up the prices and allowing the farmer to repay his federal loans 
before they came due. Star. February 4, 1936.
m Blue Book 1940. 398
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January 193$ found only 93,504 on relief, and this figure was lowered to 
39,757 by June.122
In August, bank clearings in Lincoln were up more than $2% million 
over August, 1935. All over the nation, businesses were expanding, the 
editor wrote that in the light of this commercial recovery it took "a 
great deal of nerve” for the Republican Vice Presidential candidate, Knox, 
to assert that his tarty was campaigning to "save America." It was 
humorous to Lawrence that the men who were paying for Roosevelt's defeat 
were the ones who were expanding their production facilities, as a result 
of the success of the Roosevelt recovery program.1^ 3
In writing on the economic progress exhibited during the year, 
Lawrence commented on the new farm buildings which were going up all 
over the state, tractor and implement sales were at an all-time high.
Hie increase in the income of the farmer meant an increase in his buying 
power. Hie money was not being hoarded but was put into circulation. 
Overdue bills were paid to merchants and professional men. the equipment 
which farmers purchased and the employment given to additional farm work­
ers meant increased employment to workers in factories, transportation, 
and mines all over the country. "When the farmer is prosperous his pros­
perity radiates to all sections of the nation," wrote L a w r e n c e .  *24
teiest F. Witte, Final Resort of the Nebraska Emergency Relief 
Admin 1st rat ion to the Governor. June JL, 1933. to January 1. 1938 (Aurora, 
Nebraska: Burr Publishing Co., undated), Table IX, 12. Hereafter cited
as Witte, final Relief Report.
123$tar. September 1, 1936. *2^ Ibld., January 6, 1936.
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The editor was still optimistic about recovery la Hay when he com*
men ted on a report by the State Crop Statistician, showing farm recovery
ia Nebraska. Lawrence was also optimistic about the political picture as,
in the same editorial, he reported on the visit of Secretary of agriculture
125Wallace to Lincoln. Other State Democrats were pessimistic that summer as 
they replied to a survey conducted by the Democratic National Committee. 
Although inly two or three predicted that Republican candidates would win 
in the state, only two or three felt that the Democrats would sweep.Ne- .
■braska
the results of the election proved to Lawrence that the pre-election 
jitters which some people had were just "scarecrow troubles." There would 
not be the outbreak of trouble that had been predicted if Roosevelt won.*^ 
In Nebraska, Roosevelt carried the state, receiving almost half again as 
many votes as Landon. In the gubernatorial contest, Robert L. Cochran, the 
Democratic incumbent, beat Dwight Griswold by almost the same margin. In 
the Senate race, George W. Norris, the "independent,” won over the Republi­
can Simmons, ferry Carpenter, the Democrat, came in a poor third. **3 
Nationwide, it was a Democratic Landslide.
IZSibid.. May 4, 1936.
UGjamea Farley's correspondence} Nebraska, 1936. Democratic National 
Committee; Koosevelt Official Files 369, Roosevelt Library in Hyde Fark.
If Lawrence mss asked for an opinion# bis reply was not in the file.
^ Star. September 5, 1936.
USfioosevelt: 347,434: Landon: 248,731. Cochran: 333,412; Griswold:
257,267. Norris: 258,700; Simmons: 223,276; Carpenter: 108,391. Blue
Book 1936. 457*460.
Lawrence wrote that "the heart of America went to the polls” to give 
Roosevelt "the greatest triumph and most sweeping approval that any man 
charged with heavy burdens ever received.The editor felt that it must 
have been comforting and strengthening to Roosevelt to see such an express­
ion of the real heart of America. The nation was grateful, and it gave a 
vote of appreciation and gratitude for all those who had worked to improve 
the nation. The editor did not blame Landon for the debacle which befell 
him. Xt was the "grisly crew that usurped the leadership of the republican 
party11 who was responsible.
The editor commented that apparently millions wore sunflowers for 
decorations during the campaign, but they forgot the flower when they cast 
their ballot. Xt was not likely that suxiflowers would grow so profusely 
again. Lawrence commented;
the hopeful and encouraging outcome of the election (was) the reflec­
tion that the people themselves tried to be fair, tried to weigh the 
issues, tried to arrive at an intelligent judgment, and so much of 
this spirit was infused in the casting of the ballots that the clumsy 
old trick of yesterday simply did not work.130
Once again Roosevelt and Congress had received a mandate from the
people to work for the continuation of the nation’s economic recovery. Xt
was up to the two branches to act together as they had the last three years.
National popular vote; Roosevelt; 27,751*612; Landon; 16,681,913. 
The electoral vote, 523 to 8, was the most overwhelming since 1820. Hie 
Democratic majority in the Senate was 76 to 16 and in the Rouse, 331 to 89. 
Borris, Encyclopedia of American History. 335.
13% tar. November 4, 14, 1936. Lawrence pointed out that the 
Republican National Committee wound up with a "whopper of a deficit." This 
did not speak well for a party which preached economy. Ibid.. November 14, 
1936.
ROOSEVELT AND BAIXY POLITICIANS 
When the newly-inaugurated President, Roosevelt, called the special 
Congressional session for March 9, 1933, there was an air of wartime crisis 
over the assembly, the first measure presented to the Congress was the 
Snergency Banking Relief Act. It was read as newly-elected members still 
hunted for their seats. Only one copy of the proposed bill was available, 
complete with last-minute pencil corrections. A unanimous shout by the 
House passed the bill after thirty-eight minutes of debate, that same 
evening the Senate passed the measure, and the President signed it into 
law at 8:36 P.M.131 this was the honeymoon performance of a new couple, the 
President and Congress, but which all too soon began to act like a long- 
married, ill-matched couple.
Xu September 1933, editor Lawrence wrote of the spectacular drama 
of the first six months of the Roosevelt administration. The incisive 
steps which the President had taken, routed hysteria and restored confidence. 
These steps vindicated the trust which people had shown by their votes. 
Regarding Congressional cooperation, Lawrence wrote;
^ ' The f irst one hundred days of the Roosevelt administration found 
the Nhite Rouse and congress working in close harmony, enacting 
legislation of the most extraordinary character without undue delay 
or debate. Before the lapse of three months, a legislative program 
had been put through and congress was ready for adjournment.132
13iLeuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal. 43,46. Raymond Holey wrote 
that a folded newspaper was placed in the hopper and used until the proper 
document could be prepared. Raymond Holey, AftCff Seven Years <N.Y.:
Harper and Brothers, 1959), 152.
13%tar. September 20, 1933. During the "First Hundred Days" special 
session. Congress passed sixteen major pieces of legislation requested by
When Congress convened in January 1934, Roosevelt told the members 
that he did not come to make requests for legislation, only to "counsel** 
them. The Executive and the Legislative branches of government had re­
ceived a mandate from the people. Without partisanship, they were to co­
operate in continuing the restoration of the economy. The program itself, 
he said, came from the people. Xt was an integrated program, national in 
its scope. The President then told Congress that he valued their dose 
association and cooperation; "Out of these friendly contacts we are . . .  
building a strong and permanent tie between the legislative and executive 
branches of the Government." Xt was Roosevelt's idea that the Congress 
should legislate and the Executive should execute, cooperation being the 
tie.133
The session was forecast to be a short one. "The 73rd congress will 
go down in history as having accomplished its work in the most businesslike 
and expeditious fashion of any federal assemblage since the civil war," 
commented Lawrence. Of course, to accomplish this, he wrote, oratory and 
and partisan strife would need to be held to a minimum. By placing no obstacles 
In the way, and giving wholehearted support to the President, Congress would 
merit the confidence and esteem of the people. Xt seemed logical to the 
editor that the President's program, already substantially completed, should
Roosevelt. Morris, Encyclopedia of American History. 342-346. James Farley 
wrote that he felt the session "passed more legislation which was beneficial 
to the American people than any other session of a like nature of the 
Republic." Farley, Jim Farley*a Story. 38.
133Franklin D. Roosevelt, On Our Wav (N. Y.: The John Day Co. , 1934),
200-210. Frances Ferklns, The Roosevelt X knew. 172.
be completed without Congressional interference. What the editor asked was 
that Congress "Give the President Free Rein."
If any Congressman had thoughts Shout blocking administration legis­
lation, Lawrence was sure that a talk with the "home folks" would demon­
strate the President's continued popularity. Xt would also show Idle dis­
senter the rashness of his contemplated act. Hie popularity of FDR was 
based on his demonstration that he was qualified to deal with political as 
well as economic emergencies. As the editor commented, "Roosevelt has shown 
himself to be a past master in exacting from Congress what he wants v . . . 
if the occasion arises, he has- demonstrated that he can hand out' a good 
Spanking." Lawrence was sure that the President would dominate the Con­
gressional session, and that all would go well.13^
Only a week later on January It, Lawrence regretted to announce that 
"The Honeymoon Wanes." Roosevelt came within three votes of suffering his 
first legislative defeat* Eighty-four of the $13 Democratic Representatives 
joined all of the administration opposition in voting against continuing 
the ten percent pay cut of Federal employees. 10 Lawrence this did not 
constitute a crisis, but it did indicate that Roosevelt would always have 
trouble with Congress. Xt was not essential, in fact, not desired, that 
the Congress and the President hive complete accord on every matter, wrote 
the editor. Rut on the broad, general policies, he expected the Demo§ 
cratic members to be united behind their leader.
i34gtar. January 3, 4, 1934. Roosevelt estimated that be spent three 
to four hours daily on Congressional relations during a session. Arthur H. 
Schleainger, Jr., j&e Coming of tjie New Deal (Vol. XX of The Neg Age &f 
Roosevelt. 3 vol.} Boston; The Houghton Mifflin Co., 1957*1960), 554.
The area of greatest friction between the Betaoerat# in Congress and 
Roosevelt appeared to be that of patronage* President Roosevelt, because he 
had been a governor* worked through this line instead of through Senators to 
achieve state-federal cooperation* the Congressmen, considering themselves 
ambassadors from their atate to the Federal Government , ware jealous of 
their prerogatives. they felt that they should have a voice on federal aid 
and appointment* within their state#^ the Cabinet had not always accepted 
Congressional recomeendations regarding appointments. thus, a fire was 
smoldering» which flamed forth during the voting on the independent Offices 
Appropriations Set* By this measure* Congress restored the wage cuts made 
in 1933* and increased veterans9 allowances* the editor thought it was 
ridiculous that such a minor matter mm patronage should inject itself .Into 
decisions involving a vital emergency recovery program#
This Presidential defeat had one bright side to Lawrence* It struck 
away the haunting fear* maintained by the Republican press* that Congress 
had abdlcted its position cad that Roosevelt was becoming a dictator#
The question that Lawrence now raised west how far would Congress go in 
substituting its own program for that of the President? Because the legis- 
lators were sincere in their attempts to do a good job of governing, the 
editor did. not believe that the threat of substitution was an area of con­
cern* Roosevelt did not want a spineless, docile* subservient Congress 
because it would not serve any useful purpose in the plan of government
^Frances Parkin*, the Roosevelt .1 Knew. 171. Arthur it* Schlesinger,
3*., M S M s a M M r n s l  <voi# ill of i M t eiSEiiteimm* *
Bostont The Houghton Mifflin Go#* 1957-1960), 415-421. 
l36St«r. March 15, 155*.
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Hie Congress overrode the President’s veto of the Independent 
Offices Appropriations Act on Kerch 27 end 28, 1954. Hie President had 
been caught between the necessity of balancing the budget and the neces­
sity of furnishing relief for the people. It was not a pleasant position. 
Roosevelt had used his veto, not objecting to the expenditure of the 
additional money voted by Congress, hut to the fact that Congress had 
not made provisions for securing the revenue. Hie uncanny spell which 
Roosevelt had over Congress was beginning to be broken.13?
Hie President changed his tactics, trying a "hands-off” policy in 
late March. He left Washington for two weeks of deep-sea fishing, and 
the pressure from the White House was relaxed. Roosevelt’s biographer,
James Burns, said that "soon Congress was looking like a schoolroom of 
disorderly boys with the master gone." Hie Democrats fought among them­
selves over the regulation of the stock exchange. More than one hundred 
Democrats came out in favor of an inflationary mortgage refinancing bill. 
Roosevelt sent word that, if this wild bill passed, he would fell the 
nation plainly just who was wrecking the recovery program. Vice President 
garner said that he had never seen the House in such abject turmoil in 
his thirty years of service. "Hie hands-off experiment was a dismal failure 
. . ." concluded Burns.13®
In April, Lawrence predicted that the "short” Congressional session 
would stretch out to six months. Roosevelt was "applying the lash" to 
make Congress Speed up. He was "determined to have it out with a recalcitrant
*37ibld., March 28, 1934.
^^Buraa, the Lion and the Fox. 186
and rebellious Congress and to reassert his leadership,” wrote the editor* 
Business tended to become unsettled during a lengthy legislative session*
It also meant more chance for undersirable legislation being presented 
and enacted.
As Congress continued its meetings, Lawrence foresaw that Boosevelt 
would have trouble with some pieces of undesirable legislation* First was 
the McLeod bill which would have provided Government payment of depositors 
who lost money in bank failures since 1930. Bather satirically, the editor 
asked why the date, 1930, was used as a cut-off point. And, if the Govern­
ment was to be in the business of reimbursing people for losses, why stop 
with banking losses? Although there were powerful forces back of the meas­
ure, the McLeod bill failed to pass* A second measure which was presented 
to Congress without Presidential approval was the Frazier-Lerake bill. This 
measure was designed to enable farmers to refinance mortgages, and at a 
lower interest rate* The administration had provided what it thought was 
adequate resources of cheap credit. The Frazier *-Lemke bill would leave the 
Government "holding the bag," thought Lawrence* The measure was passed, and 
the President signed it into law on June 28, 1934* Although Frazier and 
Lemke were not Republicans, the GOP backed their bill.
In fact, the Republican members of Congress had been voting solidly 
against the administration during the summer, reported Lawrence. The Republi 
can Floor Leader, Representative Bertram. Snell of Mew Fork, called on his par 
ty members to "exercise the function of a real opposition party*" The editor
*3%tar. April 16, July 2, 1934. The Frazier-Lemke Bill is discussed 
in more detail in Part Z of Chapter VII, this thesis.
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doubted that Repreaentative Snell could instill in the nation any confi­
dence in the Republican party* Anticipating the attache which the editor 
would make on the OOP during the campaign of 1936, Lawrence asked what the 
Republicans would offer in lieu of the Roosevelt program of recovery* What 
the party needed was new leadership, concluded the editor,**® the Democratic 
Congressional leaders, as well as Republican Snell, were attempting to 
control their followers, sometimes with less success.
Lawrence expressed the feeling that the President was apprehensive 
over Congressional schemes which might prove Inflationary* the “lesser 
political lights** often wanted to go further than the white Rouse desired, 
unconcerned with the political Implications involved* The editor suggested 
that Congress deliberate carefully before enacting any such measures* The 
President had presented a progressive, liberal program of reforms and social 
improvement* It was regrettable that he should be embarrassed by any irres­
ponsible Democratic Congressman who felt called upon to save the nation, 
using his own formula* Lawrence felt confident that there were a sufficient 
number of Democrats with common sense, who would hold down the visionaries* 
the last session of the Seventy*Third Congress closed on a note of revolt, 
and the Seventy-fourth Congress was to open under the same cloud.1**
The Seventy-Fourth Congress, first to convene under the provisions 
of the Twentieth Amendment, opened for work on January 3, 1935. The next 
day they listened as Roosevelt launched the second New Deal. It was to be
1A02feM*» **»«*» 30, 1934.
H I lb id.. December 26127, 1934. Bte editorial page for the 27th was 
erroneously dated December 26*
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a program of social reform with three goals. First* the better use of nat- 
ural resources for security of livelihood; second, social security; and 
third* slum clearance and improved housing conditions. Labor and the small 
farmer would be the chief beneficiaries of this program. Although Congress** 
men might have been in favor of these programs, their actions during the 
first six months of the session reflected their antagonism toward Roosevelt.
Once again Lawrence wrote that the largest area of contention between 
the Executive and the Legislature was over the division of the patronage 
pie. it was the editor’s opinion that the individual legislator would be 
glad to dispense with the program because of the troubles engendered, the 
President desired to keep partisan politics out of his program during the 
emergency period.143 Lawrence admitted that men and women who, through the 
lean years, had continued to work for the Democratic party, should have con­
sideration for appointments. But, the party could wreck itself in fifteen 
months by using politics as the primary consideration for appointments.
The control of patronage did not mean control of the electorate.
Hoover and the Republican party had all the patronage power in 1932, and 
it availed them nothing. The program of the party was the deciding factor. 
Lawrence predicted that many of the Republicans who voted for the Democrats 
would switch back if they found the Democrats insisting on patronage rights. 
There was also the possibility that a third party, composed of dissident
^^Rosenman, Papers, V, 10-12.
143Roosevelt had little patience for those who demanded that any prog­
ress Mbear the label of their own party.11 He said that he would give credit 
where credit was due. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Looking Forward (N.Y.: The
dohn Day Co., 1932), 235.
Democrats, could give the Republicans control of the Government again.
Lawrence wrote that the revolt of the young leaders within the Demo­
cratic party was e battle between the liberal and conservative wings of the 
party. If the contest remained along these lines, "it would be a refreshing 
campaign." The struggle, however, was over the spoils system -- a danger 
to the President and his program. The administration did not have as an 
objective the building up of any political machine for personal advance* 
ment. This concept was foreign to the ideals of the President; it was more 
In keeping with the practices of the "standpat" Republicans. The young men 
should give a second thought to their motives before withdrawing from the 
party. If the distribution of patronage was the real basis for their revolt, 
they would be destroying their usefulness as leaders at a time when the 
President and the party needed them badly.
In Hay 1935, Lawrence commented that the President had his back to 
the wall in his battle with Congress. The issue was the Batman Bonus bill 
which Roosevelt had vetoed because he considered it inflationary. In an 
unprecedented move the President delivered his veto message to Congress in 
person. The editor wrote that Roosevelt was at his best with his back to
lMstar, February 5,20,25, March 6, 1935.
lASfltid., august 8, 1933. Because Congressmen complained about giving 
New Deal jobs to Republicans, amendments requiring Senate approval of appointees 
were added to the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act which established the 
Works Projects Administration. Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval» 269.
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the well as he roiled up hid shirt sleeves to battle those Democrats who 
were determined to override him. ^  2he President's efforts were successful 
and his veto stood. Although Congress passed several of the measures for 
which Roosevelt asked, they did it almost grudgingly* nationwide, the 
Gallop poll found that the President's popularity had never been as low 
as it was in the fall of 1935* With this in mind, Roosevelt prepared his 
annual message to Congress, attempting to rekindle in the people and in 
Congress, the spark of enthusiasm for his program. 14?
Hie State-o£~the-tJnion message, delivered to an evening session of 
Congress, was planned almost as a keynote address for the election year* 
wrote Schlesinger. Hie press was most unkind in their accounts of the 
speech, wrote Lawrence. Hie reporters had misinterpreted the President's 
intentions* and also they had forgotten that several Presidents in the past 
had talked in the same way to Congress* Hie present situation was unique.
Hie Congress was overwhelmingly controlled by the President's party, 
and "presumably overwhelmingly in sympathy with his policy,” noted the 
editor. Hie fact was that large numbers of the Democrats were rebels.
Hie Federal Government was not alone in the revolt, continued Lawrence.
Even in Nebraska there were examples of rebellion. To all those in revolt, 
the President had "looked them square in the eye," and asked for the repeal 
of policies which "begat slavery at home and aggression abroad," recorded
146star. Hay IS, 1935* Roosevelt vetoed 505 bills during his first 
eight years in office* Congress repassed only seven of them. Schlesinger, 
Hie Coming the New Deal. 555.
147Schlesinger, Hie Politics of Upheaval. 502.
Lawrence. The editor called it the opening note of a great historical
struggle.1*8
This historical struggle was often between factions of the President’s
own party* both within Congress and without* A1 Smith spoke at a Liberty
League dinner in late January 1936. Lawrence wondered what would have been
his fate in Russia if Smith had spoken about Stalin the way he had spoken
about Roosevelt* Hie performance of the Leaguers was hypocritical and they
made fools of themselves* the editor commented.
Prances Perkins wrote that Roosevelt could not comprehend disloyalty*
Me expected his opponents to fight him* but
he was never prepared for the disloyalty end defection of people who 
called themselves his friends*
fhis sentiment was especially true during the election campaign of 1936.
Hie results of the election showed that the nation was still behind 
the President as they returned an overwhelmingly Democratic Congress to 
Washington to work with the re*elected President. Whether the Congressmen 
were behind him was another matter. During the "First Hundred Days," Con­
gress was ready to approve almost any Roosevelt plan for economic relief* 
After that period* Congress usually balked at approving any radical program. 
Hi is was especially true in the area of the economy*
t48Ibld.. 503. Star. January 6, 1936. Rosanman, Papers, %  102-107.
149star. January 23, 1936. Prances Perkins, She Roosevelt I Knew. 157.
He had the naive idee that those who had Joined up with him poll 
tically, were really on his side, to his club, so to speak*
and were with through thick and thin
CHAPTER W? 
mm FINANCE
Franklin D. Roosevelt came from the "wrong side of the tracks” to 
have a natural concern about economy. His parents, although not million-* 
sires, were sufficiently wealthy to be able to maintain the trappings of 
wealths The Hyde Park estate, Springwood, with its comfortable old house, 
annual visits to Europe for the Cure, summer vacations spent in the rustic 
setting of Gsmpobeilo, Hew Brunswick, and private tutors instead of formal 
schooling. These were the boyhood memories of the only child of doting 
parents. The Roosevelts moved in the class of the As tors and Vanderbilts,
Who also had Hudson River valley estates.
FDR was raised in a maner similar to the Whitney, the Mills, and the 
McCormick children. However, he learned from his parents the attributes of 
sympathy for others and an indifference to the claims of wealth. His father 
instilled in him an awareness of noblesse oblige, without the feeling of 
superiority. This gave a foundation to his political attitudes which was 
quite different from those conservative views held by others in his "class."*50 
At the age of fourteen, Franklin was sent to Groton, an exclusive boys school. 
There the emphasis was on the classics and liberal arts. It was during the 
silver versus gold campaign of 1896. Since the school was supported by the 
wealthy parents of the students, gold had the better of any discussion in 
the classroom.
After Groton, Roosevelt went to Harvard where he received the tradi­
tional middle-of-the road economic outlook of the turn of the century. He 
majored in History and Economics. Professor Daniel Fusfeld considered it signif-
*5^xugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt. 23-23.
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ieant that Roosevelt majored In Economics, and that his teachers, Ripley, 
Andrew, and Sprague, were advocates of economic reform. Roosevelt had an 
obvious interest in big-business and in monetary issues. Re learned that 
the role of government in business was to provide regulation to avoid abuses* 
During his two years at Columbia taw School, FDR wrote in his notebook that 
the great aim of political development was to bring the political system 
into accord with the social system* this education was good background for 
development of an economic philosophy, and yet it did not teach him how to 
meet the problems of economic instability Such as he would encounter in the 
great depression.
Fusfeld wrote that during the 1930s there were two schools of 
thought about Roosevelt*s economic policies. One thought that Roosevelt had 
a definite program of welfare legislation, while it was the opinion of his 
opponents that the President betrayed the American system of free enterprise, 
later historians, Fusfeld reveals, are of the opinion that Roosevelt himself 
had no specific economic philosophy; he was simply using the ideas of his 
advisors. In contradiction, from reading the documents available, Fusfeld 
Contends that Roosevelt had a well developed economic philosophy, based on 
a sound study and understanding of the subject#***
This latter opinion is shared by Thomas Greer, who wrote that the 
fundamental ideas Which Roosevelt held were his own, based on Jeffersonian 
tradition, molded by association with his cousin Teddy, and President Wilson.
*^*Daniel R. Fusfeld, Hie Economic Thought of Franklin P. Roosevelt 
and the origins of the Hew Deal (N.I.: Columbia University Press, 1956), 3, 
17, 33-37. Hereafter cited as Fusfeld, Economic Thought £f JDR*
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The views of FDR seldom conformed to the orthodox economist who went by the 
book, nor did this bother him, "Throughout the thirties he pursued an eco­
nomic policy which was predominantly national [sic] in aim and procedure," 
wrote Greer. Roosevelt himself wrote that "good government should maintain 
the balance where every individual may have a place if he will take it * . , ." 
The nation should work toward the time when depressions could not occur.*^2
I
TAKING THE BULLS AND THE BEARS 
At the time Roosevelt wrote his book, Looking Forward, the nation was 
deep in a depression* Business was on the ropes and needed help* During the 
1920s i tfie Hew Era of the Republicans had exaulted business almost as a religion* 
Success was the criterion by which things were judged* Ogden Mills, who was 
a Hyde Park neighbor and contemporary of Roosevelt, spoke in the House of Rep­
resentatives in 1926. He asserted that Federal centralization of control was 
"striking at the very cornerstone" of American institutions. Coolldge, who 
felt that the less the Federal Government interfered with business, the 
better, did his part to take the Government out of business*
Under this philosophy the nation in the Twenties seemed to go forward*
The living standards rose, business expanded, production increased. The faet 
was, this new prosperity created new problems, which those in authority and 
power did not know how to solve. The prosperity was spotty, overproduction 
commonplace. Speculation in the stock market was the accepted way to make
^^Thomas G. Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. The Social and Political 
Ideas of Franklin D. Roosevelt♦(East Lansing: The Michigan State University 
Press, 1958), 26, 45-46, 59. Hereafter cited as Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. 
Roosevelt, Looking Forward* 8,9.
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money. "As the twenties proceeded, the stock market socked off an increasing 
share of the undistributed gains of industrial efficiency," wrote Schlesinger.*^
When hoover was inaugurated in March 1929, he said, "I have no fears for 
the future of our country." Share were, however, a few dissenting voices, con* 
earned about the stock market boom. By that summer, the economic danger signs 
were showing, as consumer spending slackened and business inventories expanded. 
Wholesale commodity prices dropped off week after week. After minor setbacks 
in September, the stock market seemed to recover in October, only to dip sharply 
on October 23. Ihs next day, Thursday, the downward trend continued until 
Richard Whitney, a broker for J. Pierpont Morgan, came on to the floor and an* 
nounced that he would buy II. 3. Steel at 203, when it was available at 193-1/2. 
The action of the big financiers reassured the market temporarily, and it 
steadied until the next Monday. That week, as Variety magazine headlined, "WALL 
STREET LAY (ed) AM EGG." Within a month, the stock loss on paper was twenty* 
six billion dollars 1 Stocks had lost over forty percent of their value. 
Schlesinger wrote that "the Mew Era had come to its dismaying end."1^  All over 
the nation the economy sagged, and the Great Depression had begun.
In Nebraska, however, the difficulties of the citizens had not begun 
with the depression of 1929. By 1920, land prices had reached their peak 
as a result of the war-time demand for agricultural products. The decline of 
prices was sharp during the 1920s, and by 1935 the average assessed value
^^Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order. 57, 66.
154Ibid.. 153-159.
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per acre was forty-five to fifty percent less than in 1920. At the same 
time, farm mortgage indebtedness had increased, contracted for during the 
period of rising prices, to be repaid during the period of falling prices.^ 35 
ft was no wonder that the agrarian Midwest was antagonistic toward the indus­
trial East which apparently had placed the farmer in his poor economic position.
In August 1932, Roosevelt spoke at Columbus, Ohio. Xn the speech 
he recounted the failures of the Hoover administration. He especially dis­
cussed the evils of the security exchanges. Lawrence wrote an editorial, 
"Buccaneers In Business," in which he commented on the Roosevelt speech.
The naive public had been stampeded by high pressure salesmanship into 
pouring their savings into stocks and bonds. Roosevelt charged the Hoover 
administration with lulling the people into a false sense of security 
while giving no control or even attention to the ruthless operations of the 
financial wizards of Wall Street. Lawrence was certain that, as people 
studied the speech, they would realize that the candidate was a leader with 
the power to think clearly and speak honestly. These were valuable attri­
butes for a potential President. ^*6
After the potential President had become, in fact, President, he 
quickly acted to restore faith and hope in the American people. His efforts 
were so successful that by early dune, Lawrence was warning that Roosevelt 
was facing the same problem which had faced his two predecessors —  specu­
lation on the stock market. While the President was saying that the nation
15%itte, Final Relief Report. 46.
156Star. August 23, 1932.
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could not: ballyhoo Itself back to prosperity, Lawrence was surprised to 
report that people were reinvesting in securities, not Just for investments, 
but in the gamble to realize profits in the bull market situation* It was 
incredible to the editor, after the disaster of 1929, that anyone who had 
so recently said "never again,11 would be "« * * back again doing exactly the 
same thing that got them into trouble." This was the thing about which the 
President was warning, and about which he was going to act* Although the 
administration spokesmen reported that stock values were still below their 
fair market value, recovery would return people to thinking of speculation*
The editor was certain that the President desired recovery, but he was 0 0 0 0 1* 
ly certain that Roosevelt did not want it based on speculation* Positive
actlcm, possibly unpopular and difficult, would be necessary by the Presi-
1S7dent if his program was to succeed*
Roosevelt took the first step toward control of the stock market by 
the Federal Securities Act, known as the "Truth-in~Securities" Act, which 
was passed Hay 27, 1933* As the name implied, information on new securities 
was required to be made available to investors, mid new issues had to be 
registered with the Federal Trade Commission. An additional check on spec* 
ulatlon was a provision of the Banking Act of 1933, the Glass-Steagall Banking 
Reform Act, passed June 16. This provision strengthened the Federal Reserve 
Board's power to prevent banks using borrowed funds for speculation* Both of 
these measures were of an emergency nature and did not go as far as Roosevelt 
desired, but an improved bill had to wait on more urgent matters. The Banking
157Ibid., May J3, June 10, 1933.
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Act of 193S, the first major overhauling of the Federal Reserve Act since 
it was passed in 1913, was signed August 23, 1935.^®
In March 1934, Lawrence reported that the President was • • out 
to do something about that roaring canyon more familiarly known as Wall 
Street, and the Hew York Stock exchange-** In February, a stock exchange 
measure was introduced in the House by Sam Rayburn, and in the Senate by 
Duncan Fletcher. It was a fifty-page, intricate document, with three ob­
jectives. First, it was designed to protect investors from manipulators by 
placing stock trading practices under Federal supervision; second, to pro­
tect investors from misrepresentation by requiring the registration of new 
securities; and third, to reduce speculation by controlling the margin 
requirements for inves tments.159
In his message which accompanied the measure, Roosevelt complimented 
the Congress on regulating the investment business. He regretted that, out­
side the field of legitimate investment, speculation was a gamble which had 
been painted as an easy way to wealth for those who could not afford the 
loss of money. This gamble of speculation had not been confined to the indi­
vidual with his savings. Fools of individuals, and corporations, often using 
money which was not their own, attempted to manipulate the market for their 
own profit. Frequently, this resulted in the loss of savings of innocent
*-®®Tugwell, Ihe democratic Roosevelt. 288-289. Compare Roosevelt’s 
actions with what President Hoover wrote of his administration: "To ask Con­
gress for power to interfere in the stock market was futile . • . .** Herbert 
C. Hoover, Memoirs (3 vols. j- N.Y.: Ihe Macmillan Co., 1951-52), III, 16.
^%chlesinger, Ihe Coming of the New Deal. 457. Star. March 27, 1934.
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victims of the speculation. It was the opinion of the President that the 
national policy should present some restriction on the use of stock exchanges 
for purely speculative operations* They should he returned to a place of 
investment.160
Lawrence predicted that the administration was heading toward a tem­
pestuous contest when it tried to dehorn the sacred cow of Wall Street* The 
opposition claimed meddling and tinkering by the Government* The editor 
asked why the Government should concern itself with gambling; attempting to 
legislate morality for the people who wanted to risk all on the fickle turn 
of fate* The issue could not be defined in such simple terms for Lawrence*
Ihe stock exchange should not be blamed; it served a useful purpose in modem 
business as a part of industrial progress* The evil practices of speculation 
came during the 1910s* when trading departed from its original purpose* To 
the editor* this was sheer gambling* The erase had affected millions of people 
who could ill afford to lose money* In addition* testimony had revealed that 
several f inaneiers had pooled their knowledge and resources to manipulate 
stocks for their own gain* and at the expense of the hapless public* "They 
weren’t content with shearing; they took the hide and the hoofs*" commented 
Lawrence* Ho tears needed to be shed for the losses sustained by gamblers, 
but the innocent* honest Investor had also lost*
These were the evils at which the President was aiming* wrote Lawrence*
Ihe disease of speculation was attacking the very core of American life* It 
threatened American security and economic stability* People did not realise
i6%o©seveit* On Our Wav* 230-231.
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that for every person who won on the stock market, someone had to lose, the 
Government could not stop people from gambling, but the factors which cheated 
them could be controlled, therefore, it was a worthy and noble purpose which 
motivated the Fletcher-Rayburn bill.1**!
the reform measure was condemned by business men as the House Inter* 
state and Foreign Commerce Committee sat in discussions on the bill, the 
opposition contended that regulation of the exchanges was unnecessary, im­
practical, and dangerous. The most serious sounding charge was that the 
measure was part of the plan to turn the country Communistic. James H. Hand, 
Jr., of Remington Rand Corporation, produced a phamplet written by Dr.
William A. Wirt, an expose of Communists in Government. The "Wirt Affair" 
garnered headlines for a few weeks, but it did not influence the Committee. 
The Red Scare of 1934 turned out to be a farce.
In spite of the contention by the Hew York Stock Exchange President, 
Richard Whitney, that "the exchange is a perfect institution," he admitted 
that there had been abuses and excesses which had caused troubles in the 
nation's economy. But, he insisted, there was no need of Governmental reg­
ulations. When adherents of the measure contended that it would establish 
sound business practices and aid the general economic stability, Whitney 
countered that it would nationalize business. Big business leaders from 
all over the country Joined the fight to prevent passage of the measure.
Sam Rayburn called it "the most powerful lobby ever organized against any 
bill which ever came up in Congress." By April, a redraft of the measure
161Sear. Harch 27, April 17, 1934.
162See sunra. 22-24 for a discussion of the "Wirt Affair."
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was presented. It was more acceptable to Congressional and Wall Street mod* 
erates. Atter conferences in which the final differences were resolved, the 
measure was passed in early June. Roosevelt signed it on June 6, 1 9 3 4.
getting capital back to work had been a problem for the Roosevelt 
administration during 1934. Lawrence pointed out in December 1934 that 
bank deposits were at a high point while the number of bank loans was low.
He attributed this to the strict supervision of collateral by the bank 
examiners , and to the low volume of trade which caused a lack of business oppor­
tunity. Ihe recent order of the Federal Reserve Board for banks not to pay 
in excess of 2*1/2 percent interest on savings deposits, aroused interest* 
ing speculation for the editor. Ihe purpose of the order was to discourage 
the piling up of idle money. By driving this money into business, trade 
would be Increased and the economy strengthened. It was paradoxical to the 
editor that this nation, rich in bank deposits, was a nation poor in its 
economy. It was essential that this wealth be put to work, and the Presi­
dent could take credit for accomplishing this job.**^ Ihe economy continued 
to improve during 1935 and 1936.
In October 1936, the editor wrote that the "woeful" report by the 
President of the Hew York Stock Exchange was the best index of the value of 
the administration’s monetary policies. Charles Gay had written that the 
market was "thin and Illiquid" as a result of the obstacles which the Federal 
Government had placed in the path of purchases and sales of securities in
. ^^Schleelnger, Ihe Coming of the New Deal, 456*467. 
i64gtar. December 21, 1934.
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large quantities. The editor noted that Gay did not complain about the high 
level of prices on the market and the volume of sales which was rising stead­
ily* To the editor* the reason for the gloomy report was self-evident. Gay 
was a broker* Because of Governmental restrictions* large volumes of stocks 
could not be bought and sold at one time, and the more shares sold back and 
forth* the more money the brokers made*
another and more important fact was indicated to Lawrence by the report*
A damper had been placed on outright speculation* The people realised* as 
a result of the 1929 crash and the New Deal securities policies* that the stock 
market was not a financial playhouse* The market had become a place where 
investments could be made* using judgment instead of speculation* Lawrence 
felt that*
if for no other reason than that he * * . transformed the economic 
philosophy of American people from one of speculation to one of 
investment* President Roosevelt {would] go down in history as one 
of the great statesmen of all time**65
Controlling the stock market was one part of restoring the faith of 
Americans in the financial status of the country* But unless the people 
had the money available to Invest In the market* or in business* the effort 
would be wasted* As Roosevelt took office in 1933* the banking system of 
America was in the direst straits* and millions of people had their money 
tied up or lost due to bank closures* It was another facet of the blade 
diamond of depression which faced the new President* and which required a 
solution if the country was to survive*
163Ibid.. October 5, 1936.
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ALL THAT GLITTERS 
"The breakdown of the American banking system , • ♦. was not a sadden 
catastrophe," wrote Jesse K. Jones» former head of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation. Even during the periods of prosperity, while President Hoover 
was talking about the sound condition of the banks, an average of 634 banks 
failed each year# The depression period after 1029 accelerated the rate of 
failures, and in the two years, 1931 and 1932, there were 3,635 failures# 
Jones admitted that most of these hanks were small and should never have 
been opened in the first place# However, after the market break in 1929, 
more and more middle-sized banks had been appearing on the list of failures# 
Before the worst was over, banks with assets In the millions were destroyed# 
Although 1932 saw bank failures in several large cities, and a few 
states had declared bank holidays, the banking crisis Is considered to have 
begun in Michigan, in mid-February, 1933* The Union Guardian Trust, a bank 
holding company, was in trouble and asked for an RFC loan. If this company 
failed, all the Michigan banks would have to close* The loan was refused, 
because of the insolvent condition of the Bank, and even Reaery Ford would 
not lend his financial support# With no other course apparent, the Governor 
declared a bank holiday* Just like an infectious germ, the panic spread 
across the country* President Hoover wrote a secret letter to President­
elect Roosevelt, asking for his support, and in effect, asking him to re­
pudiate the proposed Hew Beal program* Roosevelt dismissed the letter as 
“cheeky.”
In a comment that would have done justice to editor Lawrence, Schles- 
inger wrote that Roosevelt watched the bankers asking for federal aid# They
77
had been high-minded when they objected to federal aid to farmers or the 
unemployed, but now they demanded assistance for themselves. Roosevelt’s 
comment was that he could see no reason to protect any one interest; the 
important thing was to save the people. While Hoover appeared to have lost 
all control of his administration, Roosevelt and his advisors were consider* 
lag a course of action, to be taken only after his inauguration. Until that 
time, FDR’s only comment was that Hoover should do what Hoover thought best.
Ihe Roosevelt discussions centered arround taking the country off of 
the gold standard. Under a never-used clause of the World War X, trading 
with the Enemy Act of 1917, the President could embargo gold exports by 
proclamation. Although Hoover felt that any action taken under this Act would 
be unconstitutional, Roosevelt determined that it was the best way, consid­
ering the emergency. Roosevelt considered that the presidency was not merely 
an administrative office. What the people needed was a leader who would take 
action.
Xhe first priority of action for the newly Inaugurated President, 
Roosevelt, was the banking crisis. It.dominated his whole first week in office, 
FDR arrived in Washington with the rough draft of his Executive Order for a four- 
day national bank holiday, using the authority of the Trading with the Enemy
167Act. Xhe order was announced on Sunday, March 5, to be effective on Monday.*
%n addition, Roosevelt called a special session of Congress, to convene on
^Jesse H. donee, Fifty Billion Dollars(M.Y.: Hie Macmillan Co. ,
1951), 13-17, passim: Schlesinger, Xhe Crisis of the Old Order. 474-483,
passim.
*^Roosevelt realized that it would take more time to complete the
March 9 and consider a permanent solution to the problem. The people
wanted action, mid Roosevelt gave them action.
A Roosevelt biographer, James Burns, wrote that the President and
his advisors realised that the real national problem was one of public
psychology. Hie people were frightened by the apparent inaction of the
Hoover administration. However, it was a curious fact that action had
been taken, If not by the Federal Government, at least by the states and
by the banks. By Inauguration bay, every state had announced a banking
holiday. Many large banks limited withdrawal amounts. To Burns,
Roosevelt played his role of crisis leader with such extraordinary 
skill that his action in keeping the banks closed in itself struck 
the country with the bracing effect of a March wind. Els action 
was essentially defensive, negative, and conservative —  but he 
made it a call to a c t i o n . 1^8
On March #, 1933, editor Lawrence asked the reader *d*at had happened 
during the three days since President Roosevelt had taken office. What 
action had changed the temper of the people and altered their out look f 
tt was the impression they got of a ". • • vigorous, confident, and deter­
mined leader with a definite program of action and the ability to put it in 
force,’* he wrote. At least for the time being, slothfulness, indifference, 
and “the contemptible philosophy which brought on ruin and disaster,” had 
passed.
Xhe Roosevelt philosophy was not a new system, but a return to the
investigations preliminary to allowing the banks to reopen. ’’Quite frankly,” 
he wrote, "we believed that it was better to limit the first proclamation to
four days and to extend the closing by later proclamation than it would have
been to close the banks for an unlimited period In the first instance.”
Roosevelt, On Our Wav. 17.
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old system of «Je£Person, Lincoln, and Wilson* For Lawrence,
from the strength of his ideals of government, strongly and vigor­
ously compelling wrongdoers to observe the decencies of modem 
society, the American people [would] take strength and hope*
The editor did not expect the Government under Roosevelt to do anything 
which the individual should rightly do for himself, but he did expect that 
the Government should protect the individual from those who would use it 
to enrich it themselves* “Expediency is dead and right arises from the 
ashes,M exalted Lawrence.*69 Roosevelt went right to work on the bank crisis.
The President and his advisors completed the drafting of the banking 
bill only one-half hour before the Congress met on March 9* The Congress­
men would not wait for the normal rules of order. By unanimous consent, 
the emergency banking bill was presented, and forty minutes allowed for 
debate* The House approved the measure without a recorded vote, and the 
Senate approved it a few hours later* The bill, which gave the President 
dictatorial power over the currency, was presented to the President, and he 
signed it at 9 o’clock that evening.170
In his Banking Pay address, Roosevelt described the crisis and what 
steps he was taking to aid recovery. Only those banks which could prove to 
be sound would be allowed to open. The first banks to open would be those 
in the twelve Federal Reserve Bank cities* The next day, banks in cities which 
had clearing houses, and then, banks in smaller cities* The delay would 
allow banks to spply for RFC loans* The President thanked the Congress,
169Star. March 8, 1933.
^Ojtoosevelt, On Our Wav. 15* Bums, The Lion and the Fox. 166-167* 
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on both sides of the aisle, for its devotion to the welfare of the public.
The President later wrote that great sums of money name out of hiding and 
were deposited after his comment that hoarding was unfashionable, and that 
money was safer in the reopening banks than in the mattress.^*
Jesse Jones described the hoarding fever which gripped the nation 
during the banking crisis, The Senate investigations, under Committee 
Counsel Ferdinand Pecora, had further weakened the already shakey faith which 
the people had in banks. By the end of February 1933, money in circulation 
was 6*1/2 times its normal amount, as a result of hoarding. At the same 
time, bank deposits were down. Even the bankers began to hoard. By calling 
in loans and disapproving new ones, they attempted to get their banks into 
a more liquid position, but their actions only increased the apprehension of 
the public.The actions of Roosevelt during his first week in office appar*^ l/;c 
ently restored confidence in the banking system.
Editor Lawrence reported an "extraordinary spectacle" in the banks 
of Lincoln, after they reopened for business on March 14. "An aggregate of 
$1,700,000 was deposited in excess of the sums withdrawn," he wrote. Even 
though much of this was accumulated pay checks, hundreds of thousands of 
dollars was money which had been hidden away in safety deposit boxes, tin 
cans, and other secret places. "It was estimated” he continued, "that over
i/lRoosevelt, 0& Our Wav. 26*31. "I have always felt that Roosevelt1 s 
Banking Day Address will go down in history as one of the greatest utter* 
ances of an American President." Farley, Jim Parley^ Story. 36.
*?2jones, Fifty Billion Dollars. 15, 18; Schlesinger, The Crisis of 
the Old Order. 457 •
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a million dollars of hoarded currency aid gold coin exposed itself to the 
sunlight for the first time in weeks, months, and in many instances, years*" 
Coins and hills, many musty and dusty, were piled high on the coun­
ters of the hank tellers. It was impressive evidence of the feats which had 
gripped the people* It was also a demonstration of the rebirth of confi­
dence and faith which the nation had in the new President and his adminis­
tration. Lawrence considered it unfortunate that Hoover had not applied 
these stem tactical it might have averted the banking crisis* "He was out 
of step with the times," was the kindest comment the editor could make*
Honest people rejoiced that there were only a minority of dishonest hankers,
173and Lawrence was proud that the Nebraska hanks had proven sound* A new day 
was dawning for American finance, and for the American people.
La July 1933, as an example of the renewed faith which the people 
had in the financial stability of the nation, Lawrence reported the over­
subscribing of a new Government Bond issue. To him this demonstrated two 
things* Besides the confidence shown In the Government and its program, the 
oversubscription showed that there was plenty of money available in the 
country for any sound investment opportunity *^^ There was, however, the prob­
lem of getting a loan to start a business*
In September 1934, Lawrence commented on a statement by the Presi­
dent at a press conference* Roosevelt had expressed concern over the atti­
tude of certain bank examiners when approving loans to individuals and to 
businesses* Before loans would be approved, the applicant needed to produce
**3Star. March 15, 1933*
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collateral of the moat ironclad typej his character did not count for any- 
thing. Ihe human element had been taken out of the loan business. Roose- 
velt asked for a return to the rule of reason in this matter.
To Lawrence, the over-tough policy of the examiners stuck at the 
very heart of the Roosevelt recovery program. This program was based on 
faith and confidence in the nation’s future. No one, except those who have 
abandoned all hope in the future of America, could approve the use of "panic 
valuations” instead of normal valuations for property offered as loan col­
lateral. No recovery program could succeed if the credit facilities of the 
nation were paralyzed in such a maner. Credit was the backbone of modern 
business, the editor contended. The President had done the correct thing 
by pointing the finger of guilt at the source of the trouble* Ihe attitude 
of the examiners needed to change if the nation was to go forward. * 5^ 
Tn March 1933, Lawrence had recorded the fact that the Federal 
Reserve was issuing six billion dollars in Federal Reserve notes, which was 
equal to all the currency then in existence. The Federal Reserve was acting 
within the law, and avoided cheapening the money by keeping up the redemp­
tion percentage. The editor saw this expansion of the currency as having 
an Immediate effect on the economy by advancing prices and values.*76 
Although there was now an ample supply of money in circulation, the Govern­
ments gold supply which backed the paper money, was being slowly depleted.
To the bankers of the world, the gold standard had been looked upon
175Ibid., September 13, 1934 176Ibld.. March 10, 1933
as the holy of holies. The currencies of most of the nations was based on 
gold. However, this common base was frequently the cause of internal finan­
cial problems. As foreign Investors dumped their holdings on the markets, 
gold moved away from the country, This happened in 1931 when Great Britain 
went off the gold standard. Within six weeks, fifteen percent of the mon­
etary gold In America was on its way overseas.*77 xo dampen or prevent such 
fluctuations, with the resultant effect on the nation1# economy, was the 
Intent of the Roosevelt administration.
Roosevelt considered that control over the nation's monetary stand­
ards was the sovereign power of the Government. His monetary policies were 
influenced by the theories of Professor George F. Warren of Cornell Univer­
sity. Xt was Warren's opinion that, if the price of gold was raised, the 
effect would be a general commodity price rise. This was not a radical 
idea in 1933. Debtors and other ardent inflationists wanted to go further 
printing more paper money and bimetal ism. Increasing the price of gold 
seemed a conservative measure by c o m p a r i s o n . *78
Xn early April 1933, the gold reserves in the United States banking 
system was causing concern for the administration. Xhe stock level was not 
dangerously low, but the flight of gold to foreign shores could become un­
controllable. On April 20, by Executive Order, the President prohibited the 
exporting of gold. The effect was immediate. Xhe domestic price level went
*77Jones, gjftv Billion Dollars. 14-15.
*78©teer, What Roosevelt Thought. 56. John Morton Blum, From the 
Morgenthau Diaries. Tears of Crisis. 1928-1939 (2 vols.5 Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co., 1959-65), X, 61-62. Hereafter cited as Blum, Morgenthau Diary
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up, and the American exchange weakened in terms of foreign currencies* Xt 
has been argued that on April 20, 1933, the country went off of the gold 
standard* To Roosevelt, the nation did not go off because the legal gold 
content of the dollar remained the same* But in another sense* we did leave 
the gold standard because gold ceased to be a medium of exchange*
President Roosevelt recounted an anecdote on the situation* When 
the Secretary of the Treasury* William Woodln, arrived at the White Bouse 
the morning after the announcement* Roosevelt looked serious and said that 
he had bad news to report —  that the country was off the gold standard* 
Woodin, being a good sport, threw up his hands and exclaimeds "What, again?" 
In October 1933, an unsuccessful attempt was made to raise prices by bid­
ding up the price of gold on the world market* In January 1934* Roosevelt*
with the approval of Congress* announced a reduction of the gold content in
179the standard dollar*
To Lawrence, as to many economists* the authority to call in all of 
the nationfs monetary gold and silver rested with the Government* Congress 
also had the authority to determine the gold content of the dollar* There­
fore, Congress was within its Constitutional rights When it gave the Pres­
ident the power to devalue the dollar* Calling on the Federal Reserve Banks 
to surrender their gold was also within the power of Congress* because the 
Banks had been created by Congress* Their purpose In being was to provide 
the means by which the nation's currency could be expanded or contracted 
to meet the needs of the economy* Therefore, the Banks had no legal right
179Roosevelt* On Our Wav* 58-61; Greer* What Roosevelt Thought* 56-57.
to make a profit* Changes in the value of the dollar meant that the Govern­
ment would make a profit, and because the people were the Government, Law­
rence equated that the people would profit in the end* With twice as many 
dollars available, the result of the six billion dollars Federal Reserve note 
issue in March 1933, the President's recovery plan could go forward without 
the burden of additional taxes*
What the editor called a "dreary statement of national policy11 had
a far-reaching effect on each American. This was the opening comment
he used when explaining the administration** monetary program to the 
reader in January 1934* During times of prosperity, the people fended 
to overlook the connection between the citizen and the Government* Washing­
ton was a remote place, and what transpired there seemed to have little con­
nection with the individual* During the emergency, however, Lawrence was 
certain that no person could truthfully say that it was no concern to him 
what the Government in Washington did* "It took an awful bump to educate 
the people * • • to the importance of weighing governmental policies," was 
his comment.
For three years during the emergency, the Federal Government had been 
makiog idec is ions, not the least complex being those concerning monetary 
policy* Historically speaking, recalled the editor, the nation had been 
wedded to "sound money" and the gold standard since the campaign of 1396* 
President Roosevelt must have called upon his profound knowledge of history, 
wrote Lawrence, and reviewed these facts before developing his own monetary
l80Star. January 15, 1934
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program. With this program in operation Lawrence was frank to admit that 
it was an experiment and that no one knew exactly where it would lead. But 
at least something was being done, which was considered a blessing by the 
editor.
Hie purpose of the Roosevelt monetary program was to return the dol­
lar to a value so that commodity prices would approximate the 1926 level. This 
was necessary, thought Lawrence, if obligations, contracted during that time, 
were to be discharged in 1934* the program would restore the purchasing 
power of the people, which was a fundamental requirement for the profitable 
operation of all business. Hie Roosevelt dollar was a sound dollar, and his 
monetary program was a sound program, and there was no lack of faith or 
confidence by the people.Lawrence wrote a second editorial on the Roose* 
velt monetary program on January 16. Two editorials on the^same day on the 
same subject were unusual for Lawrence. Apparently he felt that it was im­
portant for his readers to understand the administration's program.
In this second editorial entitled "All Must Go Forward Together," 
the editor told of the outcome of the North Dakota wheat embargo. It was po­
litical advertising for Governor William Langer, but it did not benefit the 
farmer. Hie courts had rendered the verdict of "unconstitutional,*' because 
it interfered with interstate commerce. Agriculture could not recover using 
any such freak remedies. What was needed was a broad national program which 
considered the welfare of all the diverse segments of the population. Hie 
President had such a program, wrote Lawrence, and his monetary policy was
l81Ibtd., January 16, 1934
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at the root of it. the editor then described this policy again, ending the 
editorial with the comment that the expanding economy of the nation required 
the increased volume of money, the deflationary trend of the national finan­
cial policy during the Earding-Coolidge-Hoover reign, was being reversed. 
Although Lawrence had such high hopes for the Roosevelt program, unfortunately 
it did not prove to be successful, and Roosevelt abandoned further changes 
in the gold content of the dollar.This did not end the controversy over 
the gold standard and the administration monetary program.
Several individuals and corporations sued other individuals and cor­
porations oyer the change in the gold value of the dollar * Xt was their 
contention that their contracts had been agreed to under one value of the 
dollar, and they expected payment with the same value dollar. Four cases 
were decided by the Supreme Court in February 1935, affirming the consti­
tutionality of the Congressional Joint Resolution of June 5, 1933, under 
which the President had devalued the dollar. Lawrence made editorial com­
ments on the momentous decision and its importance.
As a practical aspect, it had been the editor's experience that, 
even though the contracts he signed often had the moot gold clause, gold 
dust was not expected for the payment. Ihe payment of the debt was always 
accepted in the money in circulation, and this would now continue to be the 
legal payment* The future of the debt structure of America had rested on 
the outcome of the decision. If the Court had decided for the plaintiffs, 
Lawrence was certain that billions of dollars of debts would have had to
182Ibid. 183Greer, What Roosevelt thought. 58.
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be written off* Instead, these debts would be paid In full* There was, he
reported, an Instantaneous change in the markets* Security and commodity
prices surged upward in a general advance* To the editor, the 5-4 Court
decision showed the division between the conservative and the liberal
184elements in the Court, and in the country*
In editorials on Hay 14 and 16, 1935, Lawrence attempted to educate 
those conservative Democrats who were antagonistic toward Roosevelt's mone­
tary program. He reviewed the wild and ruinous inflation of credit which 
occurred during the Republican 1920s, causing the collapse of banks and 
other financial institutions. The first problem which Roosevelt attacked 
when he came to office was the restoring of commodity prices, and his efforts 
were successful* Those Democrats who called themselves Cleveland-Democrats 
would not be sure how Cleveland would have reacted if he had assumed the 
Presidency during a crisis similar to that facing Roosevelt In 1933*
Conditions were exactly opposite from what they were in the l$90s*
At that time, the United States wanted to go to a bimetal basis of the cur­
rency, but Europe would not do it* In 1933, most of Europe had left the 
gold standard while America was trying to maintain it. This proved to Law­
rence the wisdom of Secretary of the Treasury Morganthau when he stated that 
America could not go it alone in stabilising the dollar* Lawrence used this 
situation as an analogy for the relationship between the people and Roose­
velt* The people must believe In the Government to complete the process of 
recovery, and to Lawrence, the future seemed hopeful* The drouth appeared
^^Horris, Encyclopedia of American History * 498 ; Star* February 19,
1935*
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to have been broken end business appeared improved. The continued cooper­
ation of farmer and businessman was required because, wrote Lawrence, the
185President could not bring about recovery alone. The relation between 
recovery and financing that recovery was very close. As recovery improved, 
the cost of recovery increased. Deficit spending became a way of life.
Ill
FINANCING THE RECOVERY 
As the lame duck Congress convened In December 1932, President 
Hoover realized that It was his last opportunity to complete his desired 
programs. The important thing to him was to balance the budget while re­
maining on the gold standard. A sales tax was the speediest way to accom­
plish these ends* This proposal was presented to the President-elect, who 
disavowed it* This disavowal did not mean that Roosevelt did not want to 
raise new revenue. In fact, he felt that additional Government income was 
necessary because, at that time, he was still attempting to plan a balanced 
budget operation.
Pressures from many sides came In on Roosevelt, attempting to sway 
him to one point of view or another. The conservatives were depending on 
the pledge which Roosevelt made in his Pittsburgh campaign speech, a pledge 
of retrenchment, sound money, and budget balancing* The liberals remembered
his campaign promises of relief and public works. But what Roosevelt would
186do was revealed to neither side until he took office.
18SStar. May 14, 16, 1935.
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The emergency session of Congress met on March 9, 1933, and immed­
iately passed the President’s Emergency Banking Relief Act* The next day, 
Roosevelt surprised the Congress with a measure on economy. He told 
why the request for power to effect economy in Government was necessary* It 
was Imperative to restore economic order, and there was no time d:or a "leisurely 
approach," he said. He was pointing out a definite need, and a definite 
solution. After a revolt by the Democrats in the House, primarily over the
181request to decrease veteranra relief payments, the bill passed the next day*
Lawrence, in an editorial on March 11, cited the vigor with which 
Roosevelt tackled this problem of economy as expressive of the man of action 
who had moved into the White House. It was a bold, adventurous move —  
asking Congress to let him make the reductions in Federal spending* It was 
a courageous move —  asking for reductions in veterans' appropriations* The 
editor wrote that Roosevelt literally walked "into the lions' den" because 
of the power which veterans' organisations held and the pressures which 
they could exert* Lawrence was certain that the President did not want to 
Sacrifice veterans * benefits, only overhaul the program and eliminate the 
abuses* There were, Lawrence added, many other areas for economy in the Govern­
ment. A review of the bureaucracy would find sections which could be elim­
inated as serving no useful purpose.*^ ®®
^ 7Bums, The Lion and the Fox. 167; Roosevelt, On Our Way. 19-21.
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Of course, not everyone was so certain that the Roosevelt program 
was the answer to financial stability* On May 4, 1933, the editor told of 
Betty Richman of Chicago, who Interrupted the House of Representatives to 
shout, "You can’t relieve the depression that way* You can’t spend money 
you haven’t got*’1 Ho thing that had been done during the preceding six months 
would help recovery, she contended* As far as the Midwest was concerned,
Lawrence did not feel that the facts would bear out her charges* Com prices 
were three times, and wheat prices two times what they were when Roosevelt 
took office* The editor predicted that the economic conditions would con­
tinue to improve under the leadership of the President*
HMlss Richman,** the editor wrote, "did raise a question which [had] been 
bothering many people * . **1f Where was all of the money which had been cir­
culating during the boom years? Actually, he answered, there never was that 
much money# The economy had existed on credit* At the peak of the inflation 
period, $22*50 of credit was utilized for each dollar of currency* At the 
bottom of the depression, the ratio was 3-1* What had disappeared was not 
the real wealth of the nation, but the yardstick by which wealth was measured* 
Lawrence commented that Roosevelt had two choices of tactics to use in recovery*
Either he could allow the deflation to continue, or he could undertake controlled
189Inflation* The later course, which he chose, was considered best by the editor* 
With the several big news stories In the fall of 1933, Lawrence wrote 
that little notice had been made of the Government’s attempts at balancing 
the budget* For several weeks the daily Treasury reports had shown a cash
189Ibid., May 4, 1933.
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balance o£ ever one billion dollar a. Income was so close to outgo that the 
treasury could be considered on an even keel. Uncle Sam was spending a 
great deal of money for its ordinary and emergency functions but these expend­
itures mere offset by the emergency revenue legislation which the Govern** 
ment had enacted. Xn addition, the increase in business activity meant 
that increased taxes would be paid into the treasury.
Conservative businessmen were generally opposed to Roosevelt's tax 
and fiscal policies. Xn a Hew Year's Bay editorial, 1934, Lawrence commented 
on the tax ideas Of William Randolph Hearst, California publisher. Hearst 
demanded that the income tax be replaced by a sales tax. To the editor, 
this was taking the burden of the government's financial support away from 
those who had income and could afford to pay, and placing it on those who 
could least afford to support the Government. The income tax, together 
with the inheritance tax, was the only way to "prevent the accumulation of 
dynastic wealth," according to Lawrence. He pointed to Great Britain as an 
example of a nation Which prospered in spite of a severe income tax. Hie 
Congress would undoubtedly disregard Hearst when it considered higher taxes, 
a measure necessary to support the budget which Roosevelt was planning.
When Roosevelt announced his budget request in his speech to Congress 
on January 4, 1934, Lawrence wrote that it was a distinctly encouraging report. 
The projected debt figure of $31,834,000,000 was approximately the same as 
the safety figure given by Republican Senator David Reed of Pennsylvania.
190ibid.. September 12, 1933.
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Much of the money loaned through the various emergency agencies would he 
repaid, and should not be classified as part of the debt. As to the moneys
which was given for relief, Lawrence felt that this should he considered
in the same light as the expense of ah illness • And Uncle Sam had been 
very ill.^2 However, the Illness was not necessarily fatal, and with the 
proper kind of financing, recovery should not take long.
In the spring of 1934, Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau recom­
mended to the Senate Judiciary Committee that loopholes In the tax laws be 
closed so that the rich could not avoid paying taxes on securities. Law­
rence wrote that this suggestion would meet with the hearty commendation of 
a majority of the citizens of the country. It would also place a more nearly 
fair share of the burden of Government support on those who could pay it. 
"There (was] no valid reason why the owners of these high class properties 
should not help support the governments which protect them," was his opin­
ion. Besides taxing securities, Lawrence felt that the "court-made law"
which tax-exempted the salaries of public officials should be abolished*
Millions of dollars in revenue to the state and Federal Government had been 
lost because^iTthis ruling.
On March 27, 1934, the editor reported on the progress of the new 
tax bill discussion in the Senate* He wrote that "soak the rich" had been 
changed to "soak the investor." The new measure was supposedly to contain 
provisions which would penalise investors of all sorts, by lowering the
^ 2Star* January 5, 1934.
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surtax limit on the income from such sources. Unfortunately, Lawrence 
pointed out, this could mean added taxes for elderly people who had worked 
hard.and invested in mortgages, bonds, and securities for retirement income* 
On the other hand, high-salaried individuals would be exempted because of an 
"earned income" exemption* Public officials would continue to be exempted 
from taxes on their salaries* the ordinary wage earner, who needed the most 
help, would receive no help from the new measure, because there was no change 
in current exemption amounts* "It used to be considered right * * , for citi- 
sens to save , . * (but) now the idea is to penalise them for doing it," 
wrote the editor. In the final version, the Revenue act of It34 raised 
slightly in income, estate, and gift taxes in the higher brackets. Morgen- 
thau felt that it was only the beginning.
During the summer of 1934, the Executive branch had left the choice 
of new taxes up to the Congress* Meanwhile, Secretary Morgenthau and his 
Staff were developing new policies, the primary interest being on revenue. 
When Roosevelt let it be known that he did not favor imposing further taxes, 
or increasing the current taxes, Lawrence saw it as encouragement to ail 
types of business enterprises to expand their activities. Ihis would have 
the effect of decreasing unemployment and promoting recovery. In Nebraska, 
the Democratic party, newly elected to power, pledged that taxation would not 
change, this did not mean that either government would conduct a pinchpenny 
operation* It was an adherence to the traditional Democratic policy of 
economy in administration. Both the fresident, and the Governo r-elec t
*9*8tar. March 27, 1934; Blum, Morgenthau Diary. 290.
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deserved the backing of their Legislatures in efforts toward an economic 
government operation, admonished Lawrence.^**
When Roosevelt presented his budget message In January 1935, Lawrence 
predicted that the Republicans would be highly critical, The President had 
stated that the predicted national debt would be thirty-four billion dollars 
at the end of fiscal year 1936. This would be eight billion dollars more than 
at the end of the World War# Figures this large staggered the imagination of 
a laymen* For a comparison, the editor recalled that, prior to 1916, no peace­
time year debt exceeded one billion dollars, and at the end of the Civil War, it 
was only slightly more than that* Adding the debts of the other political sub­
divisions, the gross public debt was approximately $600 per person* "It [was] 
the equivalent of a mortgage against all existing property in this country of
about twenty percent and a tax burden • • • of about forty per cent," reported 
196the editor* This was a heavy load to carry on the way to recovery, but 
the expenditures appeared necessary*
Roosevelt had come to accept the necessity of deficit spending, but 
he continued to campaign against wasteful spending* Congress was admonished 
to shun "opportunist" appropriations, and to use long-range planning for 
public works projects* In 1935, Roosevelt admitted that the budget could 
not be balanced, and he was disappointed but not discouraged* To Lawrence, 
the question of Governmental spending was simply; was the expenditure nec­
essary, and was it sound? America and Americans had always been in debt,
^^Star, November 28, 1934; Blum, Morgenthau Diary* 297-298. 
^*>8t a r . January 8, 1935*
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he wrote, but this indebtedness was accepted because It led to the develop­
ment o£ the country. When he came to office, Roosevelt had two choices; 
either he could ignore the cries of the destitute and balance the budget* 
or he could relieve the suffering through deficit spending. He chose the 
latter course in spite of the price. "Any other plan would have invited 
even more grave and disturbing danger," predicted Lawrence. *-^7 Deficit 
spending would be a way of life for Americans, and the world, for some time.
In February 1936, Lawrence listed the names of large companies which 
had showed profits for the year, In spite of an unbalanced Federal budget, 
this was a handsome expression of appreciation for the President. Because 
it was an election year, and the Republicans would use the charge of deficit 
spending as a campaign issue, the editor reminded the reader just who had begun 
the unbalancing of the budget. President Hoover had an unbalanced budget during 
the last two years of his term. His plan for recovery had been to make huge 
loans to big business, and hope that the recovery process would trickle down 
to the "grass roots." this plan augmented the national debt by five billion 
dollars, and the expected recovery did not take place. Roosevelt, however, 
had insituted a program of direct relief to avert disaster, and in so doing, 
he reestablished faith among the people. It was the opinion of the editor 
that this much-maligned program should be considered both in terms of human 
suffering, and in the "cold, black balances of American Business."^8 And 
those American businessmen were very unhappy with the President
197Ibid.; Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. 55.
*9®Star, February 4, 1936.
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because of his tax program.
It being an election year, as Lawrence predicted, the Republicans made 
deficit spending a campaign issue. But Roosevelt could not cut expenditures 
at that time because of the severe drouth which harrassed the Midwest. In 
September, Lawrence wrote that those "snappers" who were snapping at Roose­
velt and his financial policies justified themselves on the ground^that 
the administration had increased taxes until they became a crushing burden 
to the taxpayer. Futher, they said that the consumer paid the indirect 
taxes. To dispel the fallacy that indirect taxes were up excessively from 
their 1932 level, Lawrence pointed out that the corporation income tax was 
only 3/4 of a percent above what it had been for ten years. Ihe editor 
presented an example of how this affected che farmer. Assuming that 
a company made $100 profit on a $1,000 tractor, the tax would have been 
$12.50 in 1932. in 1936, assuming the same transaction, the fax would 
be $13.25. the difference of 75$ went toward salvaging the nation. "Who 
would say that it (was) a bad bargain?", asked the editor.^ 9
Who Indeed could say that the financial policies of the Roosevelt 
administration had been a bad bargain? Ihey were part of an attempt to 
lift the country out of the dark depths of depression. But another part of 
this "lifting attempt" involved the nation*s business community. It was 
the Rational Industrial Recovery Act, passed in June, 1933.
*^ Ibid. September 24, 1936; Blum, Morgenthau Diary. 268.
CHAPTER V 
BIG BUSINESS
During much of the history of the United States, business was rela­
tively uncontrolled by the Government. The expansion which began during 
the Civil War led to the creation of industrial combinations, or trusts.
State laws were powerless to deal with those companies which had interstate 
commerce. Finally, in 1390, the Sherman Antitrust Act was passed to curb 
the forming of these empires. "The existence of the statute did not pre­
vent the continued growth of • • • monopolies under other names," commented 
the Encyclopedia of American History. As President, Teddy Roosevelt gained 
a reputation as a trust buster; forty-four antitrust suits were started during 
his administration. Additionally, state reform movements attacked the alliance 
between machine politics and organized wealth.^®®
In spite of these efforts, business and industry were able to main­
tain and strengthen their position. A high protective tariff was contin­
ued from 1961 through 1909, and again during the 1920s. Attempts by 
organized and unorganized labor to better their lot during this period 
usually ended with state or federal troops being used to break the strikes.20* 
Franklin Roosevelt considered that after the World War, an unplanned 
pyrsmldding of production and speculation led to ithe^depression of 1929. 
Industry blamed the antitrust laws, and the farmer blamed the industrialist. 
Neither was exactly correct. When Roosevelt came to Washington in 1933, he 
planned on a "New Deal" for America. This would include all segments of the 
economy.
2^ Q$iorris, Encyclopedia of American History. 261, 266-267, 270. 
ZOllbld., 551-553. 202Rooaeveit, On Our Wax. 85
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Frances Perkins, Secretary of labor in Roosevelt’s cabinet, wrote 
that this meant that the "little man nobody knew ranch about* would get 
a better break from the Government. She did hot think that the New Deal 
was a preconceived plan. Use general idea# were there, and the specifics 
were filled in as the programs grew. Roosevelt "worked with his Instincts," 
she said. In a similar vein, Dexter Perkins, a historian of the New Deal 
period, did not feel that the people could he sure of what they were getting 
when they voted for Roosevelt in 1932. They knew a great deal about Rooee- 
*•»*# b“* little ebout the program which he proposed.203
If Roosevelt did not have a well-defined program, he did have a knowl- 
edge of the situation. Roosevelt realised that business and its problems 
were not isolated from the affairs of the other segments of the nation’s 
economy, To successfully deal with one, he had to deal with all of them*
By 1932, he had decided that the nation had completed its industrial plant 
expansion. What was needed after that was better administration, 'Which was 
a job for Government and Industry, working together as partners. He felt 
that the majority of businessmen were willing to cooperate in this venture.
The era of unguided business competition was passed; the Government had a 
responsibility to provide a directing head.204
In spite of appearances, Roosevelt did not envision a completely planned 
economy* The Government should inject its helping hand only to "adjust parts9
203prances Perkins, Jfce Roosevelt I knew. 163-166 ; Dexter Perkins, 
New Age of Roosevelt. 5, 6.
204<Jreer, Nhfot Roosevelt Thought. 47-48, 59; Roosevelt, fig Our 
Wav. 40, 88.
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which got out of lino. Henry Wallace, while serving as the Secretary of 
Agriculture, wrote that certain limits were needed on the old ideas of com- 
petition and individualism* The Government was the agency to furnish these 
limitations. The democracy could endure, he concluded, only if there was a 
balance among the major producing groups.20$ The concepts of the National 
Recovery Administration can be discerned in these writings.
I
THE BLUE EAGLE
In one of his books on Roosevelt, John T. Flynn attempted to show that 
the NRA was not the brain child of President Roosevelt and his advisors. He 
cited the report of a Committee on Continuity of Business and Employment, 
created by the United States Chamber of Commerce in 1931. In the report, 
Flynn contended, the Committee proposed a program of controls Identical 
to those later incorporated into the NRA.^^ Who first thought of the pro­
gram is immaterial. The fact is that Roosevelt was the person in a position 
to implement the program, and who had the nerve to implement It.
The famous Hundred Days during the summer of 1933 was begun with the 
efforts to save the American banking system* The first New Deal measure 
was for the relief of the farmer. During those early days, Industry seemed
205goosevelt, Looking Forward. 13; Henry A. Wallace. New Frontiers 
(N.Y.s Reynal and Hitchcock, 1934), 16, 21.
206joim x. Flynn, Country Squire in the White House (N*¥«s Doubleday, 
Doran, 1940), 77* Frances Perkins [The Roosevelt I Knew* 197 ], claimed 
that when she talked to Roosevelt in April 1933, ”* * * his mind was as 
innocent as a child’s of any such program as NRA." Roosevelt later wrote 
[On Our Wav. S4]: "It would not be fair to say that the National Recovery
Act was proposed as a last-minute happy thought, any more than it would be 
to say that it was thought out and planned for before the new Administration 
came in*"
to have been left out of the picture* The "heart of the American economy" 
was heating only faintly. But, Roosevelt related, even before the inaug­
uration, he and his staff had been examining hundreds of plans for the 
rehabilitation of industry. Industry, and the nation, could not afford to
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wait for natural forces to revive it.
Frances Perkins, an advocate of public works, and like-minded Cabinet 
members, kept the subject of economic relief before the President* In April 
1933, it was revealed in a Cabinet meeting that two groups were working on 
grand schemes which would encompass public works and Industrial control.
The groups had been working in secret, without cooperation. At the insist* 
ence of President Roosevelt, Secretary Perkins took over the coordination 
of their efforts. The resulting plan was the National Industrial Recovery 
Act. While the preparation of the measure was going on, Roosevelt spoke 
to the national Chamber of Commerce, asking them to do three things toward 
recovery. He later called this speech the "forerunner of the N.R.A." He 
asked that the businessmen increase wages as commodity prices rose; that 
they practice fair methods of Competitionj and that they consider their own 
welfare as part of the nation’s welfare. In the meantime, work continued on 
the NIRA, and the completed, Roosevelt-approved bill was ready for Congress 
in mid-May.20®
Title I of the National Industrial Recovery Act was intended "to 
promote the organisation of industry for the purpose of cooperative action
20? S c h l e s i n g e r ,  The Coming of the New Deal. 67; Roosevelt, On Our 
Wav. 48, 66.
2®%raaces Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew. 197, 269-274?^ Schlesinger, 
The Coming of the New Deal, 96-98; Roosevelt, Cjjj Our Nev. 66-69.
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among trade groups." It was based on the principle of self-regulation, 
under Government supervision, using fair competition codes; The National 
Recovery Administration was created* Labor was granted the right to organ­
ise. Title II of the NIRA established the Public Works Administration. 
Although General Hugh S. Johnson, appointed head of the NRA, considered 
that the two programs should come under one head, President Roosevelt named 
Secretary of the Interior lekes as the head of the FWA. The NIRA passed 
in the House in just over one week and with minor changes. In the Senate, 
the opposition was more organised and determined. After much discussion 
and attempts at amendments, the measure passed on June 13, and the Presi­
dent signed it into law on June 16, 1933. As he signed if, he said that 
"history probably would record the . . .  Act as the most important and 
far-reaching legislation ever enacted by the American Congress."^®
Editor Lawrence did not think that the President would need to use 
the controlling powers given to him by the NIRA. The measure would be a 
club which he could use to compel industry to comply with the Act. This 
was true of most of the emergency legislation which had been passed since 
March 4. A Kansas City Star article stated that "the power to license . . .  
is the power to destroy," but Lawrence was certain that the President would 
never go to that extreme. Roosevelt needed the club of Title I to hold 
over the industrialists. The first part of the NIRA assumed that business 
would be "unselfish and public spirited," wrote Lawrence. But to the editor, 
the experiences of the past twelve years fcould Indicate that the exact oppo-
209Schle$inger, The Coming of the New Deal. 98-105. Title II, the
FWA, will be discussed in Chapter tX of this thesis.
site could be expected* Therefore, Roosevelt needed the entire Act to
effect compliance.210
The first industrial code which Lawrence discussed was that in the 
textile industry. He wrote that it might be hailed as the Magna Charts for 
that industry’s workers. Historically, the men, women, ami children who 
labored in these mills did so at almost slave wages* Under the new code, 
child labor was abolished and the minimum wage scale was increased. The 
code was a unique experiment, and showed a clear picture of the humane 
element in the Roosevelt program, wrote the editor. Hut even if the program 
was humane, it was not fully approved by all. In an editorial of the 
Lancaster County Weekly. George A. Spidel asked what these new codes would 
do for the consumer. Innocent and benevolent as they appeared, making bus­
iness profitable could only mean that the Government gave its stamp of 
approval to higher consumer prices. "TO the farmer," he wrote, "this would 
be little short of calamity, for consumer goods have been for years, increas­
ingly out of line with the products of the farm. "2H xhe farmer was not the 
only segment of the nation’s population who might oppose the NBA.
In September 1935, Lawrence reported that the honeymoon between 
Roosevelt and the industrialists was on the wane. He wrote that it was 
remarkable that the truce had lasted as long as it had. The industrialists 
were beginning to speak out in opposition to administration programs, "and 
if need be, to fight openly," the editor commented. Part of the opposition
2l0Star. Jun. 15, 1933.
2Utb 3 4 .« July 11, 1933; Lancaster County Weekly. Jun. 6, July 11, 1933.
was directed toward individuals la the Government, particularly the head of 
the NRA, General Johnson, Lawrence considered that the resentment toward 
the General wee unwarranted, he was the victim of Washington newspapermen 
who misinterpreted what he said. And through Johnson* the opposition was 
sniping at the NRA. ft was the opinion of Lawrence that the purpose of 
the Act was sound. Business itself could not have carried out that intent, 
of putting mem back to work* with the speed with which the Government had 
acted.21$
But even when the Government acted with that speed and determination* 
there was never any danger that a dictatorship would he established, the 
Government acted under democratic processes. Hie Government would not take 
over business, stated Lawrence. In fact* as he had often reminded the people, 
it was Roosevelt * s stated policy to increase the personal factor in the nation1# 
economic struggle. A unity of action was necessary during the emergency, 
but this did not mean that individual business actions were not to be 
allowed. Individual actions should not include gouging tactics* counseled 
the editor. Hie steel industry had placed bids on new rail orders totaling
700,000 tens. Roosevelt commented that these bids were too high* and 
he asked for competitive bidding. Lawrence was certain that the admin* 
istration expected business to make a profit, but this did not permit con* 
sc fenceless price boosting, the public would not accept such action, was 
the conviction of the editor.213
Lawrence quoted an unnamed "distinguished merchant" who commented 
that the average merchant was underestimating his 1934 business potential
2*%tar. September 14* 1933.
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and thus was understocking his shelves. Connecting this statement with the 
projected decrease of persons on the relief rolls, the editor x*rote that 
it was a time for plain talk. Hie Civil Works Administration had been 
created as an emergency measure, and it had performed admirably in its 
mission to provide work during the winter months. Now it was the duty and 
the opportunity of business to take over the job of providing work for the 
unemployed. "Never at any time since 1910 had there been a greater poten­
tial market for the necessities and comforts of life," wrote Lawrence.
Since 1912, people had gone without many of those things which they needed 
and wanted.
Lawrence considered 1934 as a year of challenge for business. The 
initial action toward recovery had been taken by the Government, but every­
one should have realised that the Government could not continue Indefinitely 
to support the economy. The editor rminded the reader that the nation's 
first move toward recovery had been taken through huge Government expendi­
tures. For example, he wrote, "five out of every six men who had gone 
back to work |*ot 1 their pay checks from the federal treasury." It was 
impossible for this situation to continue. Private business needed to take 
up the fight. "The only alternative (was 1 unthinkable," to Lawrence. It 
was time for business to act in expanding production and replenishing its 
stocks. It was not time, admonished the editor, to do the minimum required.
t
Boldness, daring, and faith were action words for business as it assumed 
its place in the recovery program. The NRA had done its part.$^
214xbld.. January 23, February 21, 1934.
Lawrence described the head of the NBA, General Johnson, as "blunt," 
"bellicose," and "cantankerous," but he exhibited these characteristics 
only because of the nature of his job and the pressures which were made on 
him, Johnson had invited those who criticised the NBA to present their 
opinions for consideration* To the editor, this appeal was made in the same 
vein as the purpose of the NBA. Xhat was, to create cooperation between 
business and labor; a "rehabilitation of America and the American people." 
Other countries had been faced with the same problems and had tried different 
solutions. With American ingenuity, the nation was trying yet another
solution*215
Roosevelt and Lawrence continued their admonition that private enter­
prise needed to assume the initiative in the nation* s striving toward recov­
ery. Hie President spoke to a meeting of NBA code representatives from the 
business world in March 1934. So Lawrence, the message was significant.
Xn substance, he wrote, the President said that the Government could not 
continue its huge relief expenditures. To survive, private capital and 
private initiative should justify their existence by providing job oppor­
tunities for the unemployed. The administration, Lawrence commented, would 
not retreat in its drive for a shorter work day and shorter work week for 
labor. The editor considered that this restriction was the basic intent of 
the NBA, and that the nation had generally ignored it. the people looked on 
it as only an emergency measure, not something of a permanent nature.216
Regarding Congressional acquiescence to the will of the administra-
215lbid., February 21, 1934. 216Ibid.. March 8, 1934.
tion, the editor wrote that they "did not know what else to do" at the tim&i 
Hie Congressmen were "puzzled," "Bewildered," and "disturbed," by the pro­
grams submitted by the administration, but they had no counterplan to offer. 
They agreed to the programs, based on their faith in the President. "It*s 
not thinking in terms of permanency, however," Lawrence wrote. The people 
had lost courage, vision, and pride, contended the editor. And Roosevelt 
was in the strange position of using the Government to kindle a rebirth 
of these qualities. To Illustrate his point, the editor reported on an 
informal statement made by Roosevelt, in which he counseled that the country 
needed to "• • • look ahead, to plan nationally, rather than depend on 
"legislative panaceas' for recovery or to continue to grow 'haphazardly*."
Lawrence Interpreted "legislative panaceas" to mean bureaucratic Gov­
ernment . This form of Government had expanded since 1900, and this expan­
sion did not tell the whole story, Individuals had come more and more to 
transfer their problems to the Government for a solution. They grew accus­
tomed to receiving the answers from Washington. Roosevelt attempted to 
remind the people that the Government could not perform miracles. The key 
word used by Roosevelt was "education." When the emergency was at its 
height, emergency measures were required. As conditions returned toward 
normal, the thinking of people needed to be changed end updated. The Presi­
dent had Issued a call to arms to the business community leaders to plan 
for the future, using the new factors of prosperity and welfare.
Bringing the issue closer to home, Lawrence pointed out "The Job 
Ahead of Nebraska Business." Halfway through Hay 1934, there were almost
30,000 Nebraska families receiving $5-3/4 million in relief. Hie job for
2*7Ibid., April 26, 1,34
Nebraska businessmen was the absorption of the employables into the labor 
force of private industry. The President was revising his relief program 
so that the business world would have what It had been clamoring for —  an 
easing of Government interference. This should silence the cries that the 
nation was going Socialistic or Communistic, wrote Lawrence.21**
While the President was asking business to assume its proper role in 
the recovery effort, business was asking the Government to let it alone* To 
the editor, there was a glint of humor in the cry. It had been only a short 
time since business was prostrate, and glad of help from any source. Now 
the plea was to be left alone. Lawrence was curious as to what portion of 
the administration1 s program was objectionable to business. He wondered if 
it was the primer spending, or the NBA codes, or Other regulatory measures 
which had as their aim the spread of employment and a return to fair trade 
practices. The editor also wondered, if business was given its wish, would 
it be able to achieve recovery, starting with increasing employment. So 
far, there had been no interference by the Government in this area, yet the 
only progress had been inspired by the Government. Belief from Governmental 
interference was a laudable desire, but the consequences of such action needed 
to be weighed, cautioned the editor. To return to the old methods of business 
practices was unthinkable.219
In Hay 1934, Lawrence reported that the licensing provision of the 
NBA would not be renewed. This brought to his mind the remarkable fact 
that this provision had never been utilised. This "sharp claw’* of the Blue
21Slbid.. May 17, 1934. 219Xbid.. June 16, 1934
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Eagle could have given the Government complete control over business, a 
fact which furnished ammunition for the opponents of the NBA. Instead of 
being a club over business, Lawrence considered that the measure was purely 
precautionary* Because of the experimental and seemingly radical nature of 
the entire NBA, the administration could not anticipate the reaction of the 
business community. In the year of operation under the NBA, it had received 
amazing support, so it was well to let the licensing provision lapse* "It 
[was] wise to rely more under the voluntary, cooperative spirit of the Amer­
ican people," he wrote, "rather than to attempt compulsion."220
In spite of the administration's exhortations for business to hold 
the line, prices continued to rise during 1934. As a result of the March 
meeting of the code authorities, the National Recovery Review Board was 
created to investigate monopolistic tendencies in the industrial codes* 
Clarence Barrow, the veteran criminal lawyer, was selected as Chairman* 
Lawrence commented that Barrow gave the NBA a "traditional slashing," in 
the final Board report. The editor did not consider that Barrow had pre­
sented any new arguments against the NBA. The report termed the NBA dan­
gerous because it encouraged monopoly, because it harmed the small business­
man, and because wages had not kept pace with living costs under the program. 
However, to the consternation of the enemies as well as the friends of the 
NBA, Barrow recommended the socialisation of business as a substitute for the 
NRA as the best method of gaining recovery. This pointed up the existing sit­
uation where businessmen were unhappy under the codes but fearful of any
22°Ibid.. May 19, 1934
alternative* One result of the Review Board was that it brought into the 
open the issues which had been bothering both aides of thinking on the NBA* 
It was apparent that there were changes needed in the program.221
Lawrence attached more than casual Importance to the report from 
Washington, announcing that the NBA would be revised in September 1934.
Hie announcement was in keeping with the promise which Roosevelt had always 
made —  to take experimental steps, learn from the process, and correct the 
errors, Hie President was merely doing what any farmer did in his business 
— readjust to meet new conditions. To Lawrence, the President smashed all 
political precedents by Such actions.222 Government was not a fixed, static 
thing, immune from evolution, for either Roosevelt or Lawrence, The NRA 
had its good and bad points. Perm income had not kept pace with prices, but 
gains had been made in improving the conditions of industrial workers. The 
NRA could not, in one piece of legislation, furnish solutions for every 
individual situation in such a diverse and complex nation,222
One of the first revisions made in the NRA was the resignation of 
Roosevelt's "Bad Boy," General Johnson. To Lawrence, this did not meap 
that the administration was in for a drastic readjustment. Johnson had 
been a "scrapping son of a gun," wrote the editor, but the job called for 
a man with such a personality. For twelve years the Government had been
22lgchlesinger, The Coming of the New Peal. 132, 133; Star,
Hay 21, 1934.
22%im Farley wrote f Jim Farley's Story. 37 ]: "No President so 
Shattered tradition and no President set so many precedents. Roosevelt had 
an instinctive flair for the dramatic which was to serve him well."
22$gtar. August 22, 1934.
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ruled by business * As Lawrence described it, "It was the golden era of that 
astonishing national philosophy which expressed Itself In scorn and contempt 
for Governmental control • • ♦ *" This needed to be kept in mind to understand 
the job which Johnson accepted* The program was new and revolutionary, affect­
ing everyone* Johnson was very vocal in his opinions and was ready to back up 
his statements with action* Such a man was not going to be universally 
popular in a nation of 120 million people, with 120 million points of view.
The retirement of this war horse Indicated to Lawrence that Johnson had achieved 
his purpose, and that the nation had become aware of the real aims of the NBA 
and had accepted them* Now it was time for a man of a different temperament to 
assume the head*
The editor realised that some would interpret Johnson's resignation and
the planned revision of the NBA as evidence that Roosevelt considered the NBA a
failure, and that he was ready to let it go* "Leaving that for the field of
politics," the editor wrote,
it would be well for the public to give calm perusal to the real 
aspects of the NBA* It created new thought and a new individual 
attitude in America —  a complete reversal of the past —  and as 
such it has been a preeminently successful part of the New Beal*
If one said that Johnson failed, he ignored the known facts* History would 
show that the very qualities which made Johnson a misfit constituted his great­
est strength while head of the NBA. As for the administration itself, It prob­
ably required the greatest readjustment of thought of any of the New Dea*» 
programs. The trend toward the less desirable features of rugged individualism 
had to be reversed. Labor needed the assurance of sharing in the fruits Of 
their labor. Since the enactment of the NBA, would anyone dare ^ o^ose
returning to the old way of business? That is the teat which Lawrence 
suggested applying to the NBA* He voiced the opinion that some of the fine 
idealism of the NBA would exist in the country for years to follow the 
end of the program* When Johnson stepped down, a new leader would carry on 
the work of the old crusader.22^
The new head of the NBA was Donald Richberg, who was appointed as 
the chairman of a newly created board to formulate policies for the NBA*
He was a lawyer who had achieved fame as a labor lawyer, but was little 
known as a Government official* To Lawrence, the appointment of Blchberg 
indicated that there was no lessening of the importance which Roosevelt 
placed on the NBA and its principles* Although Richberg was the anti­
thesis of Johnson, as far as temperament was concerned, Lawrence reported 
that he was a relentless fighter for principles which he believed were 
just* Blchberg was the choice of labor as a replacement for Johnson.
While his appointment would not be especially pleasing to business or 
industrial leaders, the editor felt that the NBA would be administered smoothly,
and that he would cause less trouble to the President than his "two-
225
fisted, scrappy predecessor,"
As 1934 drew to a close, Lawrence referred to the news reports 
which gave an optimistic prediction for the economy in 1935* Of course 
the editor hoped that business would continue to improve, but he also con­
sidered any feverish boom as being a most unfortunate economic develop-
22*Ibld», September 24, 26, 1934. 225Ibld., September 28, 1934,
merit. The march toward recovery had been a slow, bruising struggle,
which called for perseverance and courage. America had gone forward; her &
ideals had been revamped. People were more willing to live sanely,
without the fever of wild money-making schemes. The administration had created
the setting for this rebirth of the basic ideals of the American people.
The nation could look forward to a new year in which it would move on 
toward recovery*
X£ the nation was optimistic about the new year, the administration 
was not optimistic about the New Deal, especially the NBA. Professor 
Schlesinger wrote that "the legacy of the First New Deal was now frag­
menting in a bewildering way . . . "  Roosevelt was at a crossroads: he 
Could return to a quiet 1st, orthodox Government; he could turn to more 
tightly controlled planning; or he could hold the status quo while 
doing more long-term research. Unfortunately, none of these concepts 
were appealing to the President, who wanted a positive program with 
dramatic action# "Events were imposing policy on him," was Schlesinger*s 
judgment. The unemployment rolls were still over nine million, yet
businessmen were objecting to the money being spent on relief. And
227in the courts, the New Deal was suffering setbacks*
la May 1935, the United States Supreme Court found the Railroad 
Retirement Act unconstitutional. The NZRA cases were coming up slowly
22%bid., November 21, 1934*
222Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval. 263, 264.
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through the lower courts* There was some reason to assume that these 
cases would be resolved In favor of the Government, but it was not a certain 
thing* The pivotal case for consideration became the U.S. v. A.L.A. 
Schechter Poultry Corporation, popularly known as the "sick chicken" case. 
The lower courts had upheld the constitutionality of the case, and it 
came before the Supreme Court in April 1935, by an appeal for certiorari* 
Richberg himself participated in the argument for the Government, 
stressing constitutional precedent and social need* The opposition lawyer 
replied that if the Government could regulate the live chicken industry, 
it could ultimately regulate all human activity* On Monday, May 27, the de­
cision of the Court was announced* As it was described by Schlesinger:
Chief Justice Hughes announced that he himself would read the 
opinion In the Schechter case. Moving forward in his chair, 
his arms rigid on the bench, occasionally stroking his beard, 
speaking with unaccustomed vehemence in the quiet courtroom,
Hughes, for a unanimous court, knocked down with a series of 
blunt strokes the entire edifice of NRA.
Xt was Black Monday for the New Deal.22®
Many historical students of the NRA, wrote Professor Bums, con­
cluded that the NRA program did little to help recovery; it may have 
retarded it in fact. Also, many of them held the idea that Roosevelt 
was pleased by the defeat of the NRA. Burns, Leuchtenburg, and Schlesinger, 
all eminent Roosevelt historians, have written that the President was Indeed 
upset over the Court's decision because he believed in the principles of 
the NRA. He "never gave up trying to restore it," wrote Leuchtenburg. As
228xbld*. 274-280*
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the NBA passed into history, the administration attempted other forms 
of Governmental control over business, as the partner became the p o l i c e m a n .
XI
BUSINESS AFTER THE NBA 
As the Chief Justice read the death sentence for the NBA, Richberg 
became pale. He was later to say that the decision ranked with the repeal 
of the Missouri Compromise "as a tragic event in the history of self-govern­
ment.” The public reaction to the decision was a mixture of dismay, delight, 
and confusion. There was no overall sentiment for or against the decision.
A public opinion poll* taken a year after the event, showed that half of 
those with opinions were in favor and half opposed to reviving the NRA.^3®
Two days after ’’Black Monday,” Lawrence wrote an editorial on the 
NRA. He titled it ’’It’s A Lively Corpse.” It was strange to the editor 
that as the newspapers made the most confusing statements about the Sup­
reme Court decision, American businessmen and organisations” . . . were 
casting about hurriedly to give life and vitality to the principles 
which in truth and in fact constitute the spirit of the NRA.” It was an 
anomaly that as the Republicans were speaking out against the program, and 
for a return to the good old days* business itself did not want to return. The 
editor asked why any businessman who survived the wreck of the depression
^^Ibid., 280; Bums, The Lion and the Fox. 510* 514; Leuchten­
burg, FDR and the New Deal. 145-146; Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. 65.
^^Schlesinger* The Politics of Upheaval. 280, 283.
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would want to return to the policies which had caused the wreck* The 
NBA had not been perfect in form, and it was not administered with 
perfection, but the idea aid the intent of the measure were good. Its 
goal was to put the unemployed back to work and to restore the purchasing 
power.of Americans. ^
The Supreme Court decision had given the people cause to think*
They were against retracing their steps back from the "fires of social
consciousness which were lighted by the NRA,” wrote the editor* To 
Lawrence,
therel(was] no conflict between a decent social conception or an 
exalted idealism and sound honorable business, in which the rights 
of workers to share fairly with capital (was] recognized.
It mattered little to the editor whether the goal of a stable, prosperous 
nation was attained by legislative fiat or by a conscientious business 
community* The important thing was that individuals had the opportunity 
to work, and that they were well paid for their labors.
One of the Republicans who spoke out against the NRA and the
administration was Samuel R. McKelvie, "Nebraska’s most outstanding Re­
publican Old Guard leader,” as described by Lawrence* The editor reported 
that McKelvie proposed that President Roosevelt be impeached because of 
the statement he made, asserting that the Supreme Court decision en­
dangered certain features of the recovery program. The Star editor
231Star. May 29, 1935. 232Ibid.
wrote that this violent demand represented an amazing inconsistency on the 
part of McKelvie. The ex-Gove m o  r of Nebraska had complained bitterly 
about the destruction of American liberties* Therefore, why should he 
object when the supreme authority of one branch of the Government expressed 
himself on the ruling of another branch. The Supreme Court, Lawrence was 
certain, did not look upon Itself as being Immune from criticism, if the 
criticism was made after a decision had been reached and it could not affect 
the decision. The people looked with equal reverence and respect on each of 
the three branches of Government* But McKelvie, apparently because of 
extreme partisanship, had deserted his espousal of freedom of speech.
For two years the Republican leaders had been traveling through­
out Nebraska* exhorting the people to "throw off the shackles of a tyrant.”
No one had questioned their right to criticize. The results of the 
1934 elections had shown Impressively that the listeners did not agree 
with the Republicans* desire to return to the good old days* It was 
paradoxical to Lawrence that the Nebraska Republicans found themselves 
In the position of the old Southern conservatives. Just as they had resisted 
the social forces that ended slavery in the United States, so the 
Republicans were resisting the social changes through which the nation 
was passing in 1935. These Republicans should remember that Abraham 
Lincoln was not afraid of change/""even though it did violence to what 
had been preconceived notions of the American constitution*” The
233lbld.. June 3, 1935.
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social changes of 1935 had set themselves in motion and were sweeping 
ova? the country* "No man could change them," promised Lawrence, even by 
voiding the N R A *  ^ 4
In attempting to rebuild on the ruins of the NBA, to effect the 
social changes in which he believed, Roosevelt held a series of confer­
ences to develop a program to replace the NBA* Lawrence reported that 
the objectives of the new program would be to spread employment, abolish 
the sweat shop, prevent exploitation of labor, and increase purchasing 
power* The editor saw nothing in these objectives to which either the 
employer or employee could object* They were essentially the same 
aims as those of the NRA. After its demise, the NBA held more interest 
in the minds of the people than when it was in existence* They were 
apprehensive as to what would happen if employers gave way to greed 
and avarice, and returned to the long hours and low wages of pre-NBA 
days* The results would be a return to unemployment and the destruction 
of purchasing p o w e r . ^ 35
It was time to consider realities, wrote Lawrence* Of the 
125 million people in the nation, possibly one to three million were classed 
as unworkables because of age or health* They would always be a per­
manent charge on the country. Another eight to ten million were idle 
simply because there was no demand for their services. They would remain
235Ibid., June 4, 1934*
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a permanent charge unless jobs opened up for them# Either the Government 
could put them to work or private enterprise* 1 One of them must* The Govern­
ment could not force private enterprise to employ more people or increase 
its payrolls* Business needed to take this initiative* The development 
of some program was required, and it should not become Involved in blasts 
of partisanship*2^
Just ten days after the Supreme Court decision, the administra­
tion was completing a new program for Congressional approval* Lawrence 
attributed this speed to the "gathering storm of sentimbnt among respon­
sible business institutions" for a program which would embody the aims 
and objectives of the NBA.* the new plan, reported Lawrence, would not 
contain the so-called coercive features of the NBA, but would outline 
a voluntary statement of business practices according to the conditions 
and the needs of the time* The reaction of the people, asking for a 
resurrection of the NRA, had a simple explanation to the editor. After 
sober thought, the people realised that there was no alternative to the 
aims of the NRA except a return to the old order which had brought the 
nation to the brink'of disaster* Lawrence agreed with columnist Waiter 
Lippmanwhen he wrote that perhaps the defeat of the NRA had been sal­
utary* Congress could be encouraged to enact a law which would meet
the requirements of the Court, and business could have a new sense of
237responsibility for its attitude toward the new era* In spite of these 
possibilities of cooperation, Lawrence reported that business was still
236Xbid., June 4, 1935} March 18, 1936.
237Ibld.. June 7, 1935.
fearful of Roosevelt.
How much of this fear had been politically inspired, and how much 
was real, he could only guess* But, fearful or not, business had to 
consider its problems and it could not escape from one conclusioni the 
unemployment of 1929 to 1935 was a challenge that faced business* There 
was no certainty that all of the slack would ever be taken up; some 
unemployment would exist even under the most favorable economic conditions* 
There was no escape from the fact that something must be done for those 
unemployed* Old people should not starve when denied an opportunity 
to work* Young people, prepared for work, would not starve without 
protest when they could not find work to exercise their skills* Thus, 
the sooner that business came to appreciate the problem and acted on it, 
the greater progress business could make* No gains could be made by hold­
ing back and letting the Government assume the responsibility.2 38 The 
President could not continue to ask for Federal money for relief*
In September 1935, the President took a holiday trip across 
the country* Things were relatively quiet on the political and economic 
fronts* In his speeches along the route, Roosevelt talked of the indi­
vidual and of the purposes of his Second New Deal* When he returned to 
Washington, his desk was piled high with headaches and heartaches, Lawrence 
wrote* Americans were not kind to their Presidents, but Roosevelt had 
stood up relatively well under the punishment of the office* The
238Ibld., September 6, 1935.
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nation was fortunate, because it needed a strong man at the wheel* The 
economy was approaching normal; price levels of both manufactured and 
agricultural products were up, but still unemployment existed. This 
was- the heart of 'Americans problem and the greatest problem which faced 
the President.
From the President’s speech upon his return, the nation could
derive satisfaction that the acute phase of the depression might be over#
In the durable goods industries, which had lagged behind, the recovery trend
was upward. In the building trades, where the greatest unemployment
had existed, more construction was being accomplished than at any time
since 1929. But, Lawrence reminded the reader, the depression was not
over for many people. These included the older person who could not
compete with youth for the available jobs# This was the reason that
the President asked for the Social Security program. America had reached a
plateau in which its land had been settled and its industrial plants
built. The problem for the following years was one of a social nature#
"That [was] the full vision of Roosevelt's leadership — - he’s out ahead
of the pack in thinking of his country, its people, and their problems,1’
240wrote Lawrence,
To the editor, as to Roosevelt, another of the problems facing 
the country was control of business# The editor stated that Mno apology 
need to be offered to business for the steps taken during [the Roosevelt}
239Ibid*. October 23, 26, 1935. 240Ibid.
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administration." What business called regimentation should better be
called regulation. It had been a healthy tonic for business. Lawrence
pointed the editorial finger at business when he asked who had first
pleaded for controls such as the NRA. The United States Chamber of Com**
merce asked for it, business leaders by the hundreds advocated it during
the time it was being considered in Congress. In practice the codes were
drawn by representatives of business. Therefore, concluded Lawrence, if
the NBA was a failure, business was responsible for the failure; it had
been involved in the creation and the administration of the measure. The
same reasoning could be given for the holding company legislation and the
stock exchange regulating laws. The companies involved brought on the
regulations because of their activities when unregulated. Business was
not bigger than national welfare, commented the editor. When a segment
of business conducted itself to the detriment and injury of the national
welfare, "then business may anticipate a kick in the pants, and it deserves 
i t ,»241
Of course, business objected to the controls and the kick In the 
pants. The truce of the fall of 1935 did not last long. The radicals 
were displeased because they thought that Roosevelt meant to ease up on 
the pressure on business* The conservatives were unhappy because they 
were sure that he did not mean to ease the pressure. The political wars 
resumed as the election year approached. The statements of the opposition 
reflected the sentiment that the nation was facing perhaps the greatest
2AlIbid., November 14, 1935.
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crisis of its history* The American system of Government was at stake*
For the administration, Secretary of Commerce Danial Roper took an optimistic 
look at the economic prospects for 1936* Production and consumption were up, 
and earnings were growing* Factory employment was up ten percent over Jan~ 
uary 1935* Factory payrolls were up twenty-five percent over the same period* 
Lawrence reported that, because of the optimistic crop outlook, payments made 
by Nebraska farmers to the Federal Land Bank were up one million dollars over 
1935* In addition to the crop outlook, the editor credited the administration 
with the improved position of the Nebraska farmer* When the agricultural 
economy was good, the nation's economy Improved.2A2
It was a report of business gains in California which afforded the 
editor another opportunity to blast the critics of Roosevelt* The 
shrieks against Roosevelt and his programs, which were found in the same 
newspaper issues that contained the stories of business gains, seemed a 
little unfair to Lawrence* Instead, he wrote, the President should receive 
some credit for reversing the downward business trend during his three 
years in office* The readers could not believe statements that there had 
been no improvement In the business community; the financial reports for 
thousands of different companies denied the statements* Many of these 
industries which were solidly In the black were the ones which financed 
the smear campaign against the President* "For them, recovery [was] an 
accomplished fact," commented the editor* No one In the administration 
would say that Roosevelt was a superman, or that he had not made mistakes*
^^Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval. 500; Star, January 6,
February 4, 1936*
But someone or something had succeeded in arresting the downward trend of 
the nation’s economy, and the editor gave Roosevelt the credit.^'*
"For the first time since 1929," Lawrence wrote, "American business 
[was] in the highly desirable position where income balanced operating 
costs and fixed charges*" But, he asked, "Is business grateful?" It was 
a "foolish question," Some businessmen gave Roosevelt credit for the 
recovery, but the greater portion of the business community took the credit 
for themselves* "We killed the bear,*1 they crowed* Lawrence felt that 
this statement brought up several natural questions* Why did they let the 
bear get them down in the first' place? Why did it* take them so long to 
kill him? Why, if they were so intelligent, did business leadership lead 
the country so close to ruin? These leaders hated Roosevelt because it 
was he who knew what was. good for the economy and had the spirit to insure 
that business took its medicine* That medicine had revived business and 
the nation’s economy• 244
One criteria for judging this revival was to check the totals of 
income tax payments* Since there had been no increase in the tax levies
over 1935, then the increase in payments could only be attributed to an
«■
Increase in income over 1935* Here people were employed than any time 
since 1932* But still, unemployment existed and was a problem* And this 
was the issue which business was dodging, claimed Lawrence, Relief must be 
discontinued, and people employed by private enterprise* If industry was 
operating at full employment, then another kind of relief, and Social
243Star. March 3, 1936. 244Ibid.. August 17, 1936
Security* must be developed to relieve conditions. America needed to 
revise its thinking about social planning* was the editor1# continuing
p l e a . 2^5
As the year progressed* the editor cited other indications that the 
recovery was progressing. By mid-June, General Ho tors had produced their 
millionth automobile of the year. Xhis was equal to the entire 1931 or 
1934 output* and was double the 1933 output. Ibis also indicated to Law­
rence that people had more money to spend on such things as cars. Hie 
purchasing of automobiles, usually involving credit* meant that people 
had faith in the continued prosperity of the economy. Xn July, the editor 
printed the report of the National Retail Credit Association which showed 
there was an increase of almost ten percent.in their collections, this 
increase in sales was a result of the increase in payroll and wages* money 
available to the workers of the nation. She Republicans, the Liberty 
Leaguers* and the other opponents of the administration could attempt to 
rob Roosevelt of the credit for the continued prosperity, but their efforts 
would not avail. Xt was too easy for people to recall the dark days of the 
depression* which resulted from the policies of the Republicans, ihey 
could also remember the forward strides made during the three years that 
Roosevelt had been in office. Xhe editor was certain that no one desired 
to return to the programs which had caused the d e p r e s s i o n . 24b
As the election came closer* the campaign became hotter. Roosevelt 
was charged with several economic blunders. His opponents charged that he
245Ibld., March 18, 1936. 246Ibld.. June 17, July 17, 1936.
had caused the decline in the business of small towns. The editor retort­
ed that this process had been going on for some time before Roosevelt 
took office. The trend was the result of improved highways and the increased 
use of automobiles. People could go to the larger cities in a short time, 
and preferred to do their shopping there. Another campaign charge* reported 
by the editor, was that of waste and extravagance in the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation. Statistics given by the Chairman of the Corporation, 
Jessie Jones, were cited by the editor to refute this charge. The RFC had 
made a total of just over six billion dollars In loans, of which four 
billion dollars had been repaid. It was not surprising to Lawrence that a 
great deal of misinformation had been circulated about the RFC. The fact 
was that most of the money put out during the emergency would be returned, 
and should not be considered part of the national debt. Look at it another 
way, the editor asked. Billions were spent for purposes of war, without a 
murmur. But when billions were spent to save the people and the nation, it 
seemed a different matter. Those later billions were America’s best invest­
ment . 247
Xn spite of the opposition by business and the newspapers, Roosevelt 
was returned to office by a landslide in 193d, and with a Democratic 
Congress. Almost personally, Roosevelt had won loyalty to the principles 
of his New Deal programs. This was especially true of those agencies 
which worked directly with the people. As an example, Leuchtenburg cited 
the Farm Credit Administration which saved 300 farmsefrom foreclosure
247ibid.. July 7, September 9, 1936.
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on an average day. Roosevelt was campaigning on his record. He asked 
his listeners to compare their situation with what It had been in 1932.
As he toured the country thousands crowded to see him and tell him that 
it was he who had saved their home or job. The election results were a
2AO
personal triumph for Roosevelt.
After the election, business rapidly flocked to the New Deal 
which it so recently had been lambasting. To Lawrence there was nothing 
amazing about the change in attitude. "Big Business goes along with the 
channels it is compelled to follow, unless it can map and chart its own 
course," he wrote, “it's too smart for anything else. With it, business 
la business," The editor did not consider that this was a second honey­
moon between business and Government, because it was too early to determine
whether business had really changed its mind. A year after the election
249would be a better time to make that determination.
In the meantime, the administration, and the nation, had the 
continuing job of recovery. Unemployment continued to be a problem. A 
satisfactory program of relief for the unemployed and the unemployables 
was the goal of Roosevelt and the hope of the nation, As Lawrence often 
wrote, the depression changed the thinking of people concerning social 
planning.
^%euchtaoburg, FDR and the Raw Deal. 193.
^ %tar, December 21, 1936,
CHAPTER VI
RELIEF AND SECURITY
The great depression in America could be said to have started in
1929* That spring, the usual seasonal decrease in expenditures §4* relief
failed to materialize. There were already almost three million unemployed
in the nation. Continuing at a higher-than-average level throughout the
summer, there was a sharp upturn in expenditures in October. By December
1929, the level of relief expenditures was nearly twice as high as it had
been in December 1928. By January 1930, the number of unemployed had
jumped to over four million. This figure climbed with alarming rapidity
until it reached a peak of fifteen million in the spring of 1933. Both
public and private relief agencies tried to carry the load, with public^
agencies increasing their portion. Throughout the period, the public,
from habit, looked to private agencies such as the Community Chest for
250their needs. However, these organisations soon depleted their funds.
In October 1930, President Hoover organized an Emergency Committee 
for Employment, to coordinate, supplement, and encourage state and local 
communities in their relief efforts. The Committee recommended a Federal 
Public Works Program, but the administration would not approve it. The 
stress was placed on the responsibility of the local government for relief. 
As the private organizations ran out of funds, the local and state 
governments began to assume the responsibility for relief. In spite of 
the efforts made, it soon became apparent that the Federal Government 
would be called upon for aid, a last resort measure according to President
25Qj0gephine C* Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939 (N.Y.: Henry Holt 
and Co., 1940), 64-66.
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Hoover. The President and his advisors claimed that the use of Federal 
funds for relief would impair the Government's credit and make it impos­
sible to balance the budget. They also claimed that the idea of Federal 
relief was contrary to the Constitution. They put forward several other 
plausible-sounding arguments against granting funds for relief. These 
arguments did not sound plausible to those who were starving.
Proponents of the use of Federal funds for relief were just as 
vocal. It was their contention that a national disaster called for nat­
ional relief measures. Senator La Follette noted that over two billion 
dollars of Federal funds had been provided during the depression for the 
relief of business* Could not the same reasoning be applied to relief for 
individuals? “Eiroughout both sessions of the Seventy-Second Congress, 
attempts were made to pass bills providing for unemployment relief. But 
they either died in committee or failed to pass on the floor. As the 
pros and cons of Federal grants were being debated in Washington, several 
states were appropriating money for relief, but funds were often exhausted 
in a short time. Riots and hunger marches were reported in large indus­
trial areas. Immediate action of some nature was imperative.^51
In July 1932, a bill acceptable to the President was passed by the 
Congress and signed. It authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
to make loans to states for relief work. The loans were to be repaid by 
deductions from future Federal highway construction funds to the states.
The private charity organizations were still committed to share expenses.
25l3foe story of this struggle to obtain Federal funds for relief 
is told in Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939. 68-127.
During the year ox operation, nearly $280,000,000 was made available, and 
forty-two states and two territories received funds. Another $20,000,000 
was loaned to political subdivisions. This was the only Federal relief 
measure passed by the Hoover a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . 252
Nebraska had not applied for the RFC assistance because of a State 
Constitutional provision which prohibited the State from incurring a debt 
of greater than $100,000. Hattie Plum Williams, Professor of Sociology at 
the University of Nebraska, wrote an article, “Public Welfare," for the 
Nebraska Blue Book 1938. In the article she said that the State was not 
generally aware of the extent of the impending economic disaster in 1931. 
Drouth and grasshoppers had taken their toll in some areas of the State. 
This emergency had been met by a semi-private relief program, involv­
ing the State Tax Commissioner as the collecting agency, and the Red Cross 
and American Legion as the distributors. 1 Approximately $500,000 in aid 
was distributed in 1931 and 1932. As late as the legislative session 
of 1933, no demands for state-wide relief were made, the counties contin­
uing to provide support. But such a situation could not be maintained 
for long.253
"The decade of the 1930s might well have been known as the decade 
of destitution but for the humane leadership provided by the Roosevelt 
administration," commented Fred K. Koehler, Director of the American 
Public Welfare Association, in January 1940. The system of local poor
252ibid., 124-127. The repayment of these loans was cancelled by 
Acts of Congress in 1934 and 1938.
253piue Book 1938. 511-512.
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relief which had prevailed in the country for 150 years was superseded 
by a new philosophy. The biblical quotation, "Am I my brother's keeper?" was 
"taken off the signpost, brought down to earth, and made the query for 
every man," commented Director H o e h l e r .254
I
EMERGENCY RELIEF
In his inauguration address, Roosevelt commented that the national 
emergency should be treated as a war emergency . He expected to put the 
nation's house in order by presenting to Congress measures to combat the 
problems which faced the country. Roosevelt's message to Congress, March 
21. 1933, outlined his program for recovery. Under this program, the Fed­
eral Government would grant money to the states for relief work. He asked 
for the creation of Federal machinery to coordinate these grants.255
Frances Perkins wrote that Washington had a hectic atmosphere during 
the first days of the new administration* On her desk were over 2,000 
plans for Federal actions to relieve unemployment, and the President's 
desk contained that many more. The plans submitted by Harry Hopkins inter­
ested both the President and his Labor Secretary , and a bill based on these
254Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939. vll. ix.
2^^Ro6enman, Paper.. II, 11-15. John T. Flynn claimed that while 
he was Governor of New York, Roosevelt spoke and wrote against direct 
relief or the dole. He also objected to Federal spending for relief.
Flynn, Country Squire in the White House. 57-60. An examination of the 
President's papers reveals that FDR also spoke and wrote in favor of the 
use of public funds for relief work. In his nomination acceptance speech, 
he commented that he favored the use of public works as an emergency means 
of stimulating employment. Rosenman. Papers. I, 103-104, 115, 457-473, 653.
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plans was prepared. The Federal Emergency Relief Act was passed, and 
signed on Hay 12, 1933. The administration which was created by the Act 
was authorized $500 million# Half of this money was to be spent in the 
states on a ratio of one federal dollar for each three dollars from other 
sources. The other $250 million was for allotment to states whose relief 
burden was so heavy that they could not meet the above requirements* The 
establishment of work relief projects was assigned to the state and local 
governments. The principle of outright grants differentiated this program 
from the Hoover "loan" policy* Harry Hopkins was appointed as Adminis­
trator of the program. The FERA was "the first Step in the economic pump 
priming that was to break the back of the depression," commented Frances 
Perkins.
In describing the measure, Roosevelt reminded the states and local 
governments that it did not absolve them from their responsibility to 
exert themselves to provide aid for their own needy. The bill was a 
challenge to those officials to stimulate their m m  relief efforts* The 
works projects which were chosen needed to be "labor-creating, quick- 
acting, useful projects" which avoided the pork barrel smell* Roosevelt 
agreed with Hopkins on the decision to pay cash to those on relief instead 
of giving grocery slips. Also it was decided that aid meant the providing 
of clothing, shelter, and medical care as well as food* This was considered 
radical and impractical by conservative social workers of the day, but the
^^Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew. 184-185; Morris, Encyclo­
pedia of American History. 342-343. Harry Hopkins was a New York social 
welfare worker who had worked for Roosevelt when he was Governor.
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principle became accepted after it was proven w o r k a b l e .
There were other projects to release money Into the economy and 
relieve unemployment. Editor Lawrence called it "glorious news" which 
came out of Washington on June 12, 1933. The Government was planning to 
spend $1,000,000,000 for labor "so quickly that it 'will electrify trade 
into new life*." When "headquarters" announced that money would flow, it 
would flow at once. This did not mean the next spring, but immediately. The 
money would be spent in the form of additional highway and building con­
tracts. As Lawrence often commented, action was the key word for 
the Roosevelt administration. It had an appealing sound to the people 
who were used to the inactivity and lack of initiative which used to 
characterize Washington. The people had learned to expect a lot from 
the Roosevelt administration, and they were getting it.^®®
An editorial of August 5, 1933, commented that some people had an 
erroneous concept of the real purpose and intent of the Roosevelt recov­
ery program. Apparently officials of one Nebraska county had announced 
that their office hours would be curtailed, in keeping with the Presi­
dent's program. Lawrence saw no relationship between the recovery law 
and the curtailment of office hours. The dniy purpose of the law was to 
increase public buying power by providing additional jobs. Opening their 
offices later, and closing them earlier, would have no effect on providing 
additional jobs, or increasing the paychecks of anyone who was working*
25?Roosevelt, On Our Way, 82, 145, 266; Robert E. Sherwood,
Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History (N.Y.: Harper and Brothers,
1948), 47.
258Star. June 13, 1933.
The t#xp*y*r# would disapprove of nay such interpretation of the law.2^ *
1he taiqpayera should not be disturbed about the alee of the expen­
ditures mode by the Oovermaeut to effect recovery, wrote the editor. haw* 
recce quoted, a statement made by the United State# Qtiaabcr of Commerce 
which said that national bu#inea# oat not concerned about the Roosevelt 
budget, If  the aapaadltwtfa* would accomplish their purpose -- business 
revival* The Chamber had pointed out the vital factor in connection with 
Government expenditure#. In the ten month# since Roosevelt1# inauguration, 
-over six eiiiicn  men had returned to work, but only one-fourth million of 
these had bean absorbed by private enterprise. A# the affect of Govertxment
u ^ j y f  i t .  .d lr ik t. V  'Ok TtftiMa err i i*  i f  ah idrfc"* aito aB 'A 'j . f  #iiWiMBr* «i ■- d r  MMfrjeftfiab*#* r^i'M i*apenaing wa# re it# private industry wouia absorb xaors ana more woraara trosft 
the relief ro ll and Government project#* The money had to be expended 
to eebieva result#.2®0
In the January 22, 1914 issue of the Bftar* Lawrence commented on an 
editorial in the London Observer, which wa« laudatory to Roosevelt and hi# 
relief policies. Such a viewpoint inspired ref lactic** for the Star editor. 
England had embraced the dole a# the only way of recovery and relief* She 
had pulled through by waring out the disease, "by bleeding*" Sngliah* 
i*w  suffered sore fiNur* did the American wfof.i# • w dVrg^fvg i^lh# cur#, because
25%5l4*. Aujpuc 5. 1933.
» Jwxuacy 13. 1934. #y the «a& of 1933. *11 of the states 
and Ihtritorie# had applied for and received aid under the FEEL. A total 
of $3,250,000 had been distributed* In July 1933, Nebraska Governor 
Chari## Bryan applied for fund#, and federal emergency relief became the
chief source of Nebraska relief until 1935 and the enactment of the Social 
Security Act. Brown, FufrUc ftqUgf ISfctSIlt 14B* U a  Jtegfe 1*30, 511.
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hie medicine was more drastic* Estates were broken up, fortunes wiped out,
and a great number of people merely existed on the dole# In America, the
English editor wrote,
President Roosevelt without check * * * carried political audacity 
to its uttermost and achieved his personal successes by means which 
would have ruined another man* # . • by proclaiming and vindicat­
ing the most gigantic deficit in the record of budgets#
The Englishman appreciated the fact that Roosevelt might fall in 
his attempt at recovery, but it would be a magnificent failure# Lawrence 
commented that the American public did not fully consider the possibility 
that the experiment might fail* Americans looked upon their country, their 
culture, and their Government as enduring and permanent# In its present 
straits, there was still no lack of food or fields to produce more; there 
was still a great industrial community, with the materials and manpower to 
produce as much as was needed* Americans could not contemplate anything 
but prosperity# The problem was not what would be the goal, but how to 
reach that goal# Europeans had tried the “bleeding" method of recovery; 
they had bled since their history began# America was now showing them a 
new way to achieve recovery#^®*
In addition to the FERA, other emergency programs were established 
to aid in relief and recovery* In spite of the efforts, as winter approached, 
there were still millions on relief* Hopkins and many of his workers real­
ised how degrading was the reception of handouts, the main method of relief 
under the FERA# He presented a program of work Instead of cash relief, 
and Roosevelt agreed* The Civil Works Administration was created by an
261Star, January 22, 1934*
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Executive Order under Title II of the NIRA, on November 9, 1933, with Harry 
Hopkins as its Administrator. The CWA was created as a temporary winter 
program to furnish work relief for four million persons and to pump purchas­
ing power into the economy in a short period of time.
The program was wholly Federally administered; Hopkins moved a great 
number of his FERA personnel over to the CWA. Funds for the CWA were trans­
ferred from the budget of the PWA without Ickea* prior knowledge or approval. 
By mid-January there were over four million individuals working on 400,000 
CWA projects. During its existence, the CWA built or improved roads, school 
buildings, airports, playgrounds, parks, and swimming pools. Three thous­
and artists and writers were employed by the CWA during that period. The 
overall program cost nearly one billion dollars, but it was money well spent 
at a critical time.2®2
Near the middle of the life of the program, Lawrence reported that 
Washington had ordered a slowdown in CWA work because funds were low. He 
commented that Nebraska had benefit ted from the CWA. Over 30,000 men and 
women were supporting themselves and their families from this work program. 
Although other states had scandals in regard to administration, in Nebraska 
the money was being used as it was intended. As the program was sched­
uled for phaseout, Lawrence felt that it was time for plain talk. There 
was always the danger that temporary Government programs would become per­
manent. The CWA had been created as an emergency winter relief program, 
and it should not be extended. It had rendered a magnificent service In
2®2Brown, Public Relief 1929-1939. 157; Schlesinger, The Coming of 
the New Deal, 270.
giving families fresh hope, and adding new life to business. However, 
private enterprise should not abdicate in favor of the Government in the 
recovery effort.
In Hay when the CWA was programmed for completion, the demands on 
charity would be less, but deserving persons would still be out of work 
and their families would need to be fed and clothed. This was where pri­
vate enterprise came in. This was the challenge to business. If business 
failed to accept the challenge and did the minimum required of it, there 
would be a fresh crisis in the fall, the CWA program was the notification 
that the country was still in the greatest battle of its history. The 
initial advantage had been won due to the inspired leadership of the Pres­
ident,. It was within the power of business to win the final triumph. "Or 
Will business surrender to dry rot . . asked Lawrence.2®**
Besides being a challenge to business, the CWA was a challenge to 
the people. Telegrams and letters from all over the country were appeal­
ing to the President for the retention of the program. Lawrence reminded 
his readers of the temporary nature of the CWA. The funds used would not 
be repaid to the federal Treasury, or the local treasuries. As an emer­
gency measure, it was a glorious achievement, but as a permanent policy, 
"it might well become destructive of American tradition," he counseled.
It would be easier for business to sit back and let the Government assume 
relief responsibility. The temptation would be not to put a time limit on 
the continuation of emergency relief. But to continue would be admission
2®2Star, January 22, 23, 1934.
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that the American institutions of Government would crumble. The people 
would be affected too. The spirit of thrift must not be destroyed, pleaded 
the editor. The citizen needed to remember that the Government could hot 
take care of everyone; individual initiative was needed. Somewhere between 
the extremes of rugged individualism and Government paternalism was "the 
happy meeting ground of America," wrote Lawrence, and the President was 
attempting to keep the nation from wandering too far away from it.264
In spite of the stress which the administration placed on the "tem­
porary" nature of the CWA, even Congressional leaders attempted to extend 
its life. Lawrence wrote that Representative Kent Keller, Democrat from Ill­
inois, was the leader of a rebellious group who wanted to extend the CWA 
for an additional year. The editor attributed at least part of this effort 
to politics. Roosevelt had assured the CWA administrators that the admin­
istration was not trying to gain any political advantage by the various 
relief programs. He had made it a rule that no applicant for relief be 
asked his political affiliation. And yet, members of his own party were 
attempting to use the relief issue as a softener of their path to reelec­
tion. Lawrence considered this a real menace to the President and his 
program. There was no reason that the editor could find for altering the 
President's recovery program* It would only upset his time table for 
recovery* ^
As the CWA was nearing termination, Lawrence commented that the
264Ibid.. January 24, 1934,
2®8Ibld., February 5, 1934; Roosevelt, On Our Wav. 283.
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permanent stimulus of the program was apparent all over the country. It 
had furnished work to the unemployed, and badly needed civic improvements 
had been started. These latter projects, much talked about but little 
done about for years, would be completed because of the impetus which the 
CWA had given to civic thinking. Even the arts had been aided by the CWA. 
Lawrence was perhaps a little cynical as he told of a projected exhibit of 
paintings by CWA artists. The paintings were to be displayed next to a 
fifty million dollar art collection in the famous Corcoran Gallery of Art in 
Washington. "Evidently Mr. Bruce (the CWA director for artists) never 
heard the old axiom that comparisons are odious," was the editor's comment. 
Whether the works of contemporary artists were equal to those of the dead 
masters was a question which was too broad for his column. Lawrence did 
wish Bruce luck in "a New Field of statesmanship."2®®
The termination date for the CWA, March 31, 1934, was a time for the 
editor to reflect on what the country got for its billion-dollar invest­
ment. It put four million men to work, offering them pay checks instead 
of charity. It enabled them to go through what had been a punishing 
winter. Intangibly, it had raised the nation's morale. Materially, the 
editor listed increased bank deposits, increased volume of retail trade. 
Increased Industrial production and employment, and an increase in the 
import-export trade. This revival of the nation's purchasing power was 
attributed to the impetus which had been given to the economy by the CWA.
By Its termination, the Government did not signal a relaxation of its
266star. March 19, 27, 1934.
vigilance loir human suffering* Other agencies had been established to
handle these recurring problems* And again Lawrence reminded private
enterprise that it was the golden opportunity time to take over the job 
267of recovery* All segments of the economy should work toward recovery* 
In the fall of 1934* labor unions came out in favor of resumption 
of the CWA, to augment the efforts of the NBA* The editor thought that 
it would not be out of place to ask the unions If they had done all that 
they could to reduce unemployment. The rash of strikes in the steel and 
automobile industries* incited by the unions, seemed to indicate to Law­
rence that the unions could do more than they had done toward recovery#
If the union leaders were sincere in their desire to ease the unemploy­
ment problem* Lawrence suggested that they could help by "calling off
their agents and organisers whose business [was] to take workers away
268from their jobs*" The CWA had served its purpose* and the emergency ’ 
relief job was returned to the FEBA.
As 1934 progressed* there was more and more emphasis placed on the 
necessity of state and local governments reassuming more of the relief 
burden# This came as no surprise to Lawrence* "In fact it is just what 
should have been expected*" he commented. The administration had acted 
with speed and liberality when the emergency was acute* It should not be 
called upon to continue relief for an unlimited period* In August the 
counties would make their annual tax levies* If they did not go to the 
limit of their ability* they would receive no help from Washington. The
^ ^Ibid., March 31* 1934* ^{3Ibid.9 August 7* 1934*
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State was authorised by Its constitution to appropriate $500*000 for relief* 
This it should do. The people of the state realized the situation* so 
there was no excuse for not taking a c t i o n .269
"Relief, Like Charity, Begins at Home," was the title of an editor* 
ial on June 4, 1934. The responsibility for relief, wrote Lawrence, had 
always rested at the local level. Only when the situation was extreme did 
It warrant Federal assistance. One did not have to look hard in and around 
Lincoln to see the benefits which Nebraska had gained from the work of the 
CWA. "Having feasted for some time at Uncle Sam*s board," the editor con* 
eluded, it was not the time for local governments to complain about buying 
some of their own groceries in the f u t u r e . 2^6
W. F. Cramb, the editor of the Fairbury Journal , opposed the Federal 
plan of local relief. When Washington said that it would advance no more 
relief funds until the counties did more for themselves, he saw this as 
usurpation of the authority of the local administrations. He said, in 
effect, that no Federal Government was going to tell him what or what not 
to do. In reality, countered Lawrence, the Government was endeavoring to 
do just the opposite. It wanted out of ;the relief business. If editor 
Cramb had his way, thought Lawrence, the Federal government should furnish 
the entire relief burden or none at all. In the latter event, the county 
taxpayers would furnish thousands of dollars more than they otherwise 
would, or people would starve. Lawrence wrote that, "whenever the resolve 
that people shall be fed and sheltered is changed to a cry of 'let 'em
269 Ibid.. May 31, 1934. 270 Ibid.. June 4, 1934
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starve,' the fight is lost*"271 The problem of relief would continue to be 
a knotty one at all levels of government. The economic emergency had par* 
tially abated, and it was time to consider a new course of action.
II
WHY SETTLE FOR TEMPORARY RELIEF?
When Roosevelt talked of the economic responsibility of the state, 
this Included the safeguarding of its citizens as well as the development 
of natural resources. Some economic groups could provide for themselves, 
but there were others who needed the Intervention of the Government for 
their welfare. Roosevelt did not intend to deprive the wealthy of their 
good life by his "soak the rich" programs* He did Intend to make that 
good life possible for all men. These programs which he envisioned 
should not be in the nature of handouts, he insisted. Greer considered 
that Roosevelt
wanted to improve opportunity for the poor, but by this he meant 
opportunity to enjoy the good life through work [sic} and pro­
ductivity. His belief in the value of work explains why he fought 
against the dole. . . .  He insisted that, "we are dealing with prop­
erly self-respecting Americans to whom a mere dole outrages every 
instinct of individual independence.272
The first of the work-relief measures was the Public Works Admin­
istration, Title II, of the National Industrial Recovery Act* Harold 
lekes was the Administrator. This agency, with a fund of $3,300,000, 
was created to Increase employment and business activity by constructing 
roads, buildings, and other public projects* It was a part of the
27libid., June 12, 1934. 272Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, 16-17, 67.
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"pump-priming” process toward recovery* Created in June, it was slow 
in approving projects, partially due to the wary approach to spending 
held by I ekes* This was one reason that the CWA was created. In Nebraska, 
the major contributions of the PWA were in the areas of soil and water 
conservation. Lawrence approved of the PWA*s efforts toward restoring 
the agricultural capability of the nation for the future. He was glad 
that Nebraska did not yet have an acute problem, and that proper action 
by the state and Federal conservation activities and the PWA, would save 
and Improve the soil. ^
Lawrence wanted it pldinly understood by his readers that the PWA 
had not been created to combat the emergency but as a permanent policy.
When working with conservation and the development of natural resources, 
long-range vision and planning was required. The plan, as Lawrence 
understood it, proposed to spend over ten billion dollars over the course 
of fifty years. The money would be spent to build America by preserving 
and increasing national wealth, and raising the standard of living. It 
was "majestic in its magnitude." To the detractor who might feel that this 
plan of spending might "squeeze the orange dry,” Lawrence had an answer.
If the plan had been devoted to foolish undertakings or wasted, the money 
would be lost; the nation could not stand the burden. But if the money 
were spent so as to increase the wealth of the nation, it would be a good 
investment. In the past, frequent Interruptions and haphazard conservation
27%orris, Encyclopedia of American History, 346; Schlesinger, The 
Coming of the New Deal. 109; Star. March 9, 1934. See Part III, Chapter 
FIX, of this thesis for the story of the PWA in Nebraska.
policies had wasted billions of dollars and ruined many acres of land.
This new program would change that. Already in Nebraska, more money had 
been put into FWA projects than in all the period previous to it.274 $o 
Lawrence the PWA was another example of the administration's honest attempts^ 
to improve all areas of the nation's economy and plan for the future. 
Recovery was only a matter of time and effort.
By October 1934, President Roosevelt had determined that direct 
relief such as the FERA had served its purpose and should come to an e n d . 275 
A form of work relief, similar to the PWA and the CWA should be substi­
tuted, The local governments would furnish "pauper relief" money while 
the Federal^Government would finance public works efforts. Both Hopkins 
and Ickes developed plans. Xckes recommended long-term works designed to 
stimulate capital investment, with seventy percent of the funds going for 
material. Hopkins* plan called for short-term works to stimulate consump­
tion. It would assume private employment, and three-fourths of the funds 
would go for wages. Roosevelt agreed to a combination of the plans, heav­
ier on Hopkins* side. The plan was presented to Congress in the Presi­
dential Annual Message to Congress, January 4, 1935. It was the first
274gtar. December 18, 1934.
275i>uring its three years of operation in Nebraska, $31,000,000 was 
expended by the Nebraska Emergency Relief Administration. Of this amount, 
almost 80 percent came from Federal funds, 20 percent came from local funds, 
and only one percent came from state funds. During the peak month of 
January, 1935, 208,367 persons were on relief in Nebraska. From March 1934 
through December 1935, over 100,000 persons were on the relief rolls each 
month. Witte, Final Relief Report. 12, 20.
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part of the Second New Deal.276
An indication of the President's intentions regarding work relief 
was known during the fall of 1934. In September a spokesman for the FERA 
said that the "Santa Claus" features of the relief program should be elim­
inated. Lawrence agreed that this*was the only course of action* Direct 
relief for unemployables was necessary, but for those able to, work-for- 
pay was a necessity. Roosevelt rested at Warm Springs in November and 
worked on his new program. The editor pondered his course of action and 
its reception by the people. The editor was certain that the majority of 
the people, on relief or not, would approve of the work relief program 
over the dole. It would present the opportunity for them to use their 
brains and hands to support themselves and their families. To furnish 
jobs for the program, Lawrence considered it as a foregone conclusion?that 
public works would become a permanent feature of national policy and 
planning. This form of program would not create a drain on the Treasury 
because seventy percent of each dollar would be repaid. The entire pro­
gram was a "magnificent concept" from which would come a more prosperous
277and better nation.
Besides dividing the relief force into employables and unemploy­
ables, it was the Roosevelt plan to return responsibility of support of 
the unemployables to the state and local communities • In part this re­
flected Washington's faith that the economy would continue to Improve.
276$chlesinger, The Folitics of Upheaval. 265-266. 
277gtar. September 3, 1934.
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The editor did recommend that special consideration be given the Mid-Western 
states because of the recurring drouth and resultant lose of income. Ne­
braska did not mean to shirk its responsibilities, but there was a question 
as to whether the state and local governments could furnish the necessary aid. 
The assessment for Nebraska by the Federal relief agency for the year 1935, 
was four million dollars, the requirement had been six mil lion dollars but 
was scaled down because of the drouth and its effect on the economy. There 
were several problems involved in raising even that much money, commented 
Lawrence, both at the state and the local level. In Roosevelt’s new pro­
gram there should be given careful thought as to financing.^®
When Roosevelt gave his State of the Union message in January 
1935, Lawrence noted a difference in tone over previous speeches. In 
this <me, the note of emergency did not dominate. The President spoke of 
long-range planning for the security of the people* and the nation. He 
had turned his face from charity and the dole, and was looking ahead at 
the man's job in a progressing nation. The subject of a relief program 
would be of paramount concern during the Congressional session if the 
nation was to progress on to the prosperity which beckoned on the horizon. 
Lawrence was very pleased with the message and its p r o m i s e s . 279
When the President’s work relief program was presented to Congress, 
it had a slow passage. Congressmen were uneathuslasflc about granting such 
a large lump sum, with so few strings on the way it would be used. Nobody
27aIbld.. December 13, 22, 29, 1934j January 18, 1935.
279Ibid.. January S, 1935.
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except Roosevelt knew how the money would be spent, so no one could talk in 
favor of the measure. The conservatives saw the passage of the bill as an 
indication of the disintergration of the American form of Government* The 
liberals thought that the appropriations requested were insufficient, and 
that it was regression to return poor relief to the local communities.
The labor unions were afraid of the relief wage level as it might affect 
general wages. Roosevelt was able to save most of the measure inviolate, 
but he did have to accept some amendments. One amendment required con­
firmation for appointments to all jobs paying more than $5,000 a year.
"This single amendment guaranteed that politics would play a much larger 
part in the new works administration than it had in FERA or CWA,” com­
mented Schleslnger. Other amendments forced a bad system of allocation of 
funds, and Senator Borah insisted that relief funds were not to be used 
to build warships or munitions.280
As the Congressional debates filled the news, Lawrence commented on 
the proposed McCarran amendment which would have substituted a two billion 
dollar dole program for the "security wage” portion of the measure.
The editor considered that the nine Republicans and the Democrat who voted 
in the subcommittee for the amendment were "... playing hard and loose 
with their constituencies for the purpose of venting a personal grievance 
against the president.” In spite of the overwhelmingly Democratic major­
ity in Congress, the editor felt that it was a coalition Government; there 
were members of both parties in the Cabinet. However, any resort to
280Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval. 268-270.
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partisan politics at that point would wreck the President’s program, the
Democratic party* and possibly the nation, Roosevelt had always said that
work relief was better than the dole, and Lawrence considered that any
change from his program for one of Federal alms would be an insult to the
men and women who were forced to be on relief. The American people should
speak out about the crisis which was brewing in Washington and let their
281representatives know that they did not want a dole.
On February 23, 1935, it appeared to Lawrence that the President’s 
emergency relief measure had been done to death in Committee by a cabal of 
partisan Republicans and rebellious Democrats. The editor wondered If 
those Congressmen realised what they were doing when they acted as they 
did. Many persons who were on relief, through no fault of their own, were 
anxious to find any sort of work so that they could get off of the relief 
rolls. They did not want any part of a dole program because It would be 
too degrading. Those Congressmen were using innocent people to get back 
at the President, but he would come back to the struggle. And he would 
win, because he had the feelings of the people at heart and political 
sagacity. Five days after that editorial, Lawrence reported on this po­
litical sagacity. The President had not whimpered or gone into a temper 
at the revolt. He went his serene way, not wasting his strength on par­
tisan politics, certain that those who attacked his program would have to
282answer to the people for that attack.
28^lbid., 269 * Star. February 7» 1935•
282Star, February 23, 28, 1935.
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During the month of March, as the battle on Capital Hill continued, 
Lawrence again commented on the dignified manner in which Roosevelt was 
conducting his campaign in support of the relief measure. Instead of 
taking to the air and complaining to the people, the Eresldent had accepted 
those changes which did not affect the basic spirit of his program. On the 
other proposals he stood fast. The people of America could be proud of the 
man in whom they placed their trust in 1932. He had not let them down, nor 
would he, Roosevelt had "the qualities to govern his people wisely," com­
mented Lawrence.288
On March 29, Lawrence was happy to report that the protracted battle 
was almost over. A work committee of members from both Houses had reached 
agreement, and it was anticipated that both Houses would approve the result­
ing bill. This had been the most serious challenge which Roosevelt had had 
in his four years in office* The final measure was, in most particulars, 
the same as that which was submitted by the President. To Lawrence this 
indicated a distinct triumph for the President. The fact that this was 
the largest peacetime appropriation ever made by a Congress did not tell 
the whole story for the editor. "It represented," to him, "the greatest 
program of conservation and natural resources ever proposed by any nation." 
And the Midwest especially needed the program. The drouth had devastated 
the land, and this affected businessmen and workers as well as the farmers.
When the farmer had no money to spend, the businessman had no customers
284and the worker had no work. The new program could not come too soon.
283Ibid., March 8, 1935. 284lbld., March 29, 1935
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In July, Lawrence announced the "End of the Dole." Hie President 
had stated that all employables would be off the relief rolls by the end 
of the year. They had the option of working on public works projects or 
with private industry. Hie aged would be taken care of under the new 
Social Security program. All other relief cases would be returned to 
local governments and private charity organizations. Lawrence considered 
this a significant development. The Federal relief agencies had served 
a great purpose when local government had been unable to supply funds.
The year ahead had the promise of recovery, and the relief picture would 
change. There was still the requirement for sane rational social work, 
but the editor was sure that the necessity for emergency relief was 
passed.285
On July 15, 1936, Lawrence quoted extracts from a letter which he 
had received. The farmers of southern Nebraska were begging for help, 
but they could not compete with work relief. The abundant rains of the 
summer meant a good harvest in prospect, and thousands of farm workers 
were needed. The work would be hard, but the pay would be two or three times 
the pay of relief. Still, many would not change. This was a situation 
which could be found in industry and business as well as agriculture*
It was a problem which Roosevelt attempted to avert when he objected to the 
McCarran amendment* To require relief work to pay "the prevailing wage" 
would remove the incentive for returning to private industry. As one man 
was quoted as saying, why should he leave an eight-hour-day relief job to 
go do hard work for long hours on a farm. The judgment of the President
285ibid.. July 12, 1935.
151
286had been vindicated on this matter*
One question raised by the letter-writer was if the relief program 
had broken down the morale of the American worker. Lawrence doubted if it 
had done this* True, there were shiftless, indolent individuals, but they 
were few, and for each of them there were hundreds who exhibited an eager­
ness to provide f6r themselves* Most of the individuals who were shift­
less would have been so^even if there had been no depression or relief 
program* In lows, the editor revealed, relief was being refused to those 
who had refused private employment. Lawrence considered that this should
be the policy in Nebraska and everywhere. The longer direct relief was
287carried on, the lower the morale of the recipient became* Relief was a 
thorny problem for the worker, for the President, and for private business.
For some months, Lawrence reported, business had been happy, handing 
Roosevelt the "hot potato" of the employment problem. At the dedication of 
Boulder Dam, the President handed the potato right back to business. In 
his speech he said that it was his hope mid faith that within the year,
"the impetus given business would take care of unemployment." "The impli­
cation was unmistakable" to the editor. The clamoring about unbalanced 
budgets, mounting taxes, and the increased national debt were proper 
matters of concern* But business had been unwilling to face their role in 
the problem of widespread unemployment. It was not clear, the editor wrote, 
how private enterprise could sit by and enjoy its privileges, while millions
286Ibld.. July 15, 1935. 287Ibld.. July 15, 23, 1935.
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of potential wage earners remained idle, a potentially explosive situation. 
Not all, of course, but many of those proponents of rugged individualism 
exhibited a great weakness in not recognising the fact that people would 
not remain hungry and embittered for long. "That is human nature among the 
best and the worst," counseled the editor. Private enterprise was essential 
to the country and to the democratic way of Government* But it also had 
responsibilities to the country and to the Government. It could not con­
tinue the philosophy of every man for himself. If private enterprise was 
to survive, It had to ". • * have the Intelligence to confess the mistakes 
It made and remedy them," advised Lawrence. Business needed to exhibit a 
great degree of unselfishness* It had to be humanitarian*
The Republicans had been as vocal as business regarding what they 
considered the waste of the National Treasury. Even former President Hoover 
decried the efforts of the Roosevelt administration, calling on the people 
to turn "from muddling to sanity and reason." Roosevelt had been dealing 
with facts, not theories, wrote Lawrence* The rule books were worthless 
In a condition such as the country found Itself in 1932. The Government 
had to step in and provide aid or suffer the consequences• The job had 
been done, and now the opposition called it waste* They claimed that 
everything which had been done was done wrong. But the Government had no 
choice in the matter, and the editor considered that Roosevelt had taken 
the right path, if the relief money had been wasted, what did the opposi­
tion consider the billions which had been spent on the war, or the billions
288Ibld.. October 1, 1935.
which had been loaned to foreign governments, and not repaid? The 
nation had been involved in a fight for survival duripg the depression, 
and if the fight were won, those billions expended would represent not
ogQ
waste, but the finest investment of the nation. All segments of the econ 
omy and the Government needed to contribute their efforts and funds to win 
the final battle.
The editor of the Nebraska Dally News-Press» Nebraska City, wrote 
about county support of relief. He commented that Otoe county was "set- 
ting rather pretty” financially, but it would be jolted hard if the relief 
burden had to be carried for any length of time. If the burden had to be 
carried for any length of time, asked Lawrence, what would the county do? 
"Let ’em shift for themselves, to starve slowly and miserably?" One fact 
was evident to the editor of the Star. Before long, those officials who 
had been criticizing the administration’s relief efforts would have the 
same problems. And there was likely to be ”. . • more cases of a severe 
headache than follow the festive New Year’s gaitles."^®
Lancaster County also had problems in planning the financing of relief 
The County Board of Commissioners estimated that it would take a thirteen 
mill levy to finance the $1,792,100 burden of county expenses. The county 
was limited by law to a four mill levy, and a special session of the leg­
islature would be required to approve an increase. Lawrence did not think 
that it would be approved. The estimate of relief expenses for the county 
in 1935 was one billion dollars, all but $165,000 of which came
289Ibld.. October 7, 8, 1935. 290Ibld.. January 2, 1936.
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from the Federal Government. The Commissioners' estimate f or 1936 wast i /
based upon absorbing this expense* Lawrence regretted to think that, 
unless conditions improved miraculously, some of the 13,000 on county 
relief would be forced to make out as best they could* Of those who had 
with him insisted that relief began at home, Lawrence expected help and 
support for the local authorities who would have the problem* The problem 
was now exclusively the county’s, and it should be met*
One county which had difficulty In meeting its relief commitments 
was Douglas County* Omaha had a large number of unemployed on the rolls 
and limited industry to absorb the employables. During 1936, Lawrence 
called attention to what he considered the inadequate methods which the 
county was using to take care of its relief problems* At the same time he 
often shot barbs at the Omaha World-Harald* which he looked upon as a 
traitor to the Democratic cause* In February 1936, the Omaha paper edi­
torialized on the lack of local and state funds for relief support in the 
County* There had been three weeks of below zero cold weather which had 
caused extra expenditures* The newspaper called upon the Federal Govern­
ment to meet the need* Only a few days before, Lawrence recalled, an edi­
torial in the Omaha paper had applauded A1 Smith for his speech assailing 
the Roosevelt spending program*
Even more amazing to the editor of the Star was the subject of the 
principal World-Herald editorial on the same day that they asked for Fed­
eral aid* This editorial had painted n * • • a dour, sour, drab picture of
291xbid,* January 15, 1936*
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impending Federal tax burdens arising from the combined spending of the 
President and of the Congress* . . Lawrence considered that if was time 
to tell Omaha that it could not have its cake and eat it too. He reminded 
his readers that unfortunately, Douglas County had been broke for a long 
time, partly because it had not lived up to the requirements of the 
Government* The assessed valuation of property in Douglas County was 
lower than in other sections of the State* The citizens would not approve 
bonds to pay the expenses of Government.^92
’’Counties Can't Be Deadbeats,” was the opinion of the editor* Again 
he pointed at Douglas County* Some food and coal bills, incurred by the 
County relief agency, had not been paid for a year. Finally it required a 
court order before the County would pay. The only excuse given by the County 
for non-payment was that relief funds had run out. This was a weak excuse* 
to Lawrence, and was no reason for the merchants to be left holding the bag* 
The court order served notice that no county could adopt a ’’deadbeat” policy 
to evade its just legal o b l i g a t i o n s . ^93
The financial machinations of the Douglas County Commissioners were 
beyond Lawrence. Since 1934 the County had not been able to meet its 
relief commitments. It had been treated more generously than other sec­
tions of the State* Had it been assessed proportionately the same, it would 
have contributed two million dollars. And yet the Commissioners fixed the 
next tax levy at a lower figure than in 19351 If they could not operate the 
County on what they received in 1935, how could they expect to operate
292Ibld.. February S, 1936. 293Xbld.. July 17, 1936.
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on less in 1936? They had already pledged or spent three-fourths of that 
income* It was unfortunate that County officials had to accept payless 
days, and relief families go hungry and cold merely because the County
would not face u p  to its r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s . 9^4
When the Douglas County Engineer announced plans to build roads, 
financed mainly by WPA funds, Lawrence commented that one would think the 
officials and citizens would be loath to accept the money and be party to 
the ’’spending spree” which they professed to deplore. Instead, they seemed 
to be keen on accepting the funds and asked for more. Xt was a funny sit­
uation to Lawrence, one he could not e x p l a i n . ^95 xt could not be correlated 
with any portion of Roosevelt’s relief program.
Roosevelt's program did not always have an easy time in Congress 
because of his desire to keep politics out of relief. In March 1936, he 
asked for $1,500,000,000 for relief for the next year. Lawrence wrote 
that there were many Congressmen who were sincere about objecting to 
spending so much money for relief. But he was certain that others were 
influenced in their voting by purely political motives. They expected to 
use the relief program as a means of paying political debts. This would 
have ruined the felief program. Xt would also have ruined Roosevelt polit­
ically because of the use the Republicans could have made of the informa­
tion. Instead of asking the recipient his political affiliation, Roosevelt 
was asking business to increase job opportunities so that the tax burden
^94xbid.. August 12, September 16, 1936.
295ibid.* October 7, 1936.
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could be slashed. Lawrence wrote concerning keeping politics out of relief:
People of wealth must agree to it, not only In the spirit of decent 
humanltarianlsm, but for the protection, safeguarding, and perpetu­
ity of wealth, . . . .  in this gigantic task of caring.for millions 
of unemployed, politics should and must be eliminated.
But it was "extremely difficult to satisfy the politicians," com­
mented the editor. It was strange but criticism of relief administration 
was coming from both parties during the summer of 1936. The Republicans 
claimed that the administration was ‘’honeycombed with politics, " while the 
Democrats covertly declared that the good Jobs were being given to Repub­
licans. Obviously, both charges could not be true. “As a matter of fact," 
Lawrence reported, “neither is correct." Relief administration had always 
been kept as free as possible from politics. The editor explained the 
reason for the two parties’ accusations during the election year. The 
Republicans knew that their charges were not true, but they did not have 
any other issue on which to base the campaign, so they grasped at straws.
The Democrats were disgruntled because they had lost an opportunity to 
dictate the appointments of their “henchmen1* to Jobs. Lawrence wrote that 
he was quite certain the rank and file of Democrats would approve of 
Roosevelt’s stand, so that the greatest good would come from the program.
In Hay, Roosevelt again had trouble with Congress, reported the 
editor. The Republicans attempted to bring about the abandonment of the 
WPA, and the substitution of direct relief. The editor could not believe 
that they did this in good faith. Nothing could break the morale of those 
affected more quickly. It would rob them of self-respect. Taking a
296Ibid., March 19, 1936. 297Ibid,, April 9, 1936.
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materialistic view, the editor pointed out that the WPA was a system under 
which the public was receiving something worthwhile for the money which 
was invested. The public projects which were constructed were usually 
necessary additions to the community, impossible to obtain in any other 
manner. Lawrence did not deny that work relief cost more than the dole, 
but the benefits to the recipient and to the nation were worth the added 
expense. And the expense was necessary
Even though the stock market showed that recovery was progressing 
well, more than eleven million persons were awaiting reemployment. They 
had not shared in the economic revival. This great body of "forgotten 
men" and women had a stake in their country# Their lives needed to be 
made secure on the basis of their own labor, fairly recompensed. During 
the great debate of the election year (we would hear the same phrase 
25 years later!) the people should remember the facts. Even though 
there were eleven million out of work, compared to 1932, conditions 
were much better, Progress had been made under Roosevelt, and it would 
continue
Xn fact, the economy was in such good shape that the United States 
Chamber of Commerce asked for the termination of federal relief in Novem­
ber 1936. Lawrence agreed that business was booming, but in certain 
states, relief could not be curtailed at that time without incurring suffer­
ing and distress. Xn Nebraska this condition was a result of natural 
causes. Again in the summer of 1936 the State had experienced a terrible
298Ibld., May 29, 1936 299Ibid.. July 10, 1936.
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drouth which destroyed the corn crop. In addition, a university agri­
cultural study showed that the state soil moisture condition was sUch that 
prospects for the 1937 com crop was slight, unless additional moisture 
fell. This meant that Nebraska needed some means of subsistence through 
work or relief during the winter so that people would stay on the farms.
This condition should receive special consideration in Washington.
Because America was such a large country, hard and fast rules could 
not be established which would apply to all sections of the country at the 
same time. The editor suggested that, as areas became able to support 
themselves, they be taken from the relief program, But for areas which 
were stricken by natural or other calamities, the relief program should be 
continued. It was the humanitarian thing to do,^°®
As had become apparent, welfare would continue and become a social 
action concern for the Government at all levels* In Nebraska, an unemployment
oni
compensation tax furnished funds for assistance after 1939. The efforts 
of relief and welfare were majestic in their magnitude, but there was little 
use in keeping a farm family supplied with food and clothing if its means 
of livelihood was lost due to foreclosure or nature* Programs were needed 
to save the land and save the farmer during the trying times of the depres­
sion.
f^ljllbid., November 21, 1936.
SOlsiue Book 1938* 513, Public assistance became an item in the 
State Budget, in 1936. By 1938, it ranked second in the amount of money 
expended by the State. In the period 1937i?1939, assistance amounted to 
nearly one-fourth of the State’s total appropriations, Olson, History of 
Nebraska, 312-313,
CHAPTER VII 
SAVE THE IAND
Franklin Roosevelt was reared la the rural atmosphere of Hyde Park, 
New York. Although he often visited Europe with his parents, and spent a 
great deal of his adult life in the city, he retained his interest in the 
soil. He paid personal attention to the forestry and farming operations 
conducted on the Hyde Park estate, which was a showpiece of good farming 
practices. At Harvard he was exposed to the philosophy of Frederick Jackson 
Turner. As a New York State Senator, Roosevelt was Chairman of the Agri- 
culture Committee in 1913. As Governor of the State, he pushed for conser­
vation practices. All of his life he was active in conservation organisa­
tions.302
Thomas H. Greer compared Roosevelt to Jefferson in his preference
for country life. The Ideal community was based on a rural foundation.
In a speech at Omaha, October 10, 1936, Roosevelt said that the guiding
thought of all his plans was
. • . the fundamental belief that the American farmer, living on his 
own land, remains our ideal of self-reliance and of spiritual balance 
-- the source from which the reservoirs of the nation’s strength are 
constantly renewed.
Greer considered that Roosevelt was pledged to the “Agrarian myth" described
303by Richard Hois tad ter.
302Edgar B. Nixon fed.) Franklin D. Roosevelt and Conservation 1911- 
1945 (2 vole.; Washington: U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 1957), I, 4. Here­
after cited as Nixon, FDR and Conservation♦ Fusfeld, Economic Thought of 
FDR. 17.
303Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. 19.
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In an editorial of January 4, 1934, entitled “The Commander-In-Chief
Speaks," editor Lawrence noted that there was a feeling in the President’s
message that agriculture must be the root of a reclaimed America. Roosevelt
had said that he was convinced industrial progress and prosperity could be
attained only by raising the level of agriculture’s purchasing power. This
304
would put it in balance with the purchasing power of other forms of work.
Although Lawrence was not involved directly in agriculture, he was 
deeply conscious of the Nebraska farmer. He continually referred to Ne­
braska as an agricultural state, and insisted that there was no other source
of Income available to the Nebraskan. He felt, as did Roosevelt, that the
305American economy as a whole rested on the broad base of agriculture. The
editor was heartily and vocally in favor of those New Deal programs which
attempted to aid the farmer in his struggle against nature and the economics
of uncontrolled production.
A review of Nebraska farm statistics will show the vascillations In
the income received during the first part of the century. The index of prices
received by farmers for all commodities stayed near 100 from 1910 until it
took a rapid jump to a high of 224 in 1919. By 1921 the index went just as
rapidly back down to 112, The rest of the Twenties found the index between
115 and 153, The 1930 index was 12$; in 1931 it slumped to $8. Xt hit a
low of 62 in 1932 and 1933. The index went back above 100 in 1935 and 
306
remained there. The value of Nebraska’s corn crop in 1930 was $121,941,000.
304 305
Star, January 4, 1934. Ibid., January 13, 1936.
306Nebraska Agricultural Record, 128*
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It was $64,871,000 in 1931, and $37,701,000 in 1932. The value of the wheat 
crop of 1930 was $37,751,000 and in 1931 it was $22,786,000. In 1932 the 
value was an almost infinitesimal $7,508,000.3®'
With such variations in annual income, and with no assurance of any 
Income at all, if is understandable that a farmer had difficulty in planning 
his budget, To pay for his farm, maintain his equipment, and support his 
family required a cautious allocation of income. When income was down, as 
in 1932 and 1933, the farmer was hard-pressed to do any of these things.
The possibility that he would lose his land through mortgage foreclosure was 
a specter which haunted many Nebraska farmers as the Presidential campaign 
of 1932 was waged.
I
MISTER PRESIDENT, SAVE MS' FARM 
In his book, On Our Wav. Franklin Roosevelt wrote that the word "emer­
gency” characterised the United States in 1932. "It was an emergency," he 
continued,
that went to the roots of our agriculture • . , that had existed for 
a whole generation in its underlying causes and for three and one- 
half years in its visible effects. It could be cured only by a com­
plete reorganization and a measured control of the economic structure.
308He commented that the farm foreclosure problem dated back at least to 1920.
In his campaign speech at Topeka, Kansas, September 14, 1932, he proposed 
that the Reconstruction Finance Corporation program be broadened to Include 
protection for farmers. He suggested that Federal credits be given to banks 
and other holding companies. When these credits were given, those receiving
30^Blue Book 1940* 386. ^®%oosevelt, On Our Way. 35, 46.
the credits should be compAIled to refund the mortgages* In addition he 
asked that the interest rates on farm loans be lowered to two and one-half 
percent until economic conditions were better. The nation could not 
endure "half boom and half b r o k e . "309
Lawrence hailed this as a "sane, practical proposal," which would be 
considered by the public as a proper plan. In principle, wrote the editor, 
the Roosevelt plan was the same as that which had been advocated by national 
farm leaders. This was an additional reason to consider that the plan was 
sound. The editor realised that the bankers and farm mortgage associations 
would not be happy but he felt that the general public would agree that per­
manent economic rehabilitation of the nation rested on improving the position 
of agriculture* Lawrence also wrote that the Republicans would be against 
the program. This was interesting to him in the light of the failure of the.- 
Hoover farm p r o g r a m . 310
To the editor, Hoover did not deserve all of the criticism he had 
received. As an engineer he was an expert, but in the area of governmental 
science he lacked political leadership qualities. The Farm Board which had 
been set up was an example of his lack of understanding. As the first step 
in the Democratic party’s pledge to reduce expenditures if they gained con­
trol, Lawrence suggested the elimination of the Farm Board. He further sug­
gested that no "new organism" be created to replace it. The Department of 
Agriculture was duly constituted to administer farm control, and the editor 
felt that it was capable of doing so. "The farm board is nothing but a fifth
3®9Rosenxaan, Papers. I, 693-711. 310gtar. September 15,1932.
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wheel, and a dragging wheel at that. The sooner it is abolished the better," 
he concluded.3^
In January 1933, Lawrence reported on a Roosevelt-approved bill which 
had been introduced into the lame-duck Congress. Senator Joseph Robinson 
of Arkansas, who was the Democratic Floor Leader, proposed the creation of 
a billion-dollar Federal corporation which would lend money to farmers on 
second mortgages. In addition, loans could be made to pay taxes and other 
obligations, and to provide working capital for farmers. It placed the Fed­
eral Treasury behind the Federal Land Banks by authorizing Treasury purchase of 
Land Bank stocks and bonds.
The editor wrote:
It is recognized now that scarcely less pressing thanrhigher prices for farm 
commodities is the problem of readjusting farm debts. . . .  Senator Robinson 
in drafting his bill has bill has provided very wisely for a voluntary method 
of the readjustment of farm debts. . . .  It gives the farmer time to dig him­
self out of a hole. . . .  It puts the Government in the same position with re* 
pact to the farmer that it is in regard to bank and insurance companies.
Lawrence was sure that farm prices would go up as a result of the measure,
and that the farmer could repay the loans. He considered the measure as an
"inflation policy which will do much to pump new life info the veins of the farm
regions.”312 unfortunately, no action was taken on the measure, and the farmer
continued to lose his land.
It was paradoxical that people were starving and losing their land, while 
the grain elevators were full to overflowing, Nebraska could be cited as an 
example of want in abundance. The State produced 71,500,000 bushels of wheat 
in 1930 for which the farmer received $37,750,000. In 1931 the state produced
3Hibid.. September 28, December 9, 1932# ^^Ibid.. January 27, 1933.
fifty seven million bushels, but the farmer received only $22*750,000* The de­
valuation of the tore stop wee just e» drastic* “In the plains states, breadlines 
marched under grain elevators heaped, high with wheat," wrote touch fcenburg*3*3
After hie inauguration, President Roosevelt seat to Congress a farm re­
lief bill, the Agricultural Adjustment .Act# It passed and he signed ft into 
law on May It, It IS# Of interest at this point is the provision of the act 
which proposed to relieve the farm credit situation by providing for the refinanc­
ing of farm mortgages through Federal land Banks* When the President signed 
the measure he appealed to those she had money claims against farmers to delay 
foreclosure proceedings until the program could he Implemented * Unfortunate­
ly, many creditors did not wait, and the newspapers of the day were filled with 
reports of the span revolt of farmers as they fought to save their farms* The 
Hsu York Timas reported the warning of a Nebraska Farm Holiday movement leader:
"If we don’t get beneficial service from the Legislature, 200,000 of us are 
coming to Lincoln and we’ll tear that new State Capitol Building to pieces,“315 
Apparently, neither side was willing to bargain*
Lawrence' wrote that only one thing could stop the liquidation of farm
^ %faas Book 1940. 386* "One account reported that on a single day in 
April, 1932, one-fourth of the entire area of the state of Mississippi went 
under the hammer of auctioneers*" Leechtanguys, I^ SR and the. New Deal* 23*
314Roosevelt, On Opt fay* 265*
31%hs New York Times, January 22, 1933* Other newspaper accounts are 
cite* in Scfcl*aiag*r, Th* Coming g£ jg»£ Smt Paul. *2-4*. Approximately 95 par- 
cmnt ot Hebraaka land was farm acreage, with almoat ona-half of thia under eul- 
ti vation. Slaty-two of the 93 counties reported no urban population at all in 
If51, By 1935, the assessed valuation of farm land was almost one-half of the 
1920 value* Meanwhile, indebtedness increased from $450 million in 1920, to 
$Sf0 million in 1930* Whitts, Final Relief Report* 43-52 *
lands. This was conciliation and under standing between creditor and debtor*
The editor’s suggested method of reaching an understanding was simple*
Get the two together, let them become better acquainted, and have them give 
some fair and honest consideration to their mutual problem* To Lawrence, 
the debt moratorium bills which were being introduced and passed in many 
state legislatures merely delayed liquidations and did not prevent them*
He chided creditors as not being “enlightened and just," and debtors for 
not recognising their obligations* He continued, "* » * it would be far 
better if people depended more upon humanity and less upon legislation in 
adjusting their troubles. ” 316
The editor was categorically against the moratorium measures* In an 
editorial on January 9, 1934, entitled "This New Day," he commented on the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision validating a Minnesota Moratorium Act* 
Regarding moratoriums themselves, he said that "while the debtor has his respite 
against loss of home and farm • . * the moratorium meant * . « that he is 
losing ground steadily through the accumulation of delinquent interest*" 
Lawrence then returned to his pleas for conciliation, adding, "the real 
heart of the new deal is an effort to revive just and fair and honorable 
practices in everyday business and living*"
The Court’s 5-4 decision on the Moratorium Act was a liberal 
triumph which had far-reaching significance to Lawrence* It would seem to 
indicate that the Court would uphold the Roosevelt recovery program as con­
stitutional * The decision placed the judiciary on the side of the other two
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branches of Government in the proposition that emergencies might arise in 
peacetime which necessitated the use of quasi-martial law by the state*
"What happens after the period of stress is another matter,” wrote the editor* 
If the conservatives saw in this Court decision the creation of a dictatorial 
super-state, Lawrence did not* He contended that "every other milestone in 
growth of law and in the extension of constitutional progress may have cre­
ated the same concern*" To the editor, the beginning of America was such 
a step because It overturned previous s y s t e m s * 3*7
In an editorial on January 10, 1934, Lawrence compared the Nebraska 
moratorium law with the Minnesota law and found them similar* In a January 
31st editorial, he asked if any thought had been given to what would replace 
the moratorium law when it expired in 1935* The Sup rone Court had approved 
the Minnesota law only because it met an emergency situation* It did not 
judge on whether the law would be valid during normal times* Lawrence asked 
several questions regarding the Nebraska law* How long would the present 
emergency last? Did the backers of the law want it renewed for another two 
or four-year period after 1935? If the nation's economic condition continued 
to improve at its current rate, would the Court then reevaluate its de­
cision? To the editor, "* * * nothing [was] more important than to replace 
the uncertainty of debt obligations with definite, certain understanding*"^!^ 
As a final word on moratorium laws, the editor cited a report from 
the Federal Housing Administration, sent to its state directors in late 1934* 
The administration stated that its hands were tied as regards to assisting
31^Ibid*, January 9, 1934* Ibid•, January 10, 31, 1934.
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farmers through mortgage investors. These private companies would not help 
mortgage .finance companies while mortgage moratorium laws were in effect*
The laws, although serving an emergency purpose, jeopardized the lender’s 
security by increasing expenses and nullifying the advantages of investing 
in mortgages. The Government wanted to get out of the loan business and let 
private capital take over, but "so long as the moratorium prevails, there is 
not going to be any private financing," wrote Lawrence.
During the spring of 1934, Senator Lynn Frazier of South Dakota, and 
Representative William Lemfce of North Dakota, presented the Federal Farm
Bankruptcy Act to Congress. It was designed to prevent foreclosures and enable
farmers to secure credit extensions. Provisions were also included for farmers 
to repurchase their farms with, small annual payments, with a one percent 
interest rate. If the creditor opposed the settlement, the farmer could retain
possession on fair and reasonable terms for five years, with bankruptcy pro­
ceedings suspended during that period of time.
The bill was passed, and the President reluctantly signed it into law 
on June 28, 1934. Lawrence wondered " . . .  whether President Roosevelt, with 
his own hand, delivered a lethal dose to his recovery program . . The 
editor was sure that the bill was constitutional, but the point he made was 
that it was too controversial and provided nothing. In March, the Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks had reduced interest rates from three to two and 
one-half percent. This had placed agriculture on a better footing than it had 
been one year before. Thus, the Frazier-Lemke measure was not aecee>
3l9Ibld.. February i, 1935
The President find defended hie approval of the hill by saying that 
he did not believe the legislation would he abused by those seeking relief*
To the editor* this shoved the faith which Roosevelt had in people*s inher­
ent honesty hut was a rather flimsy foundation for the construction of the 
measure. Lawrence did not feel that the law would have the desired effect 
on farm credit* and he asked* **Who would lend the money?11 the editor con­
sidered that the measure placed doubt and uncertainty on farm mortgages as 
security* The Government would be forced to supply the credit for the farmer 
in the future* Lawrence commented that the bill was not a part of the 
Roosevelt program but was rammed through a Congress Which had ltfs eyes on 
the camming election* Later* after he had the opportunity to review the 
bill* Lawrence observed that the measure was *% . * more of a political 
gesture than first realized.” It did very little for the debtor and might
091
prove more harmful than helpful. As far as Lawrence was concerned* the 
administration-approved measures were the best*
Regarding another credit aid* the farm Credit Administration, the 
editor wrote that "nothing that has been dine by the federal Government in 
its efforts to ameliorate the condition of agriculture has been of greater 
benefit to that Industry than this refiaanelngV* The administration had 
loaned over $116 million to more than 2,500 Nebraska debtors* The editor
320Ibid., Kerch 2D* duly 2, 1934; Morris* Encyclopedia of American 
History* 349*
3 2 tar. July 2* 10* 25* 1934* The act was declared unconstitutional 
in 1935*
pointed out that Nebraska farmers had $1,360,000 more to spend in 1936 because 
their loan interest was that much less through refinancing* This* coupled 
with the policies of the Department of Agriculture Which resulted in raising 
farm commodity prices* enabled the business of the State to show a fif teen 
percent increase over the past year* Xt being election time, Lawrence ended 
the editorial by commenting, "All of the talk that can be done by Republican 
spellbinders cannot obscure these facts* and it is facts that count*322
Xn addition to the Farm Credit Administration, Lawrence was pleased 
to report the success of the voluntary debt adjustment committees in the 
State* This program* set up by the Roosevelt administration* had relieved 
hundreds of farmers from their heavy debt load* The agency had demonstrated 
what could be accomplished when a spirit of conciliation and goodwill pre­
vailed* Private creditors had scaled down their debts as much as oaetthird* 
so that their debtors could qualify for Federal loans* Lawrence quoted the 
figure $5,200,000 as the amount written off by mortgage holders* At the same 
time* other debts had been reduced by $1,614,587, allowing farmers to pay 
$98*868 in past due taxes. The heavy debt load of the farmer had been less­
ened, and the various governmental divisions of the State had benefitted by 
added revenue* All of these benefits were a far cry from the spirit of 
bitterness* hostility* and defeat which had prevailed in the nation in 1933* 
The farmer retained his farm and the creditor recovered his investment* But 
what of the people living in the industrial areas who did not have a means 
of supporting themselves?
322ibid., May S, 1936. 323jjjid., Hay 5, August 13, 1936
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As the AAA was taking submarginal land out of production, Roosevelt 
suggested that the Government buy the land* As Governor of New York, he had 
been instrumental In instituting a resettlement program for urban dwellers *3*4 
In Hay 1935, the Federal Resettlement Administration was established with 
the objective of improving the conditions of poor, small farmers, and also 
to resettle destitute urban families onto submarginal lands near cities*
There the families could live on farmstead work in the city# the AAA 
insisted that they produce no farm products for sale*^25
The Government's intent, as editor Lawrence saw it, was to create a 
type of semi-rural, semi-industrial population* Homesteads of five to ten 
acres in sub-marginal lands, mainly in the Bast, would be offered to urban 
dwellers# this amount of land would support a family with foodstuffs while 
they had partial employment in industry* Small plants would be built in or 
near these rural communities* With the plants operating mostly in the win­
ter, employment and income would be afforded farmers and their families 
during the non-farming season*
As an additional benefit from the program, cheaper power and better 
roads would result in increasing the advantages of farm life# This would 
encourage the farm youth to remain on the land instead of moving to the over­
crowded cities* Unfortunately for the program, the first sife selected was
^^Rosenman, Papers■1* 480-495 contains a speech, "Acres Fit and Unfit," 
which Roosevelt made While Governor#
325Wallaee, New Frontiers. 240-246* Wallace suggested that the submar­
ginal land might be transferred to the Indians because they were "already sub­
sistence farmers*"
Reedsville* West Virginia, a depressed coal mining town* The planners, In 
Washington and not on the scene, constructed an unworkable program through 
ignorance of local conditions * There was not even enough arable lend for 
gardens* The program mover was successful*52^
• A survey in Nebraska: in September It36, showed that the "aid to 
small farmers" feature of the Resettlement Administration had been helpful 
and successful* There were 947 farmers who were saved from foreclosure 
and 3*038 farmer# who received loams, unobtainable from any other source*
In Lancaster County, $5,500 had been repaid on loams* when only $4,500 was 
due* The results of the program shewed Lawrence that it was mot a waste 
and criminal extravagance as the opponents charged.527
‘As a result of these various administration programs associated with 
the AAA, a goodly share of the nation's farmers were able to retain their 
land* There was, however, other land in the nation which was in danger of 
being lost* This loss was through foreclosure by nature* Because of drouth, 
valuable top soil was blown sway. Because of floods, valuable land was lost 
to production, to end up m  a delta at the mouth of the Mississippi. To 
conserve the natural resources of the United States was of primary interest 
and concern to President Roosevelt and His administration*
336$tar. Hay 15, 1933. Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Mel* 
363-368, gives the story of the resettlement program. See also Xckes, 
Diary* 129, 152, 154, 12?, for Iekes* comments on what he considered the 
poor investment at Raedaville * Xefces was Chairman of the Board of the 
Subsistence Homesteads Corporation*
327Star* September 28, 1936* See also m  editorial in the Jifcar, 
October 7, 1936, relating to the repayment of loans to the administration *
II
CONSERVE THE DOMAIN; SAVE THE YOUTH 
As a youth* Roosevelt was aware of the problems and practices of con­
servation through the operation of his parents9 Hyde Park estate. His seri­
ous interest in the subject began in 1911 when he was elected to the New
York State Senate. At the time* the conservation problems of the entire
State were gaining increased attention in the Legislature, As the New York
representative to the National Conservation Congress in 1913* Roosevelt be-
328came informed on the conservation problems of the nation.
By 1933* while the attention of the people was focused on the sagging
economy of the nation* two less-publicised problems facing America had
grown to almost epidemic proportions -- non-conservation of the nation9#
resources and non-employment of the nation*s youth. Roosevelt planned to
attack both of these economic conditions with one stroke by creating the
Civilian Conservation Corps, {hiring his 1932 nomination acceptance speech*
Roosevelt described a plan for action to convert *f. • • millions of acres
of marginal and unused land into timberland through reforestation . . . .
329In so doing* employment can be given to a million men.*'
Lawrence had noted in an editorial that unemployed youth would be a 
special case for social concern during the depression. Decreasing family 
finances would force many students to leave school early. Because these 
young men would not have dependents* society would have less sympathy for 
them than for an unemployed family man. ’’The social implications of depres­
sion may be far more serious than the immediate pressing economic evils*11
328 329
Nixon* FDR and Conservation. I, 4* Rosenman* Papers. I* 654.
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warned the editor*330 Roosevelt's proposed program might eliminate the 
problem of unemployed youth.
Arthur M. Hyde* Hoover's Secretary of Agriculture, attacked the 
Democratic candidate's plan as being expensive and unworkable. Editor 
Lawrence quickly came to Roosevelt's defense* in an editorial entitled 
"Heeds or Xrees*" He wrote that* if his memory served him correctly* it 
was a Republican Roosevelt who first suggested the reforestration plan which 
fDR now proposed. The editor pointed out that the nation's timber supply 
had been heavily used for fifty years. In spite of what Secretary Hyde said* 
there was no surplus of timber supplies* contended Lawrence. Xf marginal 
land was taken out of farm production and planted as forest* the program 
would pay for itself in fifty years by increased timber supplies. Between 
Hyde's advice that land be laid id Ip to grow weeds, and the Roosevelt plan 
of growing trees* there could be only one choice, and that was not the Sec­
retary's* wrote Lawrence* He suggested that Hyde should spend his time try­
ing to explain the Hoover administration failures in agriculture instead 
of commenting on Roosevelt's programs.331
The forestation of marginal lands was attacked by the Republicans 
again in the fall of 1933* Lawrence commented that the feresfafloo plan was 
not political in nature, but was built on sane* common-sense use of human 
experience. One of the forest projects which Lawrence described was in His- 
souri. The Government had acquired land* "worthless except for recreational 
purposes and to support forests." Lawrence saw the immediate benefit of the
33?Star. May 30, 1934. 33XIbld., July 8, 193a.
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project as the employment of nearly 5,000 men. Moreover, an additional and 
Indefinite benefit was the building up of additional timber reserves for the 
nation* The soundness of the program would be appreciated more in twenty-five 
years than it was at the time*
The forestation plan was not to be confused as an attempt to reduce 
surpluses in grains, wrote Lawrence* The land which had been used for plant­
ing trees was not land that had been producing grains* The prairie states, 
where the problem of grain surpluses existed, were not normally timber grow­
ing regions* With care and supervision, however, it would be possible to 
grow trees in these states* Lawrence wrote that, providing there was water 
available, millions of acres in Nebraska and other Midwestern states could 
be put Into forests.-*32 xhe planting of this area into forests would furnish 
additional work for the CCC.
Roosevelt may not have originated the Idea of the Civilian Conser­
vation Corps, but he was Intensely interested in its concept of action*333 
"He saw it big," wrote Frances Perkins* "He thought any man or boy would 
rejoice to leave the city and work in the woods."334 in fact, Roosevelt had 
four objectives for the CCC programs to employ 300,000 men, thus keeping them 
off the streets; to send most of their pay to their families; to coordinate the
332Ibid.9 August 14, 1933; January 2, March 29, 1934*
333$iixon [FDR and Conservation. I, 99, 100*] quoted letters to Roose­
velt from conservationists, dated in 1931, recommending such a plan. How­
ever, Schlesinger [The Coming of the New Deal* 337.} wrote: "The mechanics 
were vague in the President's mind, and . . .  he turned it over to Louis 
Howe to work out*" In addition, Frances Perkins [The Roosevelt I Knew* 177.] 
wrote that the project was really all Roosevelt’si
334prancea perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew* 177.
program with the overall conservation program; and to build character Into 
the coming generation*
The bill was introduced into both Houses of Congress on Kerch 21, 
1933, accompanied by a message from the President. In it he outlined the 
program. Workers would be enrolled for public employment, but there would 
be no competition with normal employment. The work undertaken would be 
limited to forestry, prevention of soil erosion, and similar conservation 
projects which would be of practical value, both at the time and for the 
future. Ihe control and direction of the program would be by the Depart­
ments of Labor, Agriculture, War, and Interior. No additional funds would 
be required at first because unobligated funds were available to sustain 
the program for several months. Aside from the material gains which would 
accrue from the program, the President said that the moral and spiritual 
gains would be great and more important. This was the second measure 
requested by Roosevelt after he assumed office, indicating the importance 
he placed on conservation.
Opposition to the measure was not long in coming. Organised labor 
called it militaristic because the Army would be recruiting and supervising 
the program. Labor spokesmen felt that it would degrade labor because of 
the "no discharge" provision and the low, fixed pay. To placate labor, the 
Senate amended the bill to eliminate the fixed wage and term of enlistment, 
and the conditions of employment were left to the President. The Senators 
themselves criticised the fact that no limitations were placed on the kind 
of projects on which the President could use the workers. Representatives
177
of states with little public land feared that their state would not benefit 
from the proposed work. And, several amendments were made to eliminate 
these criticisms.^**
Never one to condone tampering with Roosevelt's programs, in an edi­
torial on March 25, 1933, Lawrence wrote that "it was too good to last." 
While politics had been adjourned during the initial stages of the emergency, 
when farm relief and unemployment measures came to the floor, the picture 
changed. Because the key word of Roosevelt's program was action, the editor 
asked Congress either to act quickly or give the President authorization to 
do so. The nation had confidence in Roosevelt but "delay and filibuster are 
the greatest threats for dissipation of that confidence," warned the editor.
To the objection that the CCC pay was too small, Lawrence countei~ed 
that the President had not expected to "pull full-fledged jobs out of thin 
air." Partial relief was all he hoped for. "Besides," Lawrence added, "if 
the salary were handsome, it is doubtful whether the Corps would ever be 
detached from the public payroll . . ." Americans did not want a dole or
337Russian sovietism; they wanted action. And they wanted immediate action.
After a hard fight and several amendments, the measure was passed on March
33830, 1933, and the President signed it the next day.
On February 20, 1934, Lawrence ranked the CCC as near the first of
the administration projects because it built for the future by taking the
discouraged, idle young men and putting them to work and "out of the field
336 337
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of temptation." tn addition. It taught them discipline end self-respect.
they would take home a useful occupation which they had learned in the Corps.
the editor wee sure that many of the young men involved in crime would have
led proper and useful lives had they had the CCC training, "the CCC has
339rescued thousands of these young men," he wrote.
A year later Lawrence possibly remembered that editorial when he com­
mented on the report issued by Nebraska State Reformatory Superintendent, Cue 
Hill. Hill reported that the population of the reformatory was only 300, com­
pared to 422 in 1933, an estimated savings of $30,000 in costa. It was the 
conclusion of the Superintendent that the CCC program was a contributing fac­
tor in the decrease in the number of inmates. Even including the financial 
savings, Lawrence wrote that the most important feature of the Corps was that 
It maintained the morale of the youth and kept them "in the path of recti­
tude •" Future generations would look upon the CCC program as M. . . one of
340
the most helpful and beneficial features of the recovery program."
In March 1934, Lawrence applauded the announcement of approval for 
five new CCC camps in Nebraska. These camps, he wrote, would give work in 
the summer sunshine to at least a thousand young men. The editor was sure 
that it was best for Nebraska men to be stationed in Nebraska. They could 
work better near home because they knew the soil and the climate* Also, 
their families could visit them, and mall between home and camp would flow 
more rapidly. The state and local communities would benefit by the money 
spent for materials, and by the improvement of natural beauties and recre-
339S ta r. February 20, 1934. Ib id . .  Majreti 0 , 1935.
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ational facilities through the work of the CCC. As a by-product of the CCC 
program, the public was taking an increased interest in conservation and 
allied activities. Nebraska was appreciative of the Federal Government for 
fostering such a program, commented Lawrence.341
To Nebraskans, nothing was more important than conservation of the 
soil. The CCC had done a highly useful job of conserving the natural re­
sources of the State* Their work was demonstrated to be timely, important, 
and necessary by the dust storms which had plagued the Middle West. While 
recounting these deeds, Lawrence reminded the reader that the conserving 
of the youth was the most important end product of the program. Without 
the opportunity which was afforded by the CCC, the editor was certain that 
many of the lads would have ended up as "knights of the road," acquiring 
habits of Idleness and crime
In the CCC camp schools, the men were " . . .  studying almost every­
thing from forestry to higher mathematics, English and History," reported 
Lawrence. Also in the curriculum were such diverse subjects as fire pre­
vention, surveying, geology, banking, and cooking. Forestry was an espe­
cially popular subject, and Lawrence was certain that many youth would enter 
the Forestry Department when they terminated their enlistment with the C C C . 343 
It was not only the youth who gained good experience from the CCC.
In a Cabinet meeting, Secretary of War George Dem reported that the Army had
34lIbld.. March 24, 1934. 342Ibld.. April 9, 1935; March 19, 1936.
3^3Ibld., February 20, 1934. "Of all the forest planting, public 
and private, in the history of the nation, more than half was done by the 
CCC." Leuchtenburg, FDR and the New Deal, 174.
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received valuable experience in handling the CCC program. "They had to 
learn to govern men by leadership, explanation, and diplomacy rather than 
discipline. That knowledge is priceless to the American Army," he informed 
the P r e s i d e n t . 344 Quite possibly the American Army of World War II benefit­
ed considerably from the training and experience which was given and re­
ceived in the CCC program.
Nonetheless, the CCC did not escape being part of the political football 
in the Presidential compaign of 1936. In the Republican convention keynote 
speech at Cleveland, Senator Frederick Steiwer said that young men were " ... 
compelled by the false economics of the New Deal to exchange their American 
opportunity . . . for enrollment in a federal camp." In countering these 
allegations, Lawrence cited an Institute of Public Opinion poll recently 
taken which found that, nationwide,eighty-two percent of the people favored the 
CCC program. Seventy-one percent of the farmers and ninety percent of the 
young voters said they approved of the CCC. Senator Steiwer had raised 
an unpopular battle cry and appealed to prejudice, wrote Lawrence. The 
men did not forsake private enterprise to join the Corps. They had come out 
of school only to find that the nation could not use their services. The 
editor commented that it was a partisan audience which applauded Steiwer*a 
speech, but he felt that the public opinion poll more nearly reflected the
sentiment of the n a t i o n . 345
Editor Lawrence would later write that the CCC should receive credit
344Quoted in Frances Ferkins, The Roosevelt 1 Knew. 179-180. 
345star. July 6, 1936.
for the fact that snow continued to cover areas where the Corps had worked, 
furnishing much needed moisture during the winter of 1936-1937* Continua­
tion of the CCC was a feature of the Roosevelt recovery program with which
346even his most rabid critics could not find fault. the drouth having 
played such an important place in the lives of Midwest farmers, anything 
which was done to alleviate the effects of water shortage was of interest 
to Lawrence and his readers.
isx
WATER, WATER, NOWHERE 
in the middle of the Nineteenth Century, one obstacle to the settle­
ment of Nebraska was the description of the area as part of the "Croat Amer­
ican Desert." Dr. Samuil Aughey, Professor of Natural Sciences at the Uni­
versity of Nebraska wrote a book in 1880, rebutting this description. In 
the book he set forth the theory that "rainfall follows the plow." the valid­
ity of his premise seemed to be borne out as the farming areas of Nebraska 
and rainfall Increased apace during the 1830s. Bitter experience was to 
prove that Nebraska could not be farmed in the same manner as land east of 
the Missouri*
"The acquisition of that experience was a major factor in Nebraska's 
economic and political history," wrote Swam Olson, Nebraska historian. After 
it had been determined that the State had little in the way of marketable mineral 
resources, Nebraskans realised that the State's best resource was its soil.
The key to successful agriculture was water. After different and fruitless
^ I b l d .. January 13, 1937; April 23, 1933.
attempts at ra inmaking, conservation mss accepted as the solution to the 
problem of a limited water supply. Conservation of the soil was practiced 
as m  additional measure to support the State's principal economic activity, 
agriculture. By 1930, diversification of crops and crop rotation provided 
conservation and stability to offset ihe hazards of one-crop farming.^7 
the Roosevelt administration would attempt several measures to improve 
conservation of land and water.
During the campaign of 1932, Roosevelt described 111 plan for water 
developments, quoting the views of George W. Norris as being similar to bis 
own* After he was installed in office, Roosevelt surrounded himself with 
men who were as interested in conservation as himself. The ambitious program 
Which they developed included irrigation, resettlement, and rehabilitation, 
plus increasing the number and else of national forests and parka. Unfortu­
nately, the efforts of the administration were not far enough advanced to 
erase the effects of the drouth of 1934. In Nebraska, the rainfall was little
M O
more than half of the average during the April to August growing season.
If Idie conservation efforts of the Administration were of no avail, 
at least Washington could do something to ease the situation. Once again 
as during the banking crisis, wrote Lawrence, the President speedily made up 
his mind on a course of action. This lack of hesitation was a quality which 
was responsible for Roosevelt's popularity with the people. To Lawrence,
^O tsoa, aifisasc si M gftaasa, W3* m s 321*324.
34% 0Seuman* Papers, I* 739-740; Roy H. Bobbins, Our Landed Heri- 
fcage: Hie Public Domain 1776*1936 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
iMl), 417, 411; Blue Book 1940, 396.
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the greater the emergency, the better and faster Roosevlet operated. When 
he had ascertained the facts of the drouth, the President determined that 
one billion dollars would be needed, and the program was initiated. To 
Lawrence, it was comforting to know that the nation had a leader who had the 
heart and the courage to meet emergencies with decision and action.
Even as the drouth of 1934 was taking its toll in Nebraska, Lawrence 
wrote that it was time to plan on a course of action to be taken during the 
next fall and winter. Washington had granted $525,000,000 for drouth relief, 
allocated for seed supply, livestock maintenance, and other farm needs. Hie 
editor suggested that the Nebraska Congressional delegation meet with the 
State Relief Administrator and prepare Nebraska's case for presentation in 
Washington. Politics should not enter the picture; the question was shat 
to do in this emergency situation. If action was not planned soon, Nebras­
ka would suffer compared to other states which had begun vigorous steps 
toward relief requests. "Only those who ask, and ask rather insistently, 
receive,” the editor warned.
Lawrence suggested several areas in which relief aid could be applied. 
Of special interest were the livestock herds In the State. Hie high level 
of stock development was a result of years of breeding. Work and money had 
been invested. Hie editor realised that it would be unreasonable to expect 
the Federal Government to feed all of the herds in the State, but some spe­
cial consideration should be shown to Nebraska* Besides the livestock, 
money could be spent on the Nebraska road system and permanent projects such
349star. June 9* 1934.
as flood control work on the rivers throughout the State would give immed­
iate relief work and at the same time provide a long-range, positive benefit 
to the economy of the State, "Never in the state's history has a congressional 
delegation had a greater opportunity to serve its constituency than at 
present," he concluded,^®
The most pressing of conservation projects in the State were those 
involving the rivers# In January 1934, Senator George W* Norris wrote to 
the President» recommending that funds be made available for a survey of the 
Missouri River basin, with the intent of improving those rivers in the basin.
A Mississippi Valley Committee was formed, under the Public Works Adminis­
tration, to make such a study on a broader s c a l e .^51 The state of Nebraska 
made application to the PWA for funds to accomplish work on the Sutherland 
Reservoir on the Platte River, and on the Middle Loup River near Columbus*
In March 1934, editor Lawrence discussed the objections which Secre­
tary of the Interior Ickes had voiced to the water right permits which were 
granted by Governor Charles Bryan. It was imperative that the Governor make 
an immediate settlement of the problems which were causing the deadlock, 
warned Lawrence, If immediate action was not taken, the allotted PWA funds 
might be rescinded. "It i* unthinkable that these projects should be sacrificed, 
wrote Lawrence* The funds represented the largest sum which the Federal 
Government had directed to be spent In Nebraska. This meant a great deal 
to the State and the people, Lawrence regretted that the discussions over 
differences were being conducted by letter and telegram when it would have
350xbld*. July 26, 1934, 35*Nixon, FDR and Conservation. I, 237-241,
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been much faster and easier to t e l e p h o n e *352
Lawrence was interested In reporting a protest by the United Mine
Workers against approval of the Sutherland and Columbus projects. The UMW
objected because the electric power generated by the projects would decrease
the market for coal, and thus reduce employment for their union members.
The editor reviewed what he called the "tarnished record*1 of the Union’s
efforts at preservation of employment for its members. The recent troubles
fomented by the Union leaders had caused loss of work and wages for the
membership in the name of recognizing the Union. Lawrence gave credit to
the organized labor groups within Nebraska who had refused to endorse the
353mine Union’s protest.
It was with pleasure that Lawrence announced the "Good News’* that the 
differences between the State and the PWA had been settled, and that construc­
tion totaling fifteen million dollars would start shortly on the Sutherland 
and the Columbus River projects. The projects would Improve the status of 
planned agriculture In Nebraska. The settlement also meant that other water­
shed projects within the State had a better chance of being approved.354
"Looking Ahead” to future projects, Lawrence revealed the report of a special 
waterways committee which had been filed with the President. If and when the 
projects were realized, it would mean a new Nebraska. The major project was 
for the Platte valley. It would cost sixty million dollars. The 
waters would be impounded and conserved for the ultimate purpose of
352gtar. March 16, 17, 1934. February 28, 1934.
354Ibld., March 21, 1934.
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diversion to irrigation. Hydroelectric power would be a byproduct. Law­
rence did not consider sixty or seventy million dollars as too much money to 
spend for the happiness of the millions who lived in the valleys. They 
had settled the land and worked to improve their farms, until now the assessed 
valuation of the area was more than $200,000,000. Seventy million dollars 
was less than the price of four battleships which, in 30 minutes, could be 
sent to the bottom to rust. Lawrence also compared the money to be spent 
with the $183,000,000 which had been spent on Boulder Dam, and the $60 
million spent on the upper Colorado River. "Nebraska (was) not asking 
for a gift horse," contended the editor. She would repay the money by 
the same toil with which she had always been adding to the country's 
wealth.355
Lawrence was amazed when the FW& Board of Reviews refused to approve 
the Middle Loup valley for an irrigation project in August 1934. The refusal 
was not based on objections to the plan, or chat it was not necessary and 
desirable. The application was disapproved because of the security offered, 
namely, revenue bonds. The Board insisted on general obligation bonds. This 
was a contradictory position. Hie reasoning amazed Lawrence because twob 
other developments within the State had been approved, using revenue bonds 
for collateral. In fact, all of the proposed watershed developments in- 
Nebraska had been organized under the provisions of the same State law, 
passed in anticipation of these programs and declared constitutional by the 
State Supreme Court. It was the opinion of the editor that the good name
355ibid.. June 6, 1934.
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and character of the people of Nebraska were the best collateral available 
for the projects* The farmers had proven themselves industrious, thrifty, 
and respectful of their obligations»356
A month later, Lawrence was at a loss to explain the deletion of Nebraska 
projects from consideration due to lack of funds, and the excuse that 
Nebraska had already been over-allocated on funds. The editor admitted 
that Federal funds should be spent on internal improvements only when the 
project was of a desirable and valuable nature. However, deletion because 
a State had been over-allocated did not make sense* Deserving projects 
should be undertaken regardless of geographical lines* The drouth should 
have proven an argument for the urgent need of water conservation in the 
Midwest. If the work was not accomplished and the reckless practices of 
the past were continued, the result would be disaster to the area and 
the country in a few short years.
The projects which were being considered were not intended to aid in 
increasing production. Instead, the use of Irrigation would allow the 
abandonment of hill farming which had been marginal and precarious. These 
farmers would be relocated onto valley farms where they could operate 
small, balanced, and diversified farms, with more assurance of success.357 The 
people of the State were behind Senator Norris when he laid plans for a 
Missouri Valley development program. Anything that would prevent the loss 
of homes and population, and the destruction of the basic farming industry, 
was of Interest to Nebraskans. And Senator Norris deserved their support
35^lbid., August 30, 1934. 357xbld.. October 3, 1934.
and their gratitude for his efforts in their behalf*558
Another blow to the water projects in Nebraska was delivered in Dec­
ember 1934* The editor reported that applications from Nebraska were given 
a classification of "I"* An "A" classification indicated those plans which 
should have immediate action* To Lawrence this lower classification for 
Nebraska projects was surprising and contradictory* By another survey of 
the PWA, only a small slice of Northwestern Nebraska was considered exhausted 
or aoa-fertlle and recommended to be taken out of production* This meant 
that the remainder of the State should continue to produce* And yet the 
farms of the Loup and Tri-County areas needed water if they were to continue 
any production at all*
The editor considered that "there {was! a direct conflict between 
the board's findings upon land retirement, and its recommendations for con­
servation of natural resources*" In addition, the summary and recommenda­
tions of the Board were misleading* They showed a lack of familiarity with 
conditions within the State and even a lack of knowledge regarding the basic 
facts of water control* Lawrence recommended that the members of Nebraska's 
Congressional delegation study the report and findings of the survey com­
mittee, so that they would be able to present arguments on behalf of their 
State* The editor wrote that if the population of America increased to 180 
million or possibly 220 million, all of the available farm land would be 
needed to feed the people* And Nebraska could be a great factor in the 
program, if proper conservation programs were adopted in time.333 It would
333Ibid.. November 27, 1934. 333Ibid.■ December 26, 1934,
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be two years before funds were allocated for the Nebraska projects*
In August 1936, editor Lawrence reported the good news from Wash­
ington that the applications for the Loup River projects had been approved 
and that funds had been allocated for construction* The farmers of that 
area had just lost another crop because of the summer drouth. It was iron­
ical that the rivers flowed with plenty of water past the dry fields, with 
no way available for irrigation* The projects would change all of that, 
and 67,000 acres of the best land in Nebraska would be safe from drouth* 
the projects also meant work for the farmers of the area who had lost 
everything three years in a row, who could use the employment* The people 
of the area, their homes, and their cities, were entering into a new era of 
progress and development which would add to the economy of the State, and 
be a reward for their pioneering efforts* Senator Norris deserved the con­
gratulations and the thanks of the State for his efforts In behalf of the 
Loup River projects*^0
Of course, not everyone was drilled about the expenditure of federal 
funds for water conservation in Nebraska* Lawrence commented that the Chi­
cago Tribune had been after the President for such expenditures* The Tribune 
contended that such actions were at cross-purposes with another administra­
tion policy of reducing farm production* 'Nothing could be further from the1 
truth," countered Lawrence* As he described It, water storage for irrigation 
was the only method by which land could be taken out of the production of 
surplus crops and used to produce diverse crops which had no surplus* In
360Ibld,. August 15, 1936.
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most of Idie areas which would be irrigated, com was not grown in surplus*
In fact, the livestock men were forced to import corn for feed, adding the 
freight charges to their cost of production.361
There were not only out-of-state objections to the irrigation pro­
jects. The Lancaster Countv Weekly of August 19, 1936, had an editorial 
entitled "Again We Lose," In it the editor reported that the FWA had 
allocated two million dollars for the Loup River projects. "Loup River 
waters will be impounded • • . and the natural flow of the Platte River will 
be reduced by a large volume," he contended. It was the opinion of many 
that use of the Platte water to the West had a bearing on the rainfall in the 
eastern part of the State. The subsurface water level had been lowered, :■ 
causing wells and springs to go dry. With the construction of the Loup 
project, the available water would again be decreased. The water that the 
Loup farmers would use belonged to the farmers of the southeast section of 
the S t a t e . 562 Apparently, editor Lawrence made no rebuttal to this editorial. 
However, he did write on the drouth and its effect on the 1936 election 
campaign, and how both the drouth and the campaign affected the Nebraska 
water conservation program.
After a better-than-average rainfall in 1935, 1936 was again a year 
of drouth. It being an election year, Lawrence wrote that nature had writ­
ten her own farm plank upon the land. It was estimated that the loss due to 
the drouth might rise as high as three-quarters of a billion dollars, affect­
ing half a million farm families. Again, wrote Lawrence, what was needed was
361ibid., August 7, 1934. 362|#aQCaster county Weekly* August 19, 1936.
a permanent farm plan, but m  emergency measure to take Immediate care of
an emergency situation. And again the people would turn to the man who
3 5 3
had done so much to aid them during the peat three years.
In the East, however, Roosevelt was unpopular because he spent tax 
money m  the Midwest for conservation and relief* Before he took office, 
three-fourths of the tax money went to seaboard areas for harbors* public 
buildings* ship buildings* and other federal programs. the middle states 
were considered only as a bread basket to furnish cheap food for the indus­
trial areas* Any conservation program should be a local, not a federal 
project, the Easterners thought* Is Lawrence and the people of the Loup 
valleys, the granting of federal funds was just using good common sense
because it concerned the future of the nation as a whole* fh them it was
364another example of the farsightedness of the Roosevelt program*
Ike President had done much during the hot, dry simmer to earn the 
confidence of the people, wrote Lawrence in September 1936. Me had dem­
onstrated a .knowledge of the drouth situation, and had presented a solution 
to the problem*. If was unfortunate, continued the editor, that it was m  
election year and that politics had caused the raising of dust in the po­
litical skies which had clouded the issues, the people of the Midwest were 
aware that the region had faced a major crisis during the summer, and they 
were in favor of Roosevelt, who had demonstrated his ability to deal with 
the crisis,
363IiiiS Book m g ,  396; Sj&r, July 20, 1936.
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Henry A. Wallace* Roosevelt *s Secretary of Agriculture, also received 
editorial praise from Lawrence during the winter of 1936* He had become a 
menfcer of the cabinet at a time of great crisis* With the President, he 
preached a new faith, a new concept in agriculture, America had practiced 
depletion farming, taking all out of the soil* It was the responsibility 
of Wallace to direct the farmer along a different lines soil conservation, 
water conservation, and ordered agriculture* Some scoffed that it was a 
plan to control nature* Some were reluctant to accept the new ideas, pre­
ferring to retain the same methods they and their fathers had used* But 
the farmer soon saw the wisdom of the new program and accepted it *563 The 
implementation of the concept of controlled agriculture took several forms 
during the administration of President Roosevelt*
S^ Ibid.. December 3.6, 1936.
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SAVE THB PARMER
III an editorial entitled "What the Farmer Got for $500,000,000,” 
editor Lawrence described the activities of the Hoover Federal Farm Board*
He attributed the origin of the Board directly with the President, and with 
him Lawrence placed the blame for its failure* To the editor, the plan was not 
feasible in its concept* Buying up products to bolster the market only encour­
aged over-production* The surplus in storage drove down the prices* When the 
Government attempted to sell its stores abroad, the prices again dipped* "Thus 
the farm board maintain (edj a consistent record as a demoralising influence on 
the prices of farm commodities," wrote Lawrence. Mot only did it affect prices 
but it also was a drain on the Treasury* Abolition of the Board was one way to 
help balance the budget.36  ^Clearly, some method other than the Farm Board was 
needed to help the farmer out of his predicament. The Democratic Presidential 
Candidate spoke as if he had the solution*
In a speech before the Governors' Conference in 1931, Roosevelt had said 
that the victims of defects in the nation's social and economic life were begin­
ning to ask why the Government did not act to protect them* He stated that he 
believed it was the Government's responsibility to act* His primary interest 
was land utilisation. This involved programming the land for optimum usage, 
making farm life more attractive, and getting people to cooperate with the
program*
3d7Ibid., March 19, May 8, 1932* 
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IAGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT, BEGINNING WITH WHEAT 
The essentials of his farm plan were outlined by Roosevelt in 
his campaign speech at Topeka, Kansas, In September 1932* The plan must 
finance itself; it must use existing agencies; it must be on a cooper* 
atlve basis, voluntary if possible; and it must be withdrawn when the 
emergency Is over. "Farming has not had an even break in our economic 
system,” he contended. Henry Wallace wrote that "agriculture cannot survive 
in a capitalistic society as a philanthropic enterprise* If elected,
Roosevelt was committed by the Democratic platform to recommend legislation 
which would assure the farmer a profit. Editor Lawrence endorsed the 
Roosevelt plan, asking the public to maintain an open mind because it 
had phases which were new to the nation. His selection of Wallace, a 
Republican liberal, was an example of his desire to have a working team, re* 
gardless of party affiliations.^® When Wallace learned of the special 
session of Congress called to meet the banking crisis, he asked the Pres* 
ident if it would be possible to Include agricultural legislation in 
the agenda. With the approval of Roosevelt, telephone calls assembled 
farm leaders to Washington for planning conferences.
Approximately fifty leaders of farm organisations and farm paper 
representatives came on short notice. Wallace remembered that because 
of the banking emergency, some had difficulty getting cash to pay their 
train fare, but they made it. The atmosphere of imagination and bold 
action which pervaded Washington affected the conferees, and the meetings
^^Rosenman, Papers. I, 693-711; Wallace, New Frontiers. 139.
370star. November 26, 1932.
lasted only a day and a half. Without the usual speeches and rehashing, 
approval was obtained to groat broad powers to the President• The idea 
of parity was also accepted, not only as a goal but as a limit* After 
a Saturday afternoon conference with the President, work was started 
on a draft of the bill.3?1
When he gave the signal to go ahead with work on the measure, 
Roosevelt realised they were tackling a tough problem with no assurance 
of success# Though written under pressure, Wallace considered that the 
resulting bill was a logical crystallization of solutions to the farm 
problem* Be reported that the majority of farmers who attended the 
conference considered the bill as the first ray of hope they had seen in 
a long time* Historian James Bums, however, wrote that the bill was 
drawn up by representatives of the large farm organisations, and that the 
viewpoints of the smaller Farmers* Union and the independent small 
farmer were ignored* Roosevelt himself, at a press conference in 
March, admitted that any farm plan would be in the nature of an experiment.
He argued that the plan should be tried, *' . . . and if the dam thing
372doesn’t work, we can say so frankly ♦ . .”
Five days after they started work, the completed bill was pre­
sented in the House* Roosevelt’s accompanying message spoke of the
^^^Wallace, Hew frontiers. 162-164*
2?2Wsllaee» Hew Frontiers. 165 • Burns, The Lion and the Fox* 
193-194j Greer, feat Roogeyelt, Thought, 69* *
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plan as an experiment on an untrod path* Lawrence had written earlier that 
Roosevelt had given the farmers hope by stating that he would keep
track If his first efforts were not successful, the Presidential
aye
goal was eighty cent wheat by mid-1933. Hot everyone was as enthusiastic
as Lawrence about Roosevelt’s experimentation. A cynical ex~New Dealer,
John Flynn, later wrote that Roosevelt had promised the voters:
• • * they would see no cruel jokes like plowing up cotton or not 
planting wheat or buying up crops to raise prices . . . .  He had a 
plan, he said which would not cost the government a dollar, [sic] 
Whatever became of that plan we shall never k now.
Whether it conformed to the original Roosevelt plan or not,
the new measure the Agricultural Adjustment Act — * designed to restore
the farmer’s purchasing power, was signed on Hay 12, 1933, after a long
debate in Congress. Many Congressmen, on both sides of the aisle, did
not understand the measure and were therefore apprehensive. In the House,
where debate could be limited, there was little delay in passage of the
bill. In the Senate, debates and proposals of amendments kept the bill
from a vote for some time, the main forces of opposition were the
inflationists like Burton K. Wheeler, Huey Long, and tom Connally. they
wanted additional monetary remedies written into the bill. Seeing
defeat of the basic measure, or passage of unwanted amendments, the
President finally approved an omnibus amendment submitted by Blmer
themes of Oklahoma. It gave permissive instead of mandatory lnfla~
3?%oosevelt, On Our Way, 38; Star. November 26, 1932.
374Flyn», The Roosevelt Myth. 148.
tionary controls to the President* The threat of a farmer’s strike 
on Hay 13 hy the Farmers’ Holiday Association was the push needed for 
Congress to pass the bill on Hay 12.375
Even as the proposed AAA was being debated, Lawrence was giving 
Roosevelt the credit for improving the farm situation* Com was selling 
for twenty-one cents a bushel, double what it had been in the recent 
past* Pork was up $1*00 a hundred weight* the editor chided the Ne­
braska Legislature for floundering, and suggested that it follow the 
President’s dynamic lead* Regarding this leadership, Lawrence wrote that 
Roosevelt’s stewardship needed no explanation# It spoke for itself*
The nation had never seen such a transformation in a people’s state 
of mind# The firmness and positive action of the President was what 
the nation had been looking for after the period of indecision and 
delay* The country was not out of the woods yet, he wrote, but a 
start had been made* Roosevelt had made a greater advance in two months 
than most Presidents made in two years *^76
To implement the program of agricultural adjustment, Wallace 
did not feel bound by precise planning, except for use of natural 
resources* Re considered that the national objective should he man~
375’*Probably never had so much social and legal inventiveness 
gone into a single legislative measure*” Schlesiager, The Coming of the 
Hew Beal. 39-42; Leuchtenburg, FDR and the Hew Seal* 51*
376Ibid.. April 3, May 6, 1933,
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agement of the economy, so that a balance would be maintained between
the income of agriculture, labor, and industry. The first step in
the problem of overproduction of wheat was to ease the surplus. This 
was undertaken by an International Wheat Agreement reached in London.
It provided for acreage reduction and export limitations in the United 
States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina. The reduction quota for the 
United States was fifteen percent. Besides the agreement, an export 
company was formed which subsidised exports of white wheat to the 
orient. Wallace realized that the first step probably would not work 
and that subsidized exports were not the answer, but they were actions 
as a start. After the surplus had been eliminated, the AAA could 
work on adjusting production to needs, not buying power*377
The editor of the Lancaster County Weekly. G. A. Spldel, wrote 
an editorial In June 1933, in which he pointed out that the chief 
beneficiaries of benefits from an acreage reduction plan were those 
who had been the most shortsighted and had maintained their wheat 
acreage or increased it in the face of overproduction. Those who had
reduced their acreage were not in a position to reduce further.378
Wallace admitted that the prospect of benefit payments was what attracted 
the interest of the average farmer to the AAA program. When the county
37?wallace, New Frontiers. 22, 184. 
378Lancaater County Weekly. June 27, 1933.
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production control associations were formed, the main question was,
"When will the Government checks start coming inf” When it came to 
determining produclon figures and making allotments, the first figures 
were not too acurate because they came from memory, and it was human 
nature to inflate sofas to look better and receive more benefits* 
Publication of the figures tended to increase their reliability*
Wallace realised that under ordinary circumstances, it would 
be difficult to get farmer, miller, baker, add consumer together and have 
them agree on a plan of price support* But under the pressure of 
crisis* the conferees did agree to the plan* The final plan agreed on 
was domestic allotment and acreage reduction* Fortunately for the 
Department, unfavorable weather reduced wheat prospects before it was 
found necessary to plow under crops in 1935* This saved the press 
the necessity of writing about the logic of plowing under wheat while 
millions lacked bread* fortunately also for the administration, the
farmers accepted the p r o g r a m .  379
An editorial in the Lancaster County Weekly gave three reasons 
for the "unexpected friendliness" exhibited by farmers for the wheat 
adjustment pirns* First, the plan was voluntary, and no stigma was 
attached for nonparticipation* Second, the administration of the 
plan at the local level was In the hands of farmers* Third, the finan­
cial remuneration for compliance was generous* "Wheat growers are not
379jtellace* Hew Frontiers. 170-172* Approximately 470,000 head of 
Nebraska cattle were bought by the Government in the fall of 1933, under 
an emergency livestock reduction plan* Olson, History of Nebraska, 309.
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hard to find who have a place to put the benefit payment," the editor
n m n m a n  . .  J  380commented*
Editor Lawrence was encouraged to report that Kansas was the
first atate to report 108 percent approval of the two-year program in
1935. He considered Kansas as the key to whether the plan would be
accepted nationally* In 1930, Kansas produced one-fourth of the nation’s
wheat requirements* The editor realised that the attitude of Kansas
farmers was different in 1933 than it had been in 1938. This was due,
oddly enough* to that enormous 1938 crop# "It caused heavier losses than
if the farmers had not undertaken to plant so much land," he said*
It had been a rude awakening to the Kansas farmer.*®*
In his fireside chat of October 22, 1953, the President voiced
amazement at the cooperation given to the Government by the farmers *
He was happy to report that the farm commodity prices were up, but
attributed this to speculation* He said that he was not satisfied
with either the amount or the extent of the price rise, and made it
clear that It was the administration fs policy to increase the rise and
extend it to those products which had not received benefits* "If we
cannot do this one way, we will do it another* Do it, we will," he 
382
promised*
380Litneaster Comity Weekly. August 1, 1933.
38Istar. September 21, 1933* 3®2Rosenman, Papers. IX, 426-438.
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In spite of the promises of the President, farm prices sagged again 
after the midsummer advance. The cost of living had gone up due to the NRA. 
Farm Holiday movement leaders convinced five Northwestern Governors that they 
should go to Washington to get a code for agriculture similar to the one 
for manufacturing • The Holiday leaders preached that the Government should 
fix farm produce prices. The Governors’ group met with Secretary Wallace 
and presented their request. He later wrote that they were under the spell 
of farm interests, and were not as concerned shout the broad national view 
as was the administration •
The Secretary agreed with the Governors that a code should be estab­
lished for agriculture to insure cost of production to the farmer. However, 
he pointed out that the Huey Long amendment to the NRA prohibited interfer­
ence with the free marketing rights of the Individual farmer or laborer.
The Governors suggested a substitute action to license processors and deal­
ers so that they could not purchase products except at a high price* When 
it was pointed out that this might be illegal or unconstitutional, one of 
the Governors commented, "Hell, what’s the Constitution between friends?" 
Wallace then showed the Governors that such a program would require compul­
sory control of quotas to each farmer, thus regimenting the entire range of 
agricultural activity* The Governors realised that this was unacceptable 
and impossible.Some other plan was needed.
Among the fanners, the decline In farm prices came close to touching 
off a farm strike. Among other actions taken by disgruntled Midwesterners,
*®*Wallace, New Frontiers. 56-58
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Governor William Longer of North Dakota imposed an embargo on the wheat ship­
ments to market from that State. Editor Lawrence commented that it helped 
the Governor politically, hut it flopped as an aid to the farmers. Such 
freak remedies, he wrote, could not lift agricultural prices back to their 
1926 levels* Recovery could be accomplished only by a broad national policy 
to Include all facets of the economy. President Roosevelt had such a plan 
for the nation to go forward together* As Henry Wallace wrote, "The hard
but necessary first lesson we all must learn is that we cannot prosper
. „334separately.1*
In Hay 1934, Lawrence sadly described the reason why wheat futures 
on the Chicago exchange passed the dollar mark. Dollar wheat was the magic 
word because that price usually meant prosperity for the farmer* In this 
case, dollar wheat meant that drouth had ravaged the countryside. In a 
drive over the State, the editor saw a few pieces of wheat which might make 
a partial yield. Some farmers were feeding the wheat as a substitute 
for bumed-up pastures. As a result of the drouth, the Nebraska wheat yield 
was only half of the 1933 yield but the farmers* income was $13,300,000, 
compared with $18,600,000 for the 1933 crop. It was a bitter way to get a 
per-bushel increase in price.885
As a substitute utilisation for the wheat and com lend taken out of 
production, Lawrence suggested the growing of sugar beets in the western 
part of the State, and posiibly fruit for the eastern part* There was a
38*8tar. January 16, 1934; Wallace, Nay frontiers. 29.
3838tar.Mav 31, 1934; Blue Book 1940. 386.
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small amount of sugar basts grown in Nebraska already* The harvest of 1930 
was 1,136,000 bushels * Because of the anticipated added interest in growing 
beets, the editor found if hard to be sympathetic towards the Cuban and 
Philippine sugar growers, even though Roosevelt had dedicated the nation to 
the "good neighbor" policy* Lawrence carried on m  editorial barrage in 
1933-34 as he attempted to aid the domestic sugar beet growers in their fight 
to avoid Governmental "interference*" This was one part of the A M  program 
with which he was not in full agreement * One reason that he was fighting on 
the side of the beet growers was that, although smell, he considered the 
industry important in the diversified farming plan of the State* Beet pro-
386
duction had retired a large acreage from other over-produced grain crops.
Lawrence objected when the administration announced its plan to place 
a processing tax on sugar and to pay beet growers to reduce their acreage*
To the editor, the processing tax on grains and hogs made sense because of 
overproduction* But, he pointed out, there was no surplus of sugar —  the 
United States produced only a quarter of its needs* In such circumstances 
It would be better to expand domestic production rather than limit it. As 
well as becoming self-sustaining, the wages which were paid field^and factory 
workers would aid the economy and keep them off the unemployed rolls* He con­
cluded, "The plan is void of merit of any character*”®®7
In lieu of the administration plan, the beet growers asked that they 
be allowed to work out their own program without "price fixing or a raid on
386Sear. August 3. 1933; Hatch 10, 1934; Blue Boot 1940. 387. 
3S7Star. January 13, 1934.
the treasury." This was the substance of a letter from the National Beet 
Growers* Association to the Secretary of Agriculture, quoted by Lawrence* 
Commenting on the letter, Lawrence was certain that Wallace could not act 
contrary to the wishes of the producers* The editor himself had a simple 
plan by which the Government could aid the beet grower and it would cost 
nothing* By applying import quotas on cheap foreign sugar, the domestic 
suppliers would be assured a good market* A reduction in imports was not 
implied, only the prevention of a threatened increase*®®®
Lawrence reported that when discussing the proposed sugar processing 
tait plan, Secretary Wallace commented to the Senate Finance Committee that 
he thought the growing and processing of sugar beets was an inefficient 
industry * The editor wrote that he would be interested in learning what 
Wallace considered an efficient industry, his ideas appearing very fantas­
tic* For months, Lawrence observed, Wallace had been paying out millions 
of dollars to hbelp grain, fruit, cotton, and other farmers whom he consid­
ered efficient, when the "inefficient*1 beet industry had not asked Unde 
$am for a single dime* This suggested to the editor that Wallace might 
be shooting off target.
After the sugar beet industry came under the AAA,®9® Lawrence warned 
the state Congressional delegation to insure that Nebraska got a fair share 
of the production quota* He had heard threats that Nebraska, Wyoming, and 
Colorado, which together produced a large portion of the sugar crop, might
®®®lbld., January 11, 1934. 389Ibid.. February 26, 1934.
3®°Xhe Jones-Costigaa Sugar Aet was signed Ha, 9, 1934.
have their acreage cut by fourteen percent while the small-production 
states of Michigan, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin would be able to keep 
their total acreage.®®^
As part of his editorial aid to the beet growers, Lawrence asked 
the reader if he remembered twenty* five cent-a-pound sugar * It was in 1919, 
and European sugar growers had not recovered from the war. His comment 
was:
Cuban sugar growers then had "the world by the tail" and were able 
to squeeze people • • • for a prece eight or ten times as much 
as their normal cost of production. And they made us pay the limit.
The editor suggested that these facts be kept in mind in connection with 
the Government control of beet growers. The 1919 situation might be re­
peated, he predicted, if domestic sugar production was diminished and the 
nation had to depend on Cuban plantations and mills owned by those favor­
ite Lawrence "bogeymen," Eastern capitalists. They wanted business, even 
at the expense of other Americans.®®2
The sectional strife which Lawrence acknowledged above was both East 
against West, and industry against agriculture. It was always the editor’s 
contention that the industrial Bast, worn out agriculturally, sought 
to dominate the agrarian West. This was especially true when Lawrence wrote 
about the Eastern objections to spending Federal funds in the Midwest, 
either for farm subsidies or for relief.
The editor acknowledged that paying allotments to farmers, from funds 
received by processing taxes, placed a burden upon the large cities and
®9istar. May 19, 1934. ®92Ibld., August 9, 1933.
mindustrial ***** I>y raising the price at foodstuffs* His defense was to 
reflect m  what ho called "the abuses of the past*** the protective tariffs 
ifhicl aided the manufacturers hud exploited the farming regions* the faming 
atataa had boon bled white and produced enormously to furnish low-priced 
foodstuffs for the Industrial areas of the country*
It wag “Turn About” when the "Stuck fig Squealted]*M fha Haaasfna 
M  g & H  m s m  *«*«*«* tha Government of doing nothing to prtmut an sheer— 
maily fast rla* 1m food prices* the magasina commented that tha urban con-* 
euner would blame the AAA and the farmer would blame the KHA, no natter what 
wag dona* Lawrence called this partisanship at its worst * Be contended 
that low food prices hurt the wage earner* It meant idleness and lor lie-* 
lag standards because of the lose of the fsteersf buying power*
the editor saw a new "Mason-Mxoa" line forming. It ran Barth end 
South and divided the country into a section which clamored for cheap food* 
and a section of tamers: who only asked a fair price for' their products* 
because it was vain to decry sectionalism* Lawrence applauded the 
Senators and lepvesentatlves from the agricultural areas who united in their 
common interest* One could m %  aspect the industrial Eastern bloc to relin­
quish any of their power without a struggle* the editor felt that If the 
agricultural bloc could combine, it would have the strength to be an effec­
tive good for the states in the com belt**94
* August 21, September A, 193d*
S^ lbld., December 12, 1934* October 30, 1935* Other exanplee of the
editor's comment* on sectionalism may be found in editorials on August 10 
and October 25, 1935s January 13 and June If* 1930*
The Midwest and the adminis fcration always needed friend® in Congress 
to pass end then defend the war lone programs of the AAA* This wee especially 
tree of the AAA program to limit hog production by destroying shoats, end the 
taking of com acreage out of production -  at a time when many people In the 
country were going hungry*
XI
THE 2ND W  PIGLETS AND SURPLUSES 
THE 2ND OF THE AAA
the first crop which came under the control of the AAA was cotton.3^5 
A quarter of the 1933 crop was plowed up* Unfavorable weather relieved the 
necessity of plowing under any of the wheat crop la 1933» this left com 
as the major Midwest grain crop which needed control* Because most corn 
was marketed as pork, hog controls were a necessary corollary measure* With 
the com-hog industry suffering under low prices, excess supplies, and re** 
duced markets, the farmer wondered why Washington was doing nothing about 
their problem* this lack of action was especially strange because many of 
the Agricultural Department planners came from the com belt.
Secretary Wallace wrote that it was not lack of interest but lack 
of any workable plan which delayed corn~hog relief * Domestic allotments 
for hogs was too complicated, and any reduction in com production only 
pointed up the intimate relationship between com and hogs; one could not 
be adjusted without the other. All that came from the farmers was pressure 
for action, without any helpful suggestions of a solution*
Probably because Nebraska had no cotton crop, Lawrence did not 
write editorials on that phase of the AAA*
The final choice as the heat plan was a long-time program of com 
acreage reduction and a reduction in the hog population by reduced breeding* 
The drawback to this plan was that it had no Immediate affect on prices* 
how could the faxmer-producer exist on $2* SO hogs and 35c com? A request 
for solutions to the immediate problem returned the possibility that the 
Government boy up and slaughter five or six million sheets and sows so as 
to reduce marketing supplies for the winter* This would tend to raise 
prices* The edible portions of the hog carcasses would be distributed to 
those on relief* The Department, resigned to the public outcry which would 
result, agreed to the plan*
Wallace saw three grave dangers in the program* First, was the 
reaction of the public* Second, was possible unsatisfactory arrangements 
with the meat packers* Third, that the com growers would not agree with 
any long-term program of acreage control* The farmer had to understand 
that this program was only temporary in nature, that a permanent plan was 
being prepared to follow*
The Secretary made the plan public at the Chicago World * a Fair,
August IS, 1933* The expected public outcry ensued* Even the farmers 
involved were vocal in their objections* **1901 one farmer in a hundred, 
it seemed, realised what a terrible mss the Com Belt would be in, unless 
it promptly dug deep both in thinking and action,11 wrote Wallace* In 
answer to the urban population’s objections to the action, the Secretary 
contended that no one suggested that clothing factories go on producing 
when there was no market for their merchandise* Nor was anyone morally 
Indignant when industry, in effect, plowed under much of its potential
between 1929 and 1933- "We must play with the cards that are dealt," Wal­
lace said. "Agriculture cannot survive in a capitalistic society as a 
philanthropic enterprise."396
An editorial in the Lancaster County Weekly. August 29, 1933, reported 
that farmers swamped the markets with pigs in'response to a Government 
call for five million hogs and brood saws. These animals were to be taken 
from the stock on hand. “50,000 hogs at Sioux City or Omaha in a single 
day is to many," was the editor’s comment.
In January 1934, editor Lawrence expressed surprise that there were 
only nineteen million bushels of corn sealed in the corn-hog program when 
the 1933 crop had been in excess of 230 million bushels in Nebraska. He 
considered that this was"". . . evidence of the difficulties Involved in 
getting the farm population to agree on a reduction program." Such a pro­
gram ran contrary to the natural instinct of pride in production. The low 
number of com loans, however, could be explained. Only twenty-six percent 
of the normal com crop was sold directly as a cash crop. The remainder 
was used in livestock operations. In addition, the market price of com 
was three times what it. was in 1932, and it was normal for farmers to sell 
Instead of storing their crops. Lawrence gave the farm program the credit 
for the increase in prices.^®®
396schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal. 61-635 Wallace, Hew— W V M M * W M p p  *pippippM M ' P N M M W  .  4MMMMPM*
Frontiers. 139, 178-182.
3^Lancaster Countv Weekly. August 29, 1933.
398star. January 17, 1934.
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The paying of cash benefits to farmers for acreage reduction also 
contributed to the general business revival, wrote Lawrence. The farmers 
heartily approved of the program* The editor voiced approval that Secre­
tary Wallace had not taken what Lawrence called, "the reckless step" of 
compulsion In the acreage reduction program* It would have proven the 
charges of dictatorship and have been m  interference with the principle 
of the private ownership of land* The editor accused the "pompus Rexford 
Tugwell," Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, of being an advocate of the 
use of force* Lawrence quoted Tugwell as hiving been 11. * * unwise enough 
and unfortunate enough to say ’the private ownership of land has never 
been successful.*"399
In his editorials, Lawrence attempted to show that acreage allotment 
was a better plan than the processing tax plan* The tax on pork had resulted 
in lower market prices for live hogs, thus penalising the producer*
Meanwhile, the packers claimed that they contributed the tax payment, because 
the public would not purchase pork if the price went up, Whether this was 
a valid argument or not, the producer was still the goat of the plan* The 
editor contended that even if the consumer did pay the tax, it only Increased
the difference between what he paid and what the farmer received, when eco-
400
comically speaking, the figures should be getting closer together*
One result of the swine price squeeze was that the packing companies 
began buying directly from the producer, bypassing the commission men*
This tended to depress the market even more* To Lawrence, It would be a
^Tbld»* January IS, February 8, 1934. 4<3°Ibid. % January 18, 1934*
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simple matter to terminate the practice if the packers agreed to cease the 
operation which they claimed they opposed. The editor forecast that either 
the packers or the producers should cease that type of activity or else 
Congress would take action to eliminate it,^^ The corn-hog program was having 
enough difficulty without having further complications.
The Government was holding notes on a quarter of a billion bushels 
of corn in May 1934. Lawrence pondered the question, what would it do 
with the corn When the notes came due on August 1st? With the low price 
of corn, it was improbable that the farmers would be able to, or want to, 
pay off the loans. Whether the Government held or sold the com, it could 
have a depressing effect on prices, the sane as when wheat was bought up 
and held in 1933. To the editor, however, there was reason to believe that 
there would be an advance in the price of corn* He based this belief on 
two factors; a reduction of production under the com-hog program, and a 
reduction of production due to adverse weather.
Even with reduced production, Lawrence expected that the corn supply, 
including that held by the Government, would not exceed the demand. He 
predicted that the prospect of fifty cent corn would continue at least until 
the 1935 crop was harvested, if not afterwards. In any event, he felt that 
the Government would retain its holdings because it had invested millions 
in the experiment and it could not afford a failure.^^
The editor turned out to be correct when he gave adverse weather as 
a factor in a com price advance. The drouth throughout the corn belt,
*°*lbid.. January 19, 1934. 402lbid.. May 4, 1934.
coupled with excessive heat, made It almost certain that there would he no
surplus com harvested in 1934* "Nature had gone far beyond the program
of crop reduction originally laid out by the Department of Agriculture,"
he commented, the existing supplies of grain would be needed to make up
for the shortage* Lawrence voiced uncertainty as to whether there would
be supply enough to see the country through the 1935 growing season*
Because of this possible shortage, Lawrence suggested that the
administration should have no hesitation in relieving the farmers of their
crop reduction contracts. He proposed that the farmers be allowed to plant
com and other late crops to replace the sheet, oats, and pastures which
had burned up in the dry summer * There was no tire to delay the decision
because it was vital, continued the editor,
• • • to plant any and all lands to late crops which will have a 
chance of maturing and helping to provide sustenance next winter 
for human beings and livestock. The economic salvation of the 
nation is largely dependent on stimulating production of food and 
feed, rather than limiting it.
If the Government did not follow this suggestion it would 11 • . . create the
impression that [it was] incapable of exercising intelligent supervision
of control over agricultural Industry."^0^
Whether it created that impression or not, the Government did not
release the farmers from their contracts. In 1934 the Nebraska wheat crop
was approximately one-half of the 1933 yield, and the com crop was less than
one-tenth the 1933 yield. In contrast, the index of prices received by the
*°^|bid,, June 1, 1934. Nebraska rainfall for 1934 was 14.31 inches, 
with only half of that falling during the crop season. The average annual 
rainfall was better than 20 inches* Blue Book 1940. 396.
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farmers in 1934 was eighty-four, compared to the low of sixty-two in 1933.*^* 
Because of this increase in income, Lawrence reported in August that 
farmers were paying off their com loans at the rate of $200,000 per day.
He admitted that other parts of the farm program might have errors, hut that 
this was not true of the com loan program. In fact, he wrote, the farmer 
had probably benefitted more from this program than any other,recovery or 
relief program. Without the corn loan plan, the editor did not doubt that 
many farmers would have been . forced to market their com at half the going 
price. He concluded the editorial by commenting fchht the com loan program 
.. had worked out in accordance with the highest expectations of its 
projectors and in a manner highly satisfactory to the borrowers."405
In September 1934, the editor reported that Nebraska farmers would 
receive an additional $3,500,000 during the coming crop year because the 
Government was preparing to loan fifty-five cents per bushel on corn, instead 
of fourty-five cents. Even though much com had gone to market, as a result of 
the rise in the market price, there remained millions of bushels In storage. 
With the extra money made available through the loan program, the farmer 
could pay off his other loans and have money for the winter expenses,
"This [was] meeting the farm situation in an entirely practical manner 
. . . ” Lawrence commented.^^
In spite of the promise of additional support, the corn-hog refer­
endum of October 1934 was approved by less than 1,000 votes in
404gxue Book 1940. 128, 386. 4Q5gtar> August 2, 1934.
406Ibid., September 12, 1934.
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Nebraska. This was a strange phenomenon to Lawrence. More than forty 
million dollars had been received by Nebraska farmers through the Government 
program, this had been a lifesaver to the State. Without that support, the 
effects of the drouth, wiping out crops, feed, and income, could only be im- 
agined. In defense of the farmers, whose vote indicated a doubt concerning 
the program, Lawrence did not construe that vote as ingratitude. Instead, 
he wrote that there was widespread feeling that the success of the plan could 
be annulled by those farmers who refused to sign contracts. By the close 
vote in Nebraska, Lawrence noted that the State joined with Kansas as the 
only agricultural states which looked upon the Roosevelt farm program 
with skepticism. Kansas had voted overwhelmingly against continuation 
of the program in 1935. The editor hoped that the results of the voting 
would create an atmosphere in which objections to the program might be 
brought into the open and discussed and answered.407
One charge by the critics was the cost of the program. Lawrence 
cited a report from Buffalo County to show that the charge was false. The 
report showed that the cost of the program amounted to $7.14 per contract, 
or $12,931.77 total. In return, $14,670 would be collected in processing 
taxes* The editor estimated that the total AAA benefit payments paid to 
farmers in Buffalo County would amount to $563,487. In the year of drouth 
and disaster, the receipt of this sum would keep the County from becoming a 
poverty area. The editor asked, during the political campaign in pro­
gress, that the facts of the Roosevelt program be kept in m i n d . 408
407Ibid., October 9, 11, 1934. 408Ifeid•* October 15, 1934.
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A year later, the editor reported that the com-hog referendum went 
overwhelmingly for continuance. Not a single state rejected the program* 
Although he did not think that Roosevelt and Wallace anticipated the 6*1 
margin of victory, Lawrence himself was not surprised at the results.
The Midwest, he thought, was finally n. . . claiming for Itself as a part 
of national policy the deliberate program which industrial domination made 
a permanent settled plan of American Government (i.e.. controls and sub­
sidies) It had been a fair, representative referendum, Lawrence commented.
The farmer was an Independent voter who had never been welded into a polit­
ical machine. No one could coerce the farmer, nor would he vote to please 
either Roosevelt or industry. As a result of the performance of the pro­
gram to date, the farmer had been converted to the reduction plan of the AAA.4®9 
The convert could enter the winter of 1935-36 feeling more secure after a 
better-than-average rainfall, 22,64 Inches in 19355 a bumper wheat crop,
39.500.000 bushels; and a corn crop which was five times greater than In 
1934.4*0 This sense of security must have suffered a setback in January 1936, 
when the Supreme Court invalidated the AAA. By a 6-3 decision in U.S. v.
Butler, the majority argued that the processing tax was not really a tax
but part of a regulatory system, and thus, it was not covered by the "gen­
eral welfare1* clause of Section 8, Article 1, of the Constitution.4**
The first AAA had never been accepted 100 percent by the farmers,
409Ibid,. September 28, October 28, 30, November 2, 1935. All told,
41.000 Nebraska farmers, or one-third of the State’s farmers took advantage 
of Government loans. Olson, History of Nebraska. 310.
410Blue Book 1940. 386, 396. 411U.S. v. Butler. 297 U.S. 1.
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nor was it considered 100 percent the answer by those who framed it. It 
was, like so much of the first New Beal, an emergency measure to take care 
of an emergency. More permanent plans could be designed as the emergency 
abated. As Professor Schlesinger has written, "It looked to some as if they 
(NBA and AAA] had gone about as far as they could go*1 in late 1935*
The Seventy-Fourth Congress met in January 1935, the carrier of a 
national feeling of discontent. By spring, Roosevelt appeared to have lost 
all control of a body which was overwhelmingly Democratic.412 in addition, 
all was not well within the official administration family, Harold lakes 
recorded in his diary in early February that the liberals in the department 
of Agriculture had been eliminated, with the approval of Secretary Wallace.4*^ 
Division of interest and intentions made concentrated action Impossible.
No administration voice could present arguments for desired farm legislation 
in Congress,
In July 1955, editor Lawrence wrote that the AAA was in trouble in 
Congress, Amendments were being offered to the Act which would ratify past 
processing taxes and fir tares up to the end of 1937. If Congress did not 
enact these amendments, the processing tar program could be brought to 
court. The editor asked who would refund the processing tar money if the 
matter was found unconstitutional. The manufacturer was the logical one 
to pay, although it would ultimately be the consumer who paid, Nebraska 
had a great stake in the preservation of the AAA, Which had saved the farmers 
and the State during the hard years of 1933, 1934, and 1955, Although the
4*%ehleainger, The Politics of Upheaval. 3-10* 413xcjce8, Diary .292.
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AAA was amended that summer, the threatened court suits were initiated*4-^ 4 
Lawrence reported in a November 1935 editorial, that Attorney Gen* 
eral Homer Cummings and his staff had filed a 280-page brief defending a AAA 
in a suit brought to the Supreme Court. The Government’s defense rested on 
Its contention that the processing taxes were valid exercising of Congres­
sional powers* Congress had established standards to guide the Secretary of 
Agriculture, and the 1935 ratification of processing taxes had resolved any 
defect regarding this delegation of authority. Finally, the milling company 
bringing the suit had no right to question what Congress did with the reven­
ues received. And even if they did have the right, use of the money to aid 
farm income and bring about recovery was in the general welfare.
To Lawrence, the first argument covered the area of Governmental 
paternalism. Regarding the processing fax, the industrial, urban East 
could complain that through higher food prices, they were paying the pro­
cessing tax. The tax money was then going to states which did not contribute 
as much as they received, to the editor, this was no different than requiring 
the farmer to pay more for products because of a tariff which protected and 
prospered the industrialist. The argument over the AAA would possibly rank 
with the contest over slavery, suggested Lawrence.^**
The only Star editorial on January 7, 1936, had the title, 1’A DEATH SEN- 
XBNCE FOR AGRICULTURE” in extra large letters, bordered in black* Contin­
uing the analogy to slavery, editor Lawrence paraphrased the Taney decision 
in the Dred Scott case. He quoted Taney's decision, substituting "American
41»Star. July 19, 20, 1935. A15Ibld., November 19, 1935.
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agriculturefor "the African race":
"The change in public opinion and feeling in relation to American agri­
culture which has taken place since the adoption of the constitution 
can not change its construction and meaning* and it must be construed 
and administered now according to its true meaning and intention when 
it was formed and adopted*"
Just as these words by Taney foreshadowed the Civil War, Lawrence 
thought that the words of Justice Owen Roberts, who spoke for the majority 
in invalidating the AAA, might foreshadow another great historic struggle*
Only time could tell of the ultimate significance of the ruling. The editor
pointed out that, since the beginning, the AAA had paid Nebraska farmers sixty- 
one million dollars in adjustment checks, while the processing tax amounted to 
sixteen million dollars. He pointed out these figures so that the reader could 
become aware of how the AAA was attempting to adjust the economic disparity
between farmers and the Industrial population.
If the majority ruling was accepted In Its exact language, it would 
seem beyond the power of Government to attempt establishment of a parity 
between the agricultural and Industrial populations. "Rugged individualism" 
was enthroned again, wrote Lawrence. The way was opened to uncontrolled 
production* What "ghastly limits" would be reached if the Republican sug­
gestion of direct payment of subsidies to farmers for their surplus were 
approved?
But things were not quite as bad as they could have been, noted the 
editor* Thanks to Roosevelt and the AAA, the corn belt states had been car­
ried through the great drouth. There were no surpluses, farm prices ahd been 
restored; and the farmer had renewed faith in the ultimate victory of the 
American conception of justice. The end of the AAA was not the end of the
A
world for the farmer or for America* Another farm program would be devel- 
oped, wrote Lawrence*
for several weeks after the Supreme Court decision was announced, 
Lawrence wrote editorials on the subject* Using the logic of the majority 
decision, the editor showed that all of the land grant colleges of the 
nation were Illegal* So were vocational schools and other schools which 
had received federal money* The 1917 congressional act which appropriated 
$400 million a year for matching funds to build highways in the states 
was also illegal within the concept of the majority ruling* The editor 
admitted that bringing up thses examples was straining at a gnat, but he 
wanted to prove a point* he contended that "entrenched industrialism" 
destroyed the AAA* They had not spoken out earlier against It because they 
were terrified during the early part of the emergency* When things settled
Aiy
back toward normal, they became their old blustering selves again*
As Lawrence reported that the last AAA checks were being mailed, he
questioned what would happen neat* A generous blanket of snow throughout
the state indicated adequate moisture for the summer, and more acres had
been planted to wheat and com than ever before* Because of the low price
of pork, there was a small pig crop in prospect to consume the large com
crop* With this impending bountiful harvest, he asked if the Supreme Court
ruling had sentenced the farmer to the indeterminate servitude of recurring
418glutted markets and low prices* Another question was, what would the
^^Ibid*, January 7, 1936* ^l^Ibid*, January 7, 9, 1936.
A18Ibid.. February 11, 1936,
administration do in this situation?
The Department #f Agriculture was not unprepared for the adverse 
decision by the Supreme Court* Because of their preparation, they were 
able to quickly come up with a substitute measure, the SOil Conservation 
Act of 1936* The purpose of the measure m s  to pay farmers to take their 
acres out of the production of ’’soil-depleting" crops and into production 
of "soil-conserving" crops* It was not an accident that the soil-depleting 
crops included wheat, coxa, cotton, and tobacco crops which were also on 
the surplus Hat# thus, indirectly, the effects of the AAA could be achieved, 
without offending the Supreme Court# With the blessing of the Perm Bureau, 
Congress passed the bill in early march 1936*
Dexter Perkins wrote that there was possibly a sounder idea as a 
basis for this new act, but whether there was or not, the farm belt was 
satisfied with the new program* Rexford Tugwell wrote that the new measure 
was better in every way than the AAA* it was subjected to less criticism
and passed into the category of accepted change. It was no longer revolu-
419denary to espouse the cause of parity between agriculture and industry*
Thus the farmer started the transition from the first Agricultural 
Adjustment Act, which had been declared uaeeaatltutlonai, through the Soil 
Conservation Act, which gave the Government no controls over production? 
to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which provided both parity and 
control* Another phase in the never-ending struggle of the farmer became 
history* And another phase of the Roosevelt recovery program became history*
^i9Schlesinger, The Politics of Upheaval* 504, 505. Dexter Perkins, 
The mew Age of Roosevelt* 50. Tugwell, The Democratic Roosevelt, 372*
CHAPTER IX
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In a campaign speech 'in the Commonwealth Club of San francisc©
on September 23, 1932, candidate Roosevelt recalled the frontier days
of America’s history* fhey were days when individualism was the mark
of the strong man who braved the dangers which larked for the unwary.
Sat there was no more frontier area left for expansion in 1932* Ifcere
was practically no free land for an individual to homestead* Ibis placed
a limit on further expansion by the agriculturalist* As for business,
the trend was toward an ’’economic oligarchy*1 which was pressuring the
small businessman to the wall* In industry, the plant had been built|
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What remained was the task of coordinated administration*■'
the Idea of a completed American industrial plant .seems strange 
when it is discussed in. this decade, a time of continued expans id* of 
industry as we literally head for the stars. However, as themes freer 
has written, the belief that there would be no further Indus trial escpan — 
sion was i^ iared by many economists and industrialists of the depression 
period* ”Indeed,” he wrote, ”the ‘observable facts1 gave powerful sup­
port to an * overproduction* theory.” Ihere was too much of everything:
421
wheat, pigs, Idle mills, farmers, teachers, and unemployed workers.
Lawrence expressed the same views on the limitations of Nebraska 
as Roosevelt seemed to have for America. All through the Star editorials 
runs the philosophy that Nebraska was, mad would always be, an agricul­
tural State, with little or no other source of income* Ibis idea also
420 421
Rosemnsn, Papers. I, 142-734. Greer, Nhat Roosevelt
Ihought. 48.
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seems strange when considered in hindsight. In 1960 there were over twice
422as many non-agricultural workers in Nebraska as there were farm workers.
During the period covered by this thesis, apparently the only Roose­
velt domestic program which did not receive the full support of the editor 
was the shelterbelt plan to relieve drouth. In August 1934, hetwrote:
Not often does this newspaper find occasion to differ with the 
Roosevelt administration . . .  It recognizes in the president a 
matchless leader . • , [with] high purpose to be of service to 
suffering people. Zt appreciates to the fullest extent the almost 
unbearable burden which falls upon his shoulders, and it reaffirms 
again its steadfast faith in him and his purposes.
Lawrence considered that Roosevelt was the victim of bad advice regarding
the shelterbelt plan. There was not the "slightest possibility" that the
planting of trees would have any influence for years to come because trees
were not native to the arid soil of Nebraska. The program which Lawrence
offered as a substitute was the building of small dams on farms to conserve
423the water which was present or would fall during the winter.
Lawrence did not merely echo or parrot the comments and speeches 
of Roosevelt. He discussed each phase of the New Deal program, usually 
as it affected Nebraska and Nebraskans. Using all of his capabilities as 
a brilliant editorial writer, he championed the New Deal and was vigilant 
in gaining for Nebraska its fair share of benefits from the programs.
At the same time he assailed those who would attack Roosevelt's programs,
^^U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States 
196S (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), 224, 640.
423Star, August 1, 1934. Lawrence did object to the stand which the 
administration took on foreign sugar imports because it affected the Ne­
braska sugar beet grower. See supra.. Chapter VIII, Part I.
using his pen effectively to point out the error of their ways, as he saw 
it* Ranging from satire to cold logic* his editorials presented his views 
on many subjects, for he was a well-read and knowledgeable individual with 
many interests*
The common concepts expressed by the President and by the editor could 
have steamed from their common 'educational background. Although matricu­
lating half a nation apart, they pursued similar goals: a liberal arts
and a law degree. Both were influenced by the prevailing Turner “Frontier 
hypothesis.” Moreover, demographers at the time predicted a stationary
population after 1960. These factors led many to the same conclusions at 
424
that time.
If his views of the economy were “limited,” Roosevelt did have the
insight and the courage to provide title leadership and direction for a
country which s eased to have lost leader ship and direction during a time
of economic crisis. Lawrence noted his sense of awareness* his “courage
and fighting heart." As Burns has written* Hoover and Roosevelt differed
little in their policies of relief and recovery, the difference was the
image which each presented to the people. “Roosevelt* that of a man in
42Smotion, Hoover* a man stuck fast.”
When Roosevelt was rebuffed in Congress and the Courts* he continued 
to feel that his objectives were sound and that they might be realised* 
if only in a limited way. The vindication of his faith in the programs 
is indicated by their continuation, under different names: the fair Beal*
424 425-
Greer, What Roosevelt Thought. 48. Bums, Jhg Lion and the Fox,
the New Frontier, end the Greet Society* Each echoed the economic end 
social programs which, sounding rather radical when Roosevelt presented 
them, are generally accepted Inactions of Government today* the merits 
of the Roosevelt administration, seldom doubted by Lawrence in the .Star, 
will be debated pro and con for many years to come.
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